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<td>ACT</td>
<td>Act Change Transform</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Administration Police</td>
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<td>ASAL</td>
<td>Arid and Semi-Arid Lands</td>
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<td>ATPU</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Police Unit</td>
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<td>BAFOPE</td>
<td>Baghdad for Peace</td>
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<td>BRAVE</td>
<td>Building Resilience against Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>CDI</td>
<td>County Development Index</td>
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<td>CHRIPS</td>
<td>Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies</td>
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<td>CICC</td>
<td>Coast Inter-faith Council of Clerics</td>
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<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigations Department</td>
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<td>CIDP</td>
<td>County Integrated Development Plan</td>
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<td>CIPK</td>
<td>Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya</td>
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<td>CJPC</td>
<td>Catholic Justice and Peace Commission</td>
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<td>COMPS</td>
<td>Coaching and Mentorship Programme</td>
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<td>CORD</td>
<td>Coalition for Reforms and Democracy</td>
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<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>DPCS</td>
<td>District Peace Committees</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussions</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>IEBC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission</td>
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<td>KAVILOG</td>
<td>Kisumu Anti-Violence Lobby Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNBS</td>
<td>Kenya National Bureau of Standards</td>
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<td>KNHRC</td>
<td>Kenya National Human Rights Commission</td>
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<td>KPR</td>
<td>Kenya Police Reservists</td>
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<td>LAPSSET</td>
<td>Lamu Port, Southern Sudan, Ethiopia Transport Corridor Project</td>
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<td>LCPI</td>
<td>Local Capacities for Peace International</td>
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<td>LSK</td>
<td>Law Society of Kenya</td>
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<td>MCA</td>
<td>Member of County Assembly</td>
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<td>MDC</td>
<td>Mobile Data Collection</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
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<td>MRC</td>
<td>Mombasa Republican Council</td>
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<td>MUHURI</td>
<td>Muslims for Human Rights</td>
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<td>National Council of Churches of Kenya</td>
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<td>NCIC</td>
<td>National Cohesion Integration Commission</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>National Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>NLC</td>
<td>National Land Commission</td>
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<td>NRT</td>
<td>Northern Rangelands Trust</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Steering Committee for Peace Building and Conflict Management</td>
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<td>PSS</td>
<td>Peace, Security and Stabilisation Programme</td>
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<td>RFA</td>
<td>Requests for Proposals</td>
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<td>SUPKEM</td>
<td>Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
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<td>TEAM</td>
<td>Team Empowerment for Action Initiative</td>
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<td>TJRC</td>
<td>Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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Introduction

Kenya continues to face peace and security challenges that hinder economic development and which disproportionately affect areas that are already poor and marginalised. The key challenges are: Violent extremism (terrorism and radicalisation); conflicts over natural resources (extractives and land); and political conflicts (elections, ethnicity and devolution).

To contribute to addressing these challenges, Danida has established the Peace, Security and Stability (PSS) Programme 2016-2020. The main purpose of the programme is to improve the capacity and effectiveness of CSOs, government and security oversight bodies to counter violent extremism and prevent political and natural resource conflicts in Kenya. To achieve this, the programme has five objectives. To ensure:

- Capacity of local CSOs to address emerging conflicts and forestall violence is enhanced.
- Increased women engagement in leadership roles in peace and security activities.
- Collaboration between CSOs and government agencies in addressing conflicts/extremism is enhanced.
- Increased use of local information by relevant national and county government agents to develop and implement coherent national security policies, action plans and strategies.
- Strengthened evidence-based research informing policy frameworks and decision-making to promote peace and stability.

The PSS programme approach includes grant-making and capacity building to CSOs working at county and community level on issues of conflict prevention, peace, security and counter-radicalisation, provision of technical assistance to key government and security oversight agencies and research and policy support, as well as strengthening the capacity of State agencies mandated to generate data and analysis on conflict and security. Act Change Transform (Act) is the grant-making institution for the programme, while the Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS) is providing research and policy dialogue support.

Purpose of Conflict Assessment Report: This study provides data and analysis on the peace and security status in the targeted counties of Garissa, Isiolo, Kilifi, Kisumu, Kwale, Mombasa and West Pokot. It explores the following questions:

1. What forms of conflict are prevalent in these counties?
2. What is the nature of the conflicts and who are the key actors?
3. What are the key drivers of the conflicts?
4. What are the key triggers?
5. What mitigation measures and potential exist to address these forms of conflict?
6. What scenarios are envisioned in the short, mid and long term?
7. What interventions should be designed and implemented to address these conflicts?

This study aims to inform initial programming such as issuance of Requests for Proposals (RFAs), for the PSS programme, and provides information on the different CSOs and other actors undertaking peace and security work in the target counties. It provides information that may be used to ensure the programme’s interventions are responsive to identified conflict drivers and dynamics, and builds on existing mitigation measures and potential in the target counties. It also provides insights into CSO-government interfaces, as well as the gender dynamics of conflict in the target counties. It concludes with recommendations and options for peace and security programming in the target counties.
Executive Summary

Introduction

The main purpose of the Danida Peace, Security and Stability (PSS) programme, 2016-2020, is to improve the capacity and effectiveness of CSOs, government and security oversight bodies to counter violent extremism, and prevent political and natural resource conflicts in Kenya. The programme’s approach includes grant-making and capacity building to CSOs working at county and community level on issues of conflict prevention, peace, security and counter-radicalisation, provision of technical assistance to key government and security oversight agencies and research and policy support, as well as strengthening the capacity of State agencies mandated to generate data and analysis on conflict and security.

This study provides data and analysis on the peace and security status in the targeted counties of Garissa, Isiolo, Kilifi, Kisumu, Kwale, Mombasa and West Pokot, and information programming. It explores the following questions:

1. What forms of conflict are prevalent in these counties?
2. What is the nature of the conflicts and who are the key actors?
3. What are the key drivers of the conflicts?
4. What are the key triggers?
5. What mitigation measures and potential exist to address these forms of conflict?
6. What scenarios are envisioned in the short, mid and long term?
7. What interventions should be designed and implemented to address these conflicts?

Methodology

The study adopted a mixed methods approach, including the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data. It began with a review of 102 documents, including programme documentation and reports by official agencies, CSOs, research institutions and scholars. The desk review established what is known and not known about the (a) peace and security dynamics in the targeted counties; (b) intervening institutions, including CSOs, government agencies and other stakeholders; (c) effectiveness of CSOs working on peace and security in the targeted counties; (d) the gendered dimensions of peace and security.

Some 130 key informant interviews were conducted with individuals from relevant CSOs, faith-based groups, county and national government agencies and with security and conflict experts, among other categories of informants in the target counties. An average of four FGDs were held in each of the target counties and in total, 211 people participated. The household survey on public perceptions on peace and security was undertaken by 77 enumerators in the seven counties between July 7 and July 13, 2016. Some 1,050 were polled - 150 per county -- allowing for a margin of error of +/-8% at 95% confidence level.

Data analysis was undertaken using qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques. Qualitative included convergence-divergence analysis, comparisons and theme analysis. Quantitative included descriptive statistical analysis of data from the household survey.

A validation workshop was convened bringing together experts as well as participants in the research to undertake a critique of the draft report. These critiques were incorporated in the final report.

Limitations and Mitigation Measures:

Since peace and security are complex and sensitive issues in Kenya, there tends to be a likelihood of getting inaccurate or unreliable information from respondents. While this limitation could not be completely overcome, the study attempted to mitigate it by using good sample size and multiple data collection methods to increase the odds of getting accurate information. In addition, heavy rains and vast distances in West Pokot affected the administration of the household survey in some parts of the county. The initial target sample of 150 respondents was reduced to 110.

Political Conflicts

This study finds that politically-instigated ethnic and communal violence continues to affect the counties of Garissa, Isiolo, Kisumu, Kilifi and to a lesser extent, Kwale. In Garissa, ethnic violence has become more organised and involves both “guns for hire” and standing private militias answering to local politicians. In the coastal counties, for instance, there is an unchallenged political narrative that control of the region’s politics and economy belongs to the so-called indigenous inhabitants. The so-called outsiders are not accepted as citizens and are, therefore, treated as outsiders. This narrative is played up during times of heightened political activity, particularly election seasons, and has led to violence in the past. In Kilifi, there has also been ethnic violence between the so-called indigenous communities.

In Kisumu, there is violence between members of Luo and Kalenjin communities living near the Kisumu-Nandi county
boundary, and between Luo and Luhyia communities at the Kisumu-Vihiga county boundary over land disputes. Clashes along the Kisumu-Nandi boundary have flared on and off since the early 1990s, with the most recent occurring in June 2016.

Young men are the perpetrators of violence in most cases. Politicians, on the other hand, are directly involved in inciting, mobilising fighters, planning and funding ethnic and clan-based violence. Women and children, and to a lesser extent the elderly, are the most affected. But in places such as Garissa and Isiolo, women have also been known to incite and support men to engage in communal violence.

Since the introduction of devolution in March 2013, there has been a trend of domination of county governments, and the resources they control, by dominant ethnic groups and clans, to the exclusion of smaller groups. Perceptions among communities of exclusion from political offices and development initiatives have created a siege mentality within communities and clans in various counties including Garissa, Isiolo, Kilifi, Kisumu and Kwale. Ethnic communities place high stakes in ensuring a political representative from their community is elected to office in the belief that access to resources, development initiatives and improved services requires ‘one of their own’ to be in office. In Isiolo, for instance, there is a widespread perception that the governor’s Borana community unfairly dominates the county executive positions. Members of other communities in the county have, therefore, been locked out of decision-making processes, employment, tenders and bursary opportunities. In Kisumu, clan conflicts are also affecting the running of the county government. While there are three main clans -- the Kajulu, Kano and Nyakach, Kano is perceived to be unfairly dominating the county government, and therefore, resource allocation decisions. Factions have emerged in the county government, which led to the grounding of its business in 2015 following the suspension of the County Assembly Speaker.

Over the past three years, gangs believed to be mobilised by politicians have emerged or continued to operate in Kisumu, Kwale and Mombasa. Notable gangs in Kisumu are China Squad, which is reportedly affiliated to the Jubilee Party, while the American Marines is associated with the opposition CORD. In Mombasa, several gangs, with juveniles in their ranks, are also in operation.

They include Wakali Kwanza, Wakali Wao, Spanish Spatter, Gaza, ‘Army’, ‘Navy’ and ‘Air Force’. The prominent gangs in Kwale are the militant wing of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). Moreover, there are reports of female gang members in Kwale and Mombasa.

These gangs are reportedly paid by politicians, but also extort money from them. They also reportedly offer ‘security’ services to political actors and parties. Many of these gangs are involved in crimes such as murders, violent robbery, theft and sexual violence, and target homes, businesses and social events such as weddings and funerals. Some of them also run their own businesses, as in the case of China Squad and American Marines in Kisumu. Youth and juveniles who form these gangs tend to be from poor backgrounds, and others are destitute or homeless.

While efforts have been made by security actors to crack down the gangs, there are reports that they are still in operation, particularly in Kisumu, Kwale and Mombasa.

1.

![Public Perceptions on Political Conflicts in the Seven Target Counties](image-url)

**Figure 1: Public perceptions on prevalence of political conflicts in the seven target counties**
Key Drivers of Political Conflicts

Historically, the planners and perpetrators of ethnic violence in Kenya have done so with impunity. Since early 1990s, when ethnic violence became a serious concern, there have been few arrests or prosecutions. Recommendations for action against planners and perpetrators by several official inquiries, including the 2009 Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence, have largely been ignored by criminal justice institutions. This can be explained by the fact that powerful national leaders have themselves been implicated in ethnic violence and have used their influence over these institutions to block prosecutions.

Unchecked divisive national and local-level political rhetoric seems to have deepened perceptions of exclusion and marginalisation, and contributed to promote ethnic chauvinism and tensions in many parts of the country. Moreover, political competition during party nominations and elections such as during the 2013 electioneering period seems to have led some politicians in Kisumu, Mombasa and Kwale to form gangs to intimidate their opponents.

Low levels of development, weak local economies and poor infrastructure have greatly reduced the availability of opportunities for the youth, making them vulnerable to recruitment into gangs. Widespread poverty alongside great opulence in places like Mombasa seems to have created resentment and a sense of exclusion and inequality. These kinds of conditions make young people more vulnerable to recruitment into gangs and crime.

High rates of truancy among young people, coupled with drug and alcohol abuse, are also believed to be responsible for the growth of juvenile gangs. Gangs are also motivated by the need to become powerful economic actors, as evidenced by the efforts of some of them in Kisumu to run legitimate businesses such as shops.

The perceived exclusivist politics of some governors in places such as Isiolo and Kisumu reflect Kenya’s historical and political culture of patrimonialism. This culture endures and has cemented a misplaced sense of entitlement among populous and economically powerful communities. While the shift to devolution sought partly to dismantle this culture by enhancing access to public resources and promoting a stronger sense of nationhood, politics continues to be organised along ethnicity. In turn, dominant communities tend to be driven to gain control and use of political power to their own advantage. This trend is evident at the national level and has become much more marked at the county level. The example of ethnic chauvinism that has been set by some governors and their administrations seems to have created a siege mentality among those communities that feel excluded from power. There is a growing sense among diverse communities in counties, especially as the 2017 election approaches, that politics is a winner-takes-all competition. Losing amounts to exclusion from decision-making and access to resources, such as county jobs and tenders.

Key Triggers of Political Conflicts

The main trigger of ethnic violence is incitement by politicians either directly or through their proxies and agents, which may take place during public rallies or private meetings. Subtly spoken messages, or sometimes openly inciteful speech that identifies members of an ethnic community as ‘the problem’ or as undeserving of leadership are usually used to whip up ethnic sentiments against other groups and trigger violence and conflict.

Future Scenarios

• In the run-up to the August 2017 elections, it is likely that there will be heightened and even fierce competition for elective posts in all the seven target counties;
• Given the high stakes in gaining control of the counties’ substantial budgets and resources, there is the risk that without resolute preventive action from the security agencies, politicians, in their quest to gain power, may resort to divisive tactics and intimidation during campaigns. Ethnically-instigated violence as a result of such politics cannot therefore be ruled.
• Even if violence does not occur, it is likely that this form of politics will influence many voters to elect their leaders on the basis of ethnicity, paying little attention to development pledges. The risk here is that voters may end up electing leaders who may not have any substantive programmes for their counties’ development needs. Since they will have been elected on the basis of their ethnicity, such leaders will likely perpetuate exclusivist politics, continuing to place peace and security at risk.
• If county border disputes are not addressed by the concerned devolved units with the support of the national government, they are also likely to be politicised in the 2017 election season and thereafter, and could result in new outbreaks of violence. In particular, this could be a problem in Isiolo and Kisumu.
• More importantly, if the criminal justice system continues to fail to act against the planners and perpetrators of ethnic conflict, they will likely be emboldened to engage in violence in future.
• Without resolute government action to root out and
prosecute gangs in Kisumu, Kwale and Mombasa, there is the likelihood that these gangs could be mobilised by some politicians in the run up to the elections to create instability with the aim of corruptly influencing electoral outcomes.

- In the long term, county governments and relevant national agencies will need to make significant investments, creating economic opportunities for youth at risk of joining/forming gangs. Where this is not acknowledged and done, there is the likelihood that many youth leaving school will have few prospects of succeeding, and may turn to gangs and other illegal activities.

**Violent Extremism**

This study established that radicalisation and violent extremism are serious challenges in Garissa, Isiolo, Kilifi, Kwale and Mombasa. In the past three years, there have been many terrorist attacks in Garissa, Kilifi, Kwale and Mombasa. These attacks have resulted in deaths, maiming of people and destruction of property. According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), 34 per cent of Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya have occurred in Garissa, making it the most targeted region along with Nairobi. In Kilifi, Kwale and Mombasa, radicalised youth have been accused of attacking and destroying government installations and assets, places with high civilian populations and some tourist sites.

Muslim clerics and madrassa teachers are said to have been playing a key role in radicalising youth by promoting false interpretations of the role of violence in religion. Part of the strategy of Al-Shabaab in particular, has been to attack Christians in these counties with the aim of creating divisions between them and Muslims in the hope of sparking a religious conflict. Recruitment of young men into extremist movements, particularly Al-Shabaab, has been taking place in all of the devolved units over the past three years. The recruited youth are believed to be used to commit acts of terror in other parts of the country or in Somalia. Most recently, young women have been targeted by recruiters in Garissa, Kilifi and Mombasa, and there are also reports that older women are being hired as recruiters in Kilifi and Mombasa.

There have been cases of intimidation of individuals or families, and even killings of village elders, Nyumba Kumi representatives (known as Nyumba Kumi Balozis) and youth who have abandoned Al-Shabaab and returned home. Although the incidents are not common, they have had the effect of causing fear and silencing communities.

![Figure 2: Public perceptions on prevalence of radicalisation and violent extremism in the seven target counties](image-url)
Figure 3: Locations of Al-Shabaab violence by former provinces of Kenya 2012 – July 2015
Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset, “Country Report: Kenya” (December 2013)
Key Drivers of Violent Extremism

A key driver of violent extremism in the target counties is poor access to education, employment and other opportunities to earn an income. As a result, the incentive of monetary rewards is believed to have attracted many youth to extremist causes. Perceptions of long-standing regional/communal grievances over land and other resources have also been used to lure youth.

Most parents, teachers and other care-givers are generally unaware about how to identify and deal with youths who may be getting involved in extremist movements. Few parents are aware of the online content their children are accessing. In particular, the use of social media by young people exposes them to exploitation by terrorist recruiters, who propound false ideas about religion and violence, and prey on fears and concerns about issues such as discrimination, exclusion and unemployment.

Although it has been recently adopted, Kenya has for long lacked a comprehensive and official counter-violent extremism (CVE) policy. Consequently, there has been no anchor and framework for the diverse efforts of various actors, including security agencies, civil society groups and others who are rolling out CVE-related initiatives.

The Anti-Terrorism Police Unit’s (ATPU) high-handedness also contributes to the persistence of radicalisation. ATPU officers reportedly harass, brutalise and extort money from innocent people, mainly Muslims. These activities have angered many Muslims, and it is believed that extremist recruiters prey on these frustrations to draw impressionable young people to their causes.

Future Scenarios

1. The adoption of the National CVE Policy is a good development. If resources are made available for its implementation, and there is robust collaboration between State and non-State actors, particularly in prevention as envisioned in the policy, then progress will likely be made.

2. The whereabouts of many young men who have been reportedly lured into extremist movements remain unknown. Consequently, there is apprehension that they could return undetected to carry out terrorist attacks in different parts of the country.

3. Parents, teachers and other care-givers remain unaware about the signs of radicalisation among the youth. Therefore, it is possible that the extent
of radicalisation is greater than is known or thought. In these circumstances, the threat of future terrorist violence should not be underestimated.

4. So far, there has been no systematic effort by the national or county governments to address the feeling of discrimination, exclusion and lack of opportunities among young people from some minority communities. This puts more youth at the risk of embracing extremist causes, and possibly carrying out terrorist violence.

5. Opportunities for the youth are generally limited, and many continue to feel marginalised and frustrated. If this situation persists, extremist groups will likely recruit many more young people to their causes with promises of financial rewards, power and other promises.

6. Security personnel continue to use excessive measures to address radicalisation and violent extremism. This is believed to increase anger and frustration among many people, and some may join extremist causes to avenge the brutality they have been subjected to.

**Resource-Based Conflicts**

Pastoralism is the main way of life for many people in the counties of Garissa, Isiolo, Kilifi and West Pokot. Many parts of these counties are classified as arid/semi-arid lands (ASALs), and therefore conflicts among pastoralists over water and pasture are both common and persistent. Population increase, environmental degradation and restricted access to pasture heighten tensions between communities living in these areas. This sometimes results in violence. Cattle raids are often a cover or manifestation of conflict over land, and have become increasingly commercialised and politicised over the past two decades or so.

Over the same period, local communities, particularly pastoralists, have been effectively displaced from communal lands which they have occupied and used for generations. They are denied access to lands which were historically categorised as trust lands, but which have now been purchased by individuals for business and speculative purposes. Most of the lands in question have been allocated for individual ownership, including conservancy owners.

In West Pokot, for instance, communal conflict occurs at the county boundaries, where the Pokot border the Turkana, the Marakwet and the Karamajong (Uganda). These conflicts are also related to competition over pasture and water for livestock especially during the dry season. In Kilifi and Kisumu, there is also natural resource-based conflict over land ownership, particularly disputes over ownership of communal trust lands among different communities. There is also a problem of landlessness with many squatters perceived to have taken over private parcels of land.

Herders, mainly morans or youth, are typically the perpetrators of violence in conflicts over water and pasture, which have led to deaths, maiming of people, loss of animals and destruction of property. Community elders have been accused of mobilising them, assisting them with planning and providing weapons and other resources required to carry out attacks. Political actors are thought to fuel these resource-based conflicts. Moreover, ownership of illegal firearms by pastoralists has worsened the conflicts.

In Garissa, Isiolo and West Pokot, women are also accused of putting pressure on their husbands and sons to carry out revenge raids to protect the honour of their homes and communities. However, women and children are particularly vulnerable during raids, which sometimes involve sexual violence.
Key Drivers of Resource-based Conflicts

Competition for scarce resources and access to land is a driver of conflict between communities. Unresolved disputes make the conflicts flare up periodically, particularly during dry seasons when grazing land is scarce. Pastoralists and farming communities are yet to reach long-term solutions and therefore remain locked in cyclical conflicts. Agreements such as the Modagashe Declaration that guide resource-sharing among pastoralists are not viewed as legitimate and fair by some local communities. There is the view that such agreements are biased towards dominant groups, and offer little benefit to the others.

Failure to conclusively adjudicate and allocate land after colonialism to the communities in the coastal region has turned many into squatters on their ancestral lands. Unlawful evictions and dispossession of poorer communities due to the failure of land adjudication as well as disgruntlement over ownership of large tracts of land in the Coast by non-indigenous people, including foreigners, has allowed anger to simmer and occasionally erupt in conflicts between squatters and land owners. In addition, poor implementation of land management systems has meant that many parcels of land have been illegally allocated to individuals and groups and some communities have been rendered squatters on their ancestral lands. The delay and failure to adequately adjudicate land has also meant that families will illegally take over parcels of land as squatters even where the land was legally allocated to individuals.

Political competition and high stakes in electoral outcomes also drive conflict between communities, as happens in border regions. While the boundaries remain disputed, the flare-up of conflict often follows the patterns of electoral periods. In some counties such as Garissa and Isiolo, pastoralist communities are compelled to acquire arms to defend themselves from potential attacks because the presence of State security apparatuses in the regions tends to be weak. The many illegal arms have in effect created fertile conditions for natural resource-based conflicts to persist.

While there have been many well-intentioned official attempts, including disarmament of communities, to address the problem of cattle rustling, still, there is no coherent policy to guide and coordinate the efforts of the relevant actors. In the absence of a clear policy, the efforts are episodic and entail mainly security-oriented measures. Powerful individuals thought to be involved in cattle rustling are seldom arrested or prosecuted, and appear to enjoy impunity.

Cattle rustling has become an attractive profit-making venture that has attracted criminal syndicates comprising powerful business actors and politicians. Owing to the poorly regulated livestock market in Kenya, stolen animals are not easy to track and end up in areas such as Nairobi where there is high demand.

Other key informants also suggest that unemployment and lack of opportunities for youths in Garissa, Isiolo, Kisumu and West Pokot has driven many to cattle rustling. Many young people are disillusioned and do not see any other feasible means of earning a living other than turning to this practice. The need to provide for basic needs for themselves and their families seems to outweigh the risk of death, injury or arrest.

Local elders encourage young men to engage in cattle rustling because they themselves receive the lion’s share of the spoils. Cattle also form a patronage resource for elders. When livestock is stolen, elders not only get to keep some, but also distribute the rest to community members, increasing their power and influence. Politicians have also been accused of providing resources to local communities to support cattle rustling so as to consolidate the support they enjoy, particularly during election seasons.

New infrastructure projects have heightened interest, even among pastoralists, on the centrality and value of land in places like Isiolo. Some of this land was not titled but has been sold to individuals. Given that various key national projects are underway, people are reportedly grabbing land in various parts of the county for speculative purposes. Some of the lands that have allegedly been grabbed are community owned and are used by locals for grazing. Disputes over them could lead to conflict between the grabbers and local communities.

Key Triggers of Resource-based conflicts

As far as conflicts among pastoralists are concerned, the main trigger is drought. Since pastoralists depend on rains for water and pasture, drought causes them to wander farther into areas occupied by other communities in search of water and pasture for their animals. Without clear sharing agreements, such migrations are seen as forms of trespass and are often met with violence. This is the scenario in Garissa, Isiolo, Kisumu and West Pokot.

The unchecked sale of trust lands in places like Isiolo has resulted in the displacement of hundreds of families, causing anger and frustration among the affected communities. With few options to build their homesteads, farm or graze their animals, many people have tended to “trespass” into these now privately held lands to fend for themselves and their families, setting the stage for conflict with the new owners.
Cattle raids in places like Isiolo and Kisumu are usually carried out in retaliation to previous attacks. A cycle of attacks and counter-attacks is then set in motion. These cycles continue for extended periods because attackers often go unpunished.

**Future Scenarios**

- Unchecked grabbing of land for speculative purposes has the potential to create new conflict between grabbers, authorities and local communities.
- As the 2017 general election nears, resource-based conflicts will likely be politicised by some politicians. District Peace Committees (DPCs) would be useful in deterring such politicians and providing conflict early warning information, but they are largely dormant because of lack of resources. The absence of active DPCs will make it challenging to detect conflicts early enough and deter violence.
- In the medium-term, the inability of the national and county governments to build confidence in resource-sharing agreements could lead to a breakdown of crucial conflict prevention and management mechanisms. The absence of such agreements could lead to increased disputes, and even violence, between communities over natural resources.
- The continued climate change shocks and stresses make pastoralism a perilous form of livelihood, and makes conflict over resources such as water and pasture an ever present threat in the short to the long term.
- In the long term, the continued reliance of communities on subsistence-type livelihoods will continue to exert pressure on scarce natural resources, particularly because populations are growing. These trends, if left unaddressed, will likely generate more tension and violent conflicts in the years ahead.
- As the 2017 general election nears, political actors are likely to stoke inter-ethnic rivalries. If this leads to open conflict, one of the manifestations of violence that may be seen is cattle rustling. Should this occur, then the usual cycle of attacks and counter-attacks can be expected to recur.
- The place of councils of elder is steadily being eroded. While the younger generation is still respectful of the institution, that respect is waning with every successive generation. The councils of elders are also increasingly being seen as less neutral, especially when it comes to politics. The decline of this structure will eventually deny counties a critical mitigation potential and potentially open up room for conflict and instability.
- Tension between individual land owners and squatters over contested lands is likely to escalate and become more complex as poverty and population pressure render more people landless. At the same time, for some individuals, squatting on disputed land will become more about quick money rather than a genuine assertion of rights, making the solutions to the genuine problems more difficult. Where legal titles to land remain problematic, rising levels of frustration are likely to result in further violence.

**Mitigation Measures and Potential**

One major challenge to the effectiveness of the national level actors on peace and conflict is the limited resources available to undertake and deliver on their mandate. Overall, most of the activities on peace building are supported by donor agencies rather than the State. In the era of declining donor funding, many of the agencies and actors have expressed apprehension that they may not succeed in delivering on their mandate as anticipated.

At any rate, the national peace infrastructure has for long been built around District Peace Committees with a national level coordination by the National Secretariat for Conflict Management and Peace Building (NSC). The NSC is currently hosted within the Ministry of the Interior. In the past, the NSC has coordinated the Uwiano Platform on Peace, an ad hoc network of State and non-State actors that is usually activated around general elections in Kenya and is supported by UNDP. District Peace Committees remain with varying levels of effectiveness at the moment. Devolution has also introduced a new dynamic in local governance and the power and influence previously wielded by the District Commissioner under whom peace committees operated, has significantly waned. Indications are that District Peace Committees (now County Peace Committees) remain active in less than half of the counties. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) continues to support the revival of these committees in various counties.

At the national level, the NCIC is one of the key pillars in peace building. NCIC was established in 2009 following the 2008 post-election-violence and has since been at the forefront in addressing conflicts in various parts of the country. It has also monitoring potential flashpoints and triggers for violence. The commission closely monitors utterances by political leaders as it has identified these as triggers of political and ethnic conflict. It is also involved in promoting community reconciliation in all parts of the country. NCIC has also developed a curriculum for use in
peace building by any interested actor. While the NCIC is an independent commission established by an Act of Parliament, there is also the Department of Cohesion, yet another national level pillar on peace building and conflict management. The Department of Cohesion has the mandate and responsibility for policy formulation and coordination. Together with the NCIC, the department has supported the work of the National Elders Council that is supposed to coordinate all councils of elders in the country. This is in recognition that elders are key in conflict resolution in many regions. However, the relationship between the NCIC and the department are not very cordial, which often poses challenges to their effective cooperation.

Parliament has also put in place a departmental committee with a mandate on cohesion and peace known as the Parliamentary Committee on Cohesion, which is actually a joint committee of the National Assembly and the Senate. The committee has conducted field visits jointly with the NCIC and remains an important ally to the commission, to which it submits its occasional and annual reports. In addition to these actors, the presidency has also appointed two presidential advisors on cohesion. The work of these advisors often crosses into and complements that of actors such as NCIC. The presidential advisors have, however, focused mostly on violent extremism.

Figure 6: Public perceptions on effectiveness of government institutions in addressing conflict and insecurity the seven target counties
The National Police Service (both the Administration Police and the Kenya Police) are also key actors in peace, security and conflict. Under the law, the police have both a preventive role and an enforcement mandate. Public and policy opinion on police role in conflict, violence and security is however mixed. Whereas the police have a role in stopping inter-ethnic conflicts as well as other forms of violence, the many public complaints of police complicity and involvement in some of these incidents has taken a toll on the public’s confidence in the institution. Where it is not policy complicity, the public has often complained of the ineffectiveness of the police in preventing and addressing conflicts and violence. Even so, it is of interest that the household survey shows that there is considerable public confidence in the effectiveness of the police (see figure 18 above), despite the fact that there is a broad perception among people in Kisumu that the police are biased and brutal towards locals. The implication of this finding is that perceptions of police bias and abuse do not necessarily translate into perceptions that the police are also ineffective, as might have been expected. This finding, therefore, suggests that there is a public perception that police efforts are important in addressing conflict and insecurity despite their bias and alleged excesses. Consequently, there is an argument to be made that they need to be integrated in future peace and security programmes though attention must also be paid to their weakness.

Many of the State actors working on peace and conflict have close collaborations with civil society groups. The Uwiano Platform for instance brings together civil society actors, State agencies and even inter-governmental agencies like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). For groups such as the NCIC, partnership with civil society as well as faith-based groups is largely unproblematic. Even more than the NCIC, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) has a close working relationship with civil society groups in various parts of the country. The National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC) has also worked closely with civil society groups particularly in its campaign on gender-based violence. However, the police-civil society partnership is not that strong. Although the community-police partnership is a requirement for policing under the current Constitution, police relationship with civil society groups remains troubled in most parts.

Several other actors at the national level, such as the NGEC and KNCHR, have mandates and responsibilities that have implications and contribute to peace and security. KNCHR has paid significant attention to insecurity particularly in the Rift Valley as well as the question of extremist violence with a specific interest on the conduct of security actors such as the police. Given its accountability approach, KNCHR is not a central actor in peace building and conflict prevention and mitigation except in so far as it has framed insecurity as a human rights issue and underscored the responsibility of State agencies in addressing violations associated with conflicts, insecurity and violence. The NGEC, on its part, has paid attention to the challenge of reduction of gender-based violence and has developed a strategy to that effect. This study has found that most effective conflict mitigation potentials are those operating directly on the ground. Chiefs and their assistants, as well as Nyumba Kumi committees, operate at the grassroots level and undertake interventions that affect people directly. They are viewed as legitimate and have context-specific solutions to local conflict and security challenges. The implication is that significant investment should be focused on supporting and collaborating with these institutions/mechanisms, particular chiefs and their assistants as well as village elders and Nyumba Kumi committees which collaborate with them.

There is strong civil society infrastructure on the ground in all the seven target counties for peace and conflict work. Many of these groups are involved in peace dialogue, CVE, civic education, conflict early warning work, among other related initiatives. Overall, these organisations have substantial capacities and potential. Many of them are working in partnerships with State agencies, making their interventions more effective, far-reaching and sustainable. However, they lack sufficient funding to be sustainable in the long-term. The measures they are implementing and their potential are discussed in detail under each section of this report.

**Recommendations for PSS Programme Interventions**

On the basis of the findings and analysis in this report, it is recommended that the PSS programme should consider supporting civil society actors to design, implement and scale up the following interventions to address the different peace and security concerns affecting the seven target counties. The forms of intervention include peace dialogue; policy change, advocacy, capacity strengthening, civic education and outreach as well as research and monitoring. (The detailed recommendations are found in the final section of this report).

**Political conflicts**

- Develop bottom-up reconciliation processes to bring communities together to foster cohesion through settlement of historical grievances;
- Establish partnerships with NCIC and county governments to develop and undertake peace programmes aimed at gauging community needs and views on solutions for resolving existing boundary conflicts;
- Engage informal and formal networks of locals, ethnic leaders, internally displaced persons and neutral spaces such as schools and colleges to promote peace processes;
• Scale up existing peace and conflict prevention programmes that are already working well;
• Support strengthening of sub-county peace forums to use effective technologies in their conflict early warning work;
• Strengthen the capacity of the media to set the agenda at the local level and improve coverage of public policy issues;
• Undertake civic education on violence in the run up to the 2017 general election. Focus areas should include peace, security, devolution and electoral governance and justice. County governments, ward representatives, county commissioners, local elders and opinion leaders should be included;
• Partner with and support county and national government agencies to conduct comprehensive conflict monitoring either through research studies or collaborating with credible researchers and institutions with knowledge and capacity to understand an in-depth analysis of inter-ethnic conflict, causes and drivers of the conflicts with the aim of managing the boundary conflict;
• Partner with and support community leaders to develop their own initiatives to broaden discussions on inter-clan divisions within the counties and means for their peaceful resolution;
• Lobby county governments to strengthen staff recruitment procedures to ensure fairness and equality. This will address nepotism and corruption in the employment process
• Strengthen capacities to reach out to political and religious leaders to develop peace messages grounded in local customs and integrate them into community debates;
• Strengthen capacity of civil society actors to hold politicians accountable for policy pledges;
• Strengthen the capacity of the media to set the agenda at local level, and improve coverage of public policy issues at county level;
• Facilitate public discussion of conflict issues and dynamics in conflict-affected areas to generate ideas on how to address the situation and to mobilise creative and constructive responses;
• Undertake advocacy to ensure more vulnerable children/young people receive bursaries from county and national governments;
• In partnership with official agencies, design and implement youth empowerment and life-skills training programmes to assist youth at risk of joining gangs;
• Strengthen capacity of Nyumba Kumi committees and local elders to monitor school attendance and ensure children are not idle and at risk of recruitment into gangs;
• Scale up interventions on creating awareness about youth recruitment into gangs among parents and school authorities;
• Research to build dossiers that may be used to prosecute political or other influential actors involved in supporting and mobilising gangs;
• Partner with the national and county government structures to develop programmes/policies aimed at collecting data and generating analysis on how gangs develop, their dynamics and options for intervention;

**Violent extremism**

• Lobby and partner with county governments to contextualise the National CVE Policy to meet the unique situations faced in each county;
• Create linkages with county governments and development organisations to design programmes that provide alternative livelihood options for youths at risk of being radicalised;
• Facilitate Muslim-driven madrassa and mosque reforms, which should entail review and approval of the curriculum taught. Mosque vetting committees need to be strengthened in areas where they exist and put in place where they are absent;
• Strengthen capacities of civil society actors to identify and carry out outreach and other enabling activities with groups at risk of recruitment. This may include school dropouts and returnees;
• Strengthen and scale up women’s initiatives on countering radicalisation at the family level, including holding women’s education discussions and neighbourhood meetings among others to provide family support and create the first level of defence against radicalisation of youth;
• Create awareness among relevant stakeholders on the provisions of the National CVE Policy and their roles in its implementation;
• Support interfaith efforts through enabling use of diverse approaches to the community outreach and counter-radicalisation work, including use of technology and inclusion of younger people in the leadership structures;
- Develop and scale up interventions on creating awareness about the signs of radicalisation and violent extremism among parents and school authorities;
- Create awareness on the safe use of social media;
- Convene regular community engagements with the National Police Service that can contribute to changing their practices in terms of profiling Muslims;
- Monitor and design responses to extremist messaging online;
- Research and document good CVE practices with a view to having them scaled up. This should complement research on the extent of extremist messaging online and the approaches and capacities to carry out counter-messaging;
- Build the capacity of local civil society actors to conduct their own primary research on the push and pull factors in violent extremism;
- Undertake studies to develop briefs on the operation, effectiveness and potential of Nyumba Kumi committees and village elders in contributing effectively to countering radicalisation at the preventive stage;

**Resource-based conflicts**

- Partner with county commissioners, devolved governments, NCIC, political leaders, and elders to jointly review and reform existing resource-sharing agreements in order to build in mechanisms that will foster greater community trust and acceptance;
- Acquire resources that can be used to reactivate dormant DPCs. This could include providing resources for meetings, mobility, communication, operation of early warning systems and awareness creation;
- Scale up successful interventions such as the work of the Tecla Lorupe Foundation which has inter-communal peace building sports activities;
- Lobby and partner with devolved governments, county commissioners, the National Police Service, KNCHR and elders to carry out long-term, humane and voluntary disarmament. These exercises must be accompanied by an increase in deployment of security personnel so as to prevent people from taking the law into their own hands;
- Partner with county and national government agencies to strengthen customary institutions and conflict resolution mechanisms, including councils of elders and women groups;

- Strengthen capacities of civil society actors working on conflict and on land rights to understand the current land management and governance regime, including the various actors and processes involved in addressing current and historical land challenges;
- Strengthen capacities of local communities to better engage in land management;
- Adopt use of effective technologies, such as SMS-based conflict warning systems, in their conflict early warning work;
- Partner with county governments, conservancies and NGOs to carry out civic education on conservancies and how they affect pastoral lifestyles;
- Carry out research and mount advocacy actions for the return of all communal/trust land that has been grabbed for speculative purposes or otherwise irregularly acquired;
- Partner with research institutions to research and generate data and analysis that can inform national and county government policy formulation aimed at modernising local economies to enable more people to move away from subsistence livelihoods;
- Research on the impact of technologies such as SMS-based conflict warning systems. This should be done with a view to improving their effectiveness, uptake and scaling up their use;
- Partner with county commissioners, devolved governments, elders and other stakeholders to initiate processes that will develop county-focused policies/programmes aimed at comprehensively addressing cattle rustling;
- Create linkages with local authorities and development organisations to design programmes that provide alternative livelihood options for youth involved in, or are at risk of being involved in cattle rustling;
- Partner with county and national government agencies to initiate consultative processes that lead to the formulation of policy options for providing alternative livelihood strategies to achieve food security and limit dependence on livestock;
- Lobby county governments to strengthen regulations for tracking the movement of animals out of counties so as to counter syndicates involved in animal theft;
- Undertake advocacy aimed at ensuring that the planners and funders of cattle raids, including politicians, are arrested and prosecuted;
- Lobby for better land administration, particularly the passage and implementation of the pending Community Land Bill;
Cross-cutting recommendations:

- It is clear from this study that conflict in the seven target counties is highly gendered. Women and men participate in unique ways, are affected differently and have unique capacities for engaging in mitigation. Therefore, RFAs for grant funding from the PSS programme should require grantees to demonstrate this understating in their specific contexts and design projects that are sensitive to this gendered nature of conflict.

- In order to receive PSS programme funding, prospective grantees should demonstrate that their peace and security interventions will to the greatest extent possible engage chiefs, assistant chiefs, Nyumba Kumi committees, DPCs and local community security structures. It is clear from this study that these structures are widely trusted and seen as legitimate in all the seven target counties. They operate at the grassroots level and have intimate knowledge of local peace and security challenges, and the capacity to formulate context-specific solutions.

- The PSS programme’s research component should establish a conflict and security observatory that tracks and generates periodic reports (monthly, quarterly and annually – all shared online) on the peace and security context in the seven target counties. This observatory would address the gaps in availability of data on peace and security trends in the target counties which this study found. It would also provide a reference check for the PSS programme to allow it to adapt to changing trends and also provide grantees with better insights and a more global outlook on peace and security issues that go beyond the issues they face in their specific counties.

Methodology

Design of Study

Desk Review: The development of this study began with the collection and review of literature and information on the PSS programme and peace and security in the seven target counties. A total of 102 documents, including programme documentation, reports by official agencies, CSOs, research institutes and scholars, were reviewed. The desk review established what is known and not known about the (a) peace and security dynamics in the targeted counties; (b) intervening institutions including CSOs, government agencies and other stakeholders; (c) effectiveness of CSOs working on peace and security in the targeted counties; (d) the gendered dimensions of peace and security. In addition, the review sought to establish the different methodological approaches that have been used to research these issues so as to ensure that the study’s approach added value.

Data Collection

Data collection for both the conflict assessment and baseline survey of this study was conducted concurrently. The study adopted a mixed methods approach, including the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data. The use of mixed methods has allowed for triangulation of data, thus enabling the CHRIPs team to ensure that findings and analysis are credible, reliable and accurate.

Prior to beginning field work, CHRIPs made an application for a research permit from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation, which was approved in late June 2016.

Development of data collection tools: The desk review enabled the CHRIPs team to develop broad research questions for the study. These questions emerged from the analysis of the relevant issues in all available sources, as well as gaps in the available data. Some of these research questions applied to all the target counties, while others applied to specific ones. Thereafter, several data collection tools with detailed questions were developed. They included separate questionnaires for carrying out key informant interviews on government officials, civil society actors and other local actors with experience and insights on issues of peace and security in the different counties as well as a questionnaire for the household survey and guides for focus group discussions (FGDs). All the data collection tools factored in the cross-cutting issue of gender.

Key Informant Interviews: Key informant interviews were used to collect data on the conflict dynamics in the seven counties and to establish baseline values for the three outcome indicators for the PSS programme. Between June 28 and July 15, 2016, the CHRIPs research team conducted interviews with individuals from relevant CSOs, faith-based groups, county and national government agencies, security and conflict experts among other categories of informants in the seven counties. Some follow-up interviews were conducted by phone after the team returned from the field. A total of 130 key informant interviews were conducted in the seven target counties and were spread out as follows: Garissa-31; Isiolo-24; Kisumu-25; Kilifi-13; Kwale-9; Mombasa-14; and West Pokot-14. (The target sample agreed with ACT was 20-30 per county or 140-210 key informant interviews in total)

Sampling for the key informant interviews was guided by the initial list of informants engaged in the CSOs, government agencies and other stakeholders that had
already been identified through the desk review as well as partial CSO mapping that had been undertaken. Sampled key informants were considered as ‘expert informants’ as they primarily work on peace and security issues in the targeted counties and have first-hand knowledge. Other key informants were sampled on the basis of gaps, key issues in information arising from review of the literature; the nature of their engagement with conflict and security in the targeted counties; and suggestions from other key informants.

**Focus Group Discussions (FGDs):** FGDs were also used to generate data for the study. FGDs brought together youth, women, elders and opinion leaders. An average of four FGDs were held in each of the seven target counties. They each had between six to eight participants, and were guided by a list of five to six topics. In total, 211 people participated in FGDs spread out as follows: Garissa-21; Isiolo-37; Kisumu-38; Kilifi-28; Kwale-31; Mombasa-28; and West Pokot-28.

**Household Survey**

The household survey was undertaken using face-to-face interviews. Questionnaires were administered to randomly-selected household respondents in the targeted counties. The household survey questionnaire was designed to gauge the respondents’ perceptions on the (a) causes, types and consequences of conflict and insecurity; (b) the effectiveness of the interventions of different CSOs working on peace and security issues as well as county and national government agencies; and (c) the extent and effectiveness of CSO-government collaboration in addressing peace and conflict issues.

The overall sampling frame used was derived from the 2009 population and household census data, and the study used a multi-stage stratified sampling strategy (see below).

**Target Population:** The study targeted the adult population, (18 years and above), male and female living in urban and rural areas in the seven counties. Refugees and non-members of a household were not interviewed. To ascertain this, the enumerator listed all those present in a household and asked specific questions seeking to clarify whether they would be considered household members or not, Kenyans or non-Kenyans. As such, visitors and refugees were not considered members of a household and were therefore not listed in the standard scientific tool called the “Kish Grid”.

**Sample size determination and distribution:** In determining the sample size of this study based on the sampling requirements, the following formula was used. (This formula is used in estimating the sample taking into consideration population size, level of confidence and margin of error.)

\[ n = \frac{Nz^2pq}{E^2(N-1) + z^2pq} \]

Where
- \( N \) = population size of the county
- \( z \) = confidence level (1.96)
- \( E \) = margin of error (8 per cent)
- \( p \) = the proportion of a population with a particular characteristic (0.5)
- \( q \) = the proportion of a population not having this characteristic (0.5)

Based on the above formula and parameters, the sample size calculation yielded the following samples of 150 for all the target counties.

**Sampling:** The total sample size drawn for this survey was therefore 1,050 for the seven counties whose total adult population is 2,428,801. In drawing the random sample, the main reason was the desired level of accuracy for a county level survey. Because of the sample design and other random effects, the precision or the margin of error of this sample size is at +/-8 per cent at 95 per cent confidence level. The sample frame below was based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census data by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>18+ Years Pop. at the Household Level</th>
<th>Sample Size at +/- 8%</th>
<th>Actual Targets Achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kilifi</td>
<td>515,212</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwale</td>
<td>300,040</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garissa</td>
<td>275,269</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isiolo</td>
<td>69,998</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisumu</td>
<td>477,939</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>581,047</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Pokot</td>
<td>209,296</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Sample Size</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,050</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,037</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sampling frame and sample allocation:** The first level was to determine the target number of interviews by county proportionate to population distribution, stratified by rural/urban. CHRIPS relied on the acceptable margin of error for each county, factoring the population size in each. It also considered the margin of error when all of them were put together to determine the sample size to work with in each county given what the budget for the survey would allow.

For this study, counties were the Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) and sub-locations were the Secondary Sampling Units (SSUs). The Primary Sampling Units, (counties) were purposively selected as they were the basis of the PSS programme. Within the county, the sub-locations were selected by probability proportionate to size, whereby in each county, the SSUs were listed by the cumulative population frequency. A random number was generated (this is a number between one and a sampling interval number which is based on the cumulative population and the number of SSUs that were selected in the strata (county), and where this number fell within the cumulative population, the sub-location was selected as the SSU. This was repeated until all the pre-defined number of SSUs was reached within the strata. In each selected SSU, 10 interviews were conducted.

**Household identification:** Like many household surveys, a household is primarily; (a) a unit of people who eat from the same food pot (b) are answerable to one household head and (c) could also be living under the same roof though not necessarily. This was verified by the enumerators asking the questions about the number of people who lived under the same roof and ate together. Once at the sampling point (SSU/sub-location), the interviewers reported to the gatekeepers, in this case the assistant chief, to whom they introduced the survey. The chiefs then assigned village elders to help them identify the boundaries of the sub-location in ensure that the survey was conducted within the randomly selected sub-location (SSU).

The enumerators then identified a landmark such as school, church, mosque, police post, chief’s camp, shop, among others close to the households to be selected. For the purposes of household-based surveys, a landmark was defined as a permanent feature at a specific location that will be available for many years to come. In the SSUs classified as urban, the enumerators started by standing at the selected landmark and using the “date score” and decided on the first household to be interviewed (sampled). This was done by summing up the date, in case it had two digits. For instance on June 12, 2016, all the interviews would begin at the third household from the landmark, (that is: 12th; 1+2=3), while on the 15th, the enumerators would sum up 1+5=6, then begin on the sixth household from the landmark. On July 2, they would begin the interviews from the second household from the landmark. (2nd: 0+2=2.

Assuming the first sampled household was successful, four households were skipped before attempting the subsequent one on the fifth household. After every successful interview, this skip pattern was followed to ensure that each sampling point was well covered until the required number of interviews was achieved. As the enumerator walked away...
Deployment of Enumerators: Seventy seven enumerators drawn locally from the target counties administered the survey. A 1:1 ratio for gender balance was ensured in their recruitment. For purposes of efficient administration, 11 data enumerators were distributed in each county, enabling them to conduct between seven and eight interviews per day over two days.

The 77 enumerators were trained/inducted on the survey in Eldoret, Thika and Mombasa between July 6 and 13, 2016. Topics covered included overview of what research entails, description of survey, doles of supervisors and the interviewers in the exercise, sampling intervals to be used, application of the Kish Grid, interviewing techniques and handling of questions from respondents. Enumerators also got the opportunity to test the MDP tool on their phones to get acquainted with it beforehand. They were deployed to the field to undertake the survey between July 7 and July 16, 2016.

The survey was administered through a Mobile Data Collection (MDC) platform. The questionnaire had closed-ended questions. It was made available in both English and Kiswahili to eliminate language barriers. Using an MDC platform helped with verification/validation of the sampling method through functionalities that included – for each survey – capturing enumerator and interviewee profiles as well as the survey location’s GPS coordinates to 25 metres accuracy. It also allowed for automatic data transmission/synchronisation across the mobile network of users (whenever or as soon as signal coverage was available) to a secure server, from which it was later retrieved for analysis.

Validation and Critique

After the development of the report, a workshop was convened bringing together experts on conflict, peace and security as well as individuals who participated in the study as key informants. Key stakeholders in the field of peace and conflict also participated. The workshop served as both a critique and a validation of the study. Insights, suggestions and recommendations generated at the workshop were incorporated in the final report.

Limitations and Mitigation Measures

Since peace and security are complex and sensitive issues in Kenya, there is a likelihood of getting inaccurate or unreliable information from respondents. While this limitation could not be completely overcome, the study attempted to mitigate it by using good sample sizes and multiple data collection methods to increase the odds of getting accurate information. The accuracy and credibility of findings and analysis was been enhanced by using triangulation of all

Data Analysis and Report Writing

Data analysis and report writing mainly included undertaking synthesis of the data gathered during the fieldwork. All analysis was carefully reflected upon and backed by evidence gathered during field work, including information from the desk review, key informants, FGDs and the household survey. Data analysis was undertaken using qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques. Qualitative included convergence-divergence, comparisons and theme analysis. Quantitative included descriptive statistical analysis of data from the household survey.

The recommendations were drawn directly from the findings and analysis, and each was carefully assessed for its feasibility, appropriateness and alignment to the PSS programme’s objectives and scope.

Quality Assurance and Review Mechanisms

Several complementary approaches were used to ensure data quality during the qualitative and quantitative phases of the study.

Regarding quality control for the collection and analysis of qualitative data, all data gathered through qualitative research—key informant interviews and FGDs—was corroborated by cross-referencing it with different sources. Follow-up interviews by phone for clarifications were critical in this regard. In relation to the household survey, all the questionnaires for the quantitative survey (received in electronic format) were checked and verified by the CHRIPS Survey Design and Implementation Associate.

Refresher training and induction of research assistants and data enumerators were conducted prior to the start of the household survey. A guide was also developed for the training and field work of the enumerators (annexed). This guide contained information and directions on the objectives of the study, data collection tools, interviewing techniques and survey focus areas/entry points. All research assistants and data enumerators were required to sign and adhere to the principles, ethics and protocols for the research.

Regular and consistent field supervision was also undertaken during the entire field research phase. WhatsApp groups were also created for all the 77 enumerators for the household survey. This aided coordination of their work, troubleshooting and addressing concerns and challenges that emerged during administration of the survey.
the data gathered through the different methods -- key informant interviews, FGDs and the household survey.

The CHRIPS research team was also aware of the security sensitivities relating to conflict in the target counties and accordingly accommodated the concerns of some of the key informants by assuring them that all the information they provided would not be directly attributed to them in the study report. Another challenge encountered was difficulty in getting some government officials for the key informant interviews. In other cases, some officials had other pressing commitments and, as a result, interviews tended to be rushed. This challenge was partly addressed by finding alternative respondents such as substituting county commissioners with their deputies.

Heavy rains and vast distances in West Pokot affected the administration of the household survey in some parts of the county. Five of the 11 enumerators administering the survey took three days as opposed to the planned two to complete their work. Owing to vast distances between households in some of the enumeration areas, the initial target sample of 150 respondents was reduced to 110. Other than West Pokot, the target of 150 respondents was met or surpassed in all the other six counties.

1. Isiolo County

1.1 County Profile

Isiolo is a semi-arid area. It has two electoral constituencies: Isiolo North, encompassing Isiolo town, Merti and their environs, and Isiolo South, encompassing Garba Tulla and its environs. According to the 2009 National Population Census, Isiolo County had a cosmopolitan population of 143,234, with Borana, Samburu, Gabra, Sakuye, Turkana, Meru and Somali being the main ethnic groups.

The county borders seven others: Garissa to the east, Marsabit to the northwest, Meru and Kitui to the southwest, Tana River to the southeast and Wajir to the northeast. The Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) estimates that the county’s poverty rate is 76.2 per cent. Most of the county is rural and residents practise pastoralism. The county is projected to experience a high rate of economic development as a result of the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) projects, which include the construction of a resort city, an international airport and highway and railway links to Lamu, Lokichogio and also to Ethiopia.

Several types of conflict affect Isiolo: Those driven by skewed resource allocation by the county government, inter-county boundary disputes and large infrastructure projects are emerging forms of conflict that did not exist in the county until the introduction of devolved government in 2013. Radicalisation/violent extremism is another new form of instability that has emerged in Isiolo in the past three or four years. Natural resource-based conflicts and cattle rustling have been perennial problems. There is a general convergence between findings of the household survey (see figure 7 above) and data from the key informant interviews and FGDs that these conflicts are the most prevalent in Isiolo.
## 8.

### Public Perceptions on Causes of Conflict - Isiolo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic hatred</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition over natural resources</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political competition</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devolution</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unresolved historical grievances</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak government institutions</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug and alcohol abuse</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of opportunities/unemployment</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural practices</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist ideologies</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of illegal arms</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary disputes</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 8: Public perceptions on causes of conflict in Isiolo

This study has established that competition over natural resources and ethnic hatred are the most significant causes of conflict and insecurity in Isiolo, followed by unemployment and the availability of illegal arms. The data from the household survey (see figure 8 above), interviews with elders/opinion leaders, government and civil society officials, as well as previous research converge on this point.

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²Eight of the 10 county executive committee members (CECs) are Borana (confirm, cite this figure).
This study finds that chiefs and assistant chiefs seem to be the effective actors on peace and security issues on the ground. Most people - 68 per cent of respondents in the household survey -- believe this to be the case (see figure 9 above). This view was shared by most of the key informants and FGD participants who were interviewed. Other grassroots peace and security structures, particularly Nyumba Kumi committees, DPCs and local community policing structures ranked higher than other mechanisms. Despite their perceived excesses, police were seen by a significant percentage of the public - 39 per cent - as being effective. (see figure 9 above).

1.2 Devolution, Power-Sharing and Ethnic Conflict

1.2.1 Nature of Conflict and Key Actors

This suggests that inter-ethnic and politically-instigated conflicts are perceived to be the most prevalent in the county. The introduction of devolution in March 2013 created a hitherto unavailable opportunity for Borana, Meru, Samburu, Somali and Turkana communities to share political power. The current governor is a Borana, while his deputy is a Somali and the speaker of the county assembly is a Samburu. The expectation was that this negotiated power-sharing arrangement would promote inclusiveness and reduce ethnic polarisation in the county. However, this expectation has not been met. Instead, there was a widespread perception among respondents including civil society, security agencies, youth groups and elders’ groups that the governor’s Warjida clan unfairly dominates the county executive positions, even though there are people from other communities living in the county. Indeed, in 2012, the Isiolo Inter-Ministerial Committee on Conflict over Management of Conservancies observed that “the Borana claim Isiolo as a historical right and view all other communities living in the county, such as Turkana, Somali and Meru, as migrants who recently moved there in search of pasture, arable land and other economic opportunities”. This view was also confirmed by various key informants, who noted that members of these communities have tended to be locked out of decision-making processes, employment, tenders and bursary opportunities. Given this situation, several respondents contended that the Borana-dominated government had heightened ethnic tension in the county, and was, therefore, viewed as exclusivist and discriminatory due to its treatment of people from other communities.

It appears that minority communities, other than the “Isiolo Big Five” feel this exclusion more acutely and there are signs that they are also adopting forms of ethnic organisation and politics. A civil society informant reported that a group known as the Minority-37 Group (signifying Kenya’s 42 communities minus the “Isiolo Big Five”) was recently registered, purportedly to represent the political interests of the members of the other 37 communities living in the county. M-37, as it

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1 Eight of the 10 county executive committee members (CECs) are Borana (confirm, cite this figure).

2 Inter-Ministerial Committee (2012), Report of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Conflicts over Management of Conservancies in Isiolo County, 18.
is popular known, includes elders, business people and other influential people in the county, and aims to gain representation in the county government to ensure their communities benefit from devolved resources.

These feelings of exclusion were also evident in the business sector. Some key informants suggested that many businessmen in the county seem to attribute their success or failure to the fact of belonging to a certain community. Youth consulted in an FGD also reported that many people felt that business owners only employ people from their own communities. These trends are thought to contribute to the already heightened ethnic tensions in the county. As Rowherder writes, political ethnicisation of conflicts and conflicts due to natural resources remain the greatest challenges in Isiolo County.

1.2.2 Key Drivers
The exclusivist politics of the Isiolo governor and other political actors in the county reflect Kenya’s historical culture of patronialism. This culture endures and has cemented a misplaced sense of entitlement among populous and economically powerful communities. As a result, in Isiolo, many people feel underrepresented in the county leadership, which is dominated by one community. While the shift to devolution sought partly to dismantle this culture by enhancing access to public resources and promoting a stronger sense of nationhood, politics continues to be organised along ethnicity. In turn, dominant communities tend to be driven to gain control of and use political power to their own advantage. This trend is also evident at the national level, and has become much more marked at the county level, with Isiolo serving as a striking example. A 2012 report of the Inter-Ministerial Committee notes that “the curse of negative ethnicity is very pervasive in Isiolo County and is heightened by competition for political leadership”.

The example of ethnic chauvinism that has been set by the governor and his administration seems to have created a siege mentality among the communities which feel excluded from power. There is a growing sense among the county’s diverse communities, especially as the 2017 election approaches, that politics is a winner-takes-all competition. Losing equals exclusion from decision-making and access to resources, such as county jobs and tenders. Rather than joining forces to determine how this situation can be addressed, the incumbent and political leaders representing other communities continue to practice divisive forms of politics, including outright incitement of ethnic hatred, hoping to increase their own and their communities’ political bargaining power. Some informants have suggested that this may lead to political and/or electoral violence in future.

The emergence of a group like Minority-37 could be viewed as positive for the cause of equality and non-discrimination in the county. It is entirely possible that such groups could play an effective role in demanding genuine power-sharing and distribution of the benefits of devolved governance. However, such groups may also act to drive and sustain rather than reduce exclusivist practices by county elites since it is by its very nature based on the same idea.

Some FGD participants complained that local media, particularly FM radio stations, have been stoking ethnic tensions by broadcasting information that seems to incite hatred against certain leaders and communities. If left unchecked, these kinds of broadcasts could contribute to division of communities even further. Some government and civil society informants also complained that ‘briefcase NGOs’ without clear mandates have contributed to ethnic tensions as they work with specific communities to the exclusion of others. In addition, there are instances where they have generated information that is skewed or false about different actors, communities and situations. This has the potential to incite anger and hatred.

1.2.3 Mitigating Potential and Measures
So far, no action has been taken by national government agencies, religious and civil society institutions, and other actors, to address the problem of exclusivist politics and practices within the Isiolo county government. This may be explained by the fact that these actors generally lack the access and influence required to encourage and convince politicians to change their attitudes and styles of politics. This problem is not unique to non-State actors in Isiolo alone. While non-State actors in Kenya have in the past been able to influence structural change in the country’s political system, they have tended to lack the influence required to determine how politics is practiced. However, Gender Watch, the National Integration and Cohesion Commission (NCIC) and local councils of elders are beginning to pay attention to this problem and the potential for violence.

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5Inter-Ministerial Committee (2012), Report of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Conflicts over Management of Conservancies in Isiolo County, 40
1. In the run-up to the August 2017 elections, it is likely that there will be heightened and even fierce competition for elective posts in Isiolo. Given the high stakes in gaining control of the county’s substantial budget and resources, there is the risk that without resolute preventive action from security agencies, politicians, in their quest to gain support, may resort to divisive tactics and intimidation during campaigns. Ethnically-instigated violence as a result of such politics cannot therefore be ruled.

2. Even if violence does not occur, it is likely that this form of politics will influence many voters to elect their leaders on the basis of ethnicity, paying little attention to their development pledges. The risk here is that voters may end up electing leaders who may not have any substantive programmes for the country’s development needs. Since they will have been elected on the basis of their ethnicity, such leaders will likely perpetuate exclusivist politics, continuing to place peace and security in the county at risk.

1.3 Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

1.3.1 Nature of Conflict and Key Actors

A minority -- just four per cent -- of respondents in the household survey identified radicalisation and violent extremism as a form of conflict that has persisted in Isiolo over the last three years. This is understandable given that there have been no terrorist attacks reported in the county in that time. However, key informants from security agencies, civil society and elders’ groups concur that radicalisation, and the potential for extremist violence, are serious threats to peace and security in Isiolo. According to the county commissioner, at least 27 young men have been recruited into Al Shabaab and sent to Somalia for training since 2012. (So far, there are no reports of young women being recruited into the terrorist group). Civil society actors, elders and FGD participants consulted for this study indicated that Al Shabaab recruiters have focused on secondary schools, where they target bright students. Several respondents indicated that it is believed that at least 30 students at Isiolo Boys Secondary School have been lured to Somalia since February 2013.

Several key informants claimed that recruitment of youths into Al Shabaab is still ongoing. While recruiters initially focused on youths living and schooling in the urban area, they are now believed to have turned their attention to other parts of the county, including Kula Mawe in the south and Merti in the north. According to the county commissioner, parents whose children are thought to have been lured to Somalia face great stigma in the community. This may worsen the problem as others whose children may be at risk could be discouraged from seeking assistance.

1.3.2 Key Drivers

One of the underlying explanations for the existence of radicalisation in Isiolo and other parts of the country is that Kenya lacks an official counter-violent extremism (CVE) policy, which would guide and coordinate the CVE initiatives of security agencies, civil society and others. Violent extremism is still largely addressed from a security perspective through counter-terrorism operations, while the prevention aspect, which is crucial, has not received...
much attention. A major national conference on a draft national CVE policy (that addresses prevention) was held in 2015, but it has not been adopted and there is little public information available about it.

Perceptions of discrimination, exclusion and the lack of opportunities for many young people in Isiolo, and across the country have made extremist causes appealing to some of them. Not much progress has been made by the State in addressing these perceptions and creating real opportunities for the youth.

According to SCORE officials, the problem of radicalisation in Isiolo is worsened by the fact that most parents, teachers and other care-givers are generally unaware about how to identify and deal with youth who may be getting involved in extremist movements. This lack of awareness hinders the possibility of preventive action being taken before it is too late.

Hardly any parents in Isiolo are aware of the kind of online content their children are accessing. In particular, the use of social media by young people exposes them to exploitation by terrorist recruiters, who propound false ideas about religion and violence, and prey on fears and concerns about issues such as discrimination, exclusion and unemployment. Several key informants claimed that the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit’s (ATPU) ineffectiveness, corruption and heavy-handedness contribute to the persistence of radicalisation. ATPU officers reportedly harass, brutalise and extort money from innocent people, mainly Muslims. These activities have angered many Muslims and it is believed that extremist recruiters prey on these frustrations to draw impressionable young people to their causes.

1.3.3 Mitigating Potential and Measures

There are several government agencies and non-State actors carrying out CVE interventions in Isiolo. They include the Office of the County Commissioner and other National Government Administration Office (NGAO) officials, the ATPU, and three CSOs; -SCORE, Isiolo Interfaith and Isiolo Peace Link.

SCORE, the Isiolo Volunteer Organisation

SCORE is a volunteer organisation established in 2014 in response to the trend of ‘disappearances’ of young people, who are believed to have been lured by Al Shabaab to Somalia. It implements some CVE activities, some of which are based on the Building Resilience against Violent Extremism (BRAVE) USAid manual. Its work is focused mainly in Isiolo, but it has plans to expand to Marsabit and Mandera counties. As a security precaution, all its members and initiatives have been vetted and approved by the county commissioner. The organisation has a director, various coordinators, mentors/trainers, a finance officer and an official spokesperson. Strategic direction and oversight are provided by an executive committee of 10 members. There are 10 members working in each of the county’s 10 wards. They all have diverse backgrounds and include Muslims and Christians.

COMPS: SCORE implements the Coaching and Mentorship Programme (COMPS), which seeks to get secondary school students to reflect on the correct interpretation of Islam as far as violence and extremism are concerned. The school-focused work is done in partnership with vetted Imams from the Isiolo Inter-faith Organisation. Through COMPS, SCORE provides advice to students on their career options. It has also facilitated interactions between students, the Office of the County Commissioner and the deputy governor to demonstrate to them that the government exists to assist them and protect them from extremist movements. SCORE plans to expand COMPS to reach more schools.

Isiolo County Street-hood Families: Homeless youths are also targeted under COMPS. So far, the programme has enabled 200 youths to register a CBO known as Isiolo County Street-hood Families. Homeless youth are particularly vulnerable to recruitment into extremist movements because they lack livelihood opportunities. Through this initiative, funds have been made available for these youth to start small businesses such as kiosks and engage in sports and performing arts. In partnership with the National Environmental Management Authority (Nema), the youth are being trained on how to generate income from recycling used materials. Some 20 per cent of the income generated is invested in an endowment fund account to help sustain the initiative. SCORE has managed to convince the Isiolo Central MP to use his Constituency Development Fund (CDF) to pay for the training of 10 of these youths in carpentry and masonry at the Isiolo Youth Polytechnic. SCORE has also assisted 50 more to acquire national identity cards.

Outreach to Parents: SCORE has been reaching out to the parents of the students who “disappeared” from Isiolo Boys Secondary School, with the aim of learning how they may have gotten involved in extremism. The organisation is also raising awareness among parents on the how to identify youth who may be getting involved in extremism. Women (mothers) and teachers are key in this outreach work as they spend considerable time with the youth who may be at risk.

Social media and public information: SCORE is active on various social media platforms, particularly Facebook. Through its link to the Eye-on-Isiolo County Facebook page, it is able to share its messages on religion and extremism to about 90,000 people in the county. It also uses its WhatsApp group to mobilise its 100 members and to coordinate its activities. Currently, SCORE is developing a radio programme that will focus on CVE.
The county commissioner is impressed by SCORE’s work and views the organisation as a valuable partner in CVE work in the county. This study similarly endorses SCORE’s interventions. Their collaborative approach, incorporating strategic actors such as the Office of the County Commissioner, Isiolo Inter-faith, Nema and Isiolo Youth Polytechnic, stands to increase their effectiveness, reach, sustainability and legitimacy. Moreover, their interventions are multi-faceted, positioning them to better address the complex, multi-dimensional challenge of extremist violence.

**Isiolo Inter-faith Organisation**

Isiolo Inter-faith brings together Islamic and Christian clerics to advocate for peaceful coexistence among all communities in Isiolo. The organisation is effective in carrying out conflict resolution interventions as it is widely viewed as neutral and trustworthy. Its approach of anchoring its interventions on religion and spirituality appeals to many people in the county who place great value on these ideas. Clerics in the organisation use their pulpits to promote religious tolerance, peace and dialogue.

The organisation has been working closely with SCORE’s COMPS by deploying Imams to speak to secondary school students on religion and violence. In particular, they promote the idea that the correct interpretation of the teachings of Islam clearly deplores violence and stress the need for peaceful coexistence and tolerance among all people. Christian clerics are also part of this effort as there have been reports of young Christian men converting to Islam in order to join Al Shabaab.

The county commissioner is impressed by the work of Isiolo Inter-faith, and like SCORE, considers the organisation a valuable partner in CVE work in the county. This study endorses the interventions of Isiolo Interfaith because they appeal to values which are important to many people, and therefore have the potential to change negative attitudes and behaviour related to conflict. The organisation sees the benefit of partnering with others, including secular actors, an evidence of its understanding that CVE must be approached and coordinated from different perspectives.

**Isiolo Peace Link**

This organisation recently expanded its peace work to focus on CVE. This work is in its nascent stages but is likely to have a positive impact in the long run since the organisation is a highly regarded actor in the county, and it plans to work closely with SCORE, Isiolo Inter-faith and the Office of the County Commissioner-Isiolo, with which it has good relations.

**Office of the County Commissioner and the Isiolo County CVE Committee**

Many key informants and FGD participants indicated that the current county commissioner is enthusiastic, committed and open to ideas about how to address peace and security issues in the county. This office also enjoys access to sensitive information about violent extremism through its networks with the Department of Criminal Investigations (DCI) and the National Intelligence Service (NIS). Chiefs who fall under this office are involved in CVE work to the extent that they track and make reports on young men who may have “disappeared”, and are believed to have gone to Somalia for training on terrorism.

Its CVE interventions are, however, still at a nascent stage. The office is yet to develop the terms of reference for the Isiolo County CVE Committee, which will direct and coordinate the CVE interventions of State and non-State actors in the county. Once operational, the CVE Committee is likely to play an important and effective role in CVE as it has representation from DCI, NIS, civil society, religious actors and youths among other parties.

SCORE reports that the county commissioner has been supportive of its work, offering office space when needed, and providing support during its activities.

**National Police Service**

The National Police Service is expected to be a frontline player in all efforts against violent extremism as it is mandated, and has the resources required, to detect and prevent all forms of violence. However, as highlighted elsewhere in this section, the ATPU, which implements the National Police Service’s anti-terrorism operations, is generally not trusted by Isiolo residents because its officers are viewed as ineffective, corrupt and brutal. This trend has led to the deterioration of relations between the ATPU and the community, effectively hindering the potential for ATPU-citizens’ collaboration to tackle violent extremism. Indeed, a minority (32 per cent) of respondents in the household survey believed that police are effective in addressing conflicts.

**Nyumba Kumi Committees**

There is a broad consensus among key informants and some FGD participants that although still in their early stages of development, Nyumba Kumi committees have been effective in addressing ordinary crimes and disputes. While a few informants suggested that the committees have the potential to address violent extremism, a larger number holds a contrary view. This is supported by findings from

<sup>6</sup> SCORE is a volunteer organisation working to counter violent extremism in Isiolo.

<sup>7</sup> From 2006, local and international human rights groups have implicated ATPU officials in numerous incidents of unfair profiling and violation of the rights of predominantly Muslim terrorism suspects at the Coast as well as other parts of the country.
the household survey which shows that only 15 per cent of respondents believed that Nyumba Kumi committees are effective at managing conflict. They believe that the committees will not be effective in this regard as members will likely not volunteer information on suspected extremists because of the fear of reprisals.

1.3.4 Future Scenarios
1. There is a promising, albeit nascent, potential for CVE interventions in Isiolo. Significant results in addressing violent extremism in the county can be achieved in the near-to-medium term if the county CVE committee becomes fully operational, more actors, -- including the county government -- are brought on board, and more resources are made available to all the actors. Isiolo seems to have the potential required to become a good model for CVE interventions in Kenya.

2. The whereabouts of the young men who were reportedly lured from schools to join Al Shabaab in Somalia have not been established. There is apprehension among some respondents that they could return undetected to carry out terrorist attacks in the county, or other parts of the country.

3. Given that many parents, teachers and other care-givers remain unaware about the signs of radicalisation among the youth, it is possible that the extent of youth radicalisation in Isiolo is greater than is known or imagined. In these circumstances, the threat of future terrorist violence should not be underestimated.

4. So far, there has been no systematic effort by the national or county governments, Isiolo included, to address the feelings of discrimination, exclusion and lack of opportunities that are harboured by many young people from some minority religious and ethnic communities. The more official action is delayed, the greater the risk that more youth will embrace extremist causes, and possibly carry out terrorist violence in the county or other parts of the country.

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1.4 Inter-County Boundary Disputes and Conflicts over Large Infrastructure Developments

1.4.1 Nature of Conflict and Key Actors
The introduction of devolution has created boundary disputes between counties in different parts of the country that did not previously exist. In the case of Isiolo, the new boundary delineating the county and the neighbouring Meru County, have been a source of tension between the two counties particularly in the past year. Key Vision 2030 and Lapsset projects such as the Isiolo Resort City, the Isiolo International Airport and the Lamu-Garsen-Isiolo Highway, are at centre of these boundary disputes as parts of these projects fall in border areas. About a third (31 per cent) of respondents in the household survey said conflict over boundaries has persisted in Isiolo since the introduction of devolution in 2013, while 36 per cent said it has persisted over the past 12 months.

On one hand, there are claims by the Meru governor, his supporters and local communities that Gambella, Kisima, Battalion 78 and Ngarmara are part of Meru. On the other hand, the governor of Isiolo, his supporters and local communities claim that parts of Meru fall within the borders of Isiolo. Some of the disputed areas are in Igembe North, Igembe Central, Tigania East and Tigania West. All these areas are occupied by diverse communities, including the Borana, Meru and Turkana.

Between October-December 2015, tension in these areas exploded into violence. Youthful gangs reportedly organised by powerful political actors from the two counties also participated in the violence. According to the Isiolo Central District Officer, some of the displaced people either fled deeper into Meru or Isiolo or were forced to take refuge in the homes of their relatives and friends. There is a concern among various informants and FGD participants interviewed for this study that people living in these disputed areas fear that they may be forcibly displaced in future if the question of the boundary is not resolved.

The Isiolo County Commissioner confirmed that personnel from the Administration Police and Rapid Deployment Unit have been increased in the disputed areas to deter further violence. At another level, the Isiolo County Government has chosen to lodge a case in the High Court seeking a judicial remedy to the dispute. The case is still pending.

1.4.2 Key Drivers
By 2010, there were a total of 210 districts in Kenya. Under the 2010 Constitution, these districts were amalgamated into 47 counties whose boundaries reflected those of the 47 districts that existed in 1993. Prior to the formation of counties, Isiolo district was a large area that straddled the former Eastern and North-eastern provinces. The boundaries dispute between Isiolo and Meru predate the establishment of counties. This problem is seen in other parts of Isiolo, such as some areas bordering Garissa and Samburu. However, there has so far been no conflict in these places. It does not seem that the challenge of potential boundary disputes between counties was foreseen and planned for by the national government, the IEBC or the Transition Authority at the time the counties were established. Even now, there is no clear strategy to address these disputes.
According to several key informants, a key driver of the Isiolo-Meru boundary conflict is the emergence of large-scale infrastructure projects that had been planned for construction in the former Isiolo District. With the delineation of new county boundaries, some of the sites for these projects now fall in Meru County, and along the disputed border areas. Some of these initiatives include Vision 2030 projects such as the Isiolo Resort City, the Isiolo International Airport and Lapsset. For instance, Meru County leaders claim that the area where the Isiolo International Airport is being constructed falls within Meru borders, and is therefore an asset over which the county and the national government share control. Similarly, Meru leaders argue that part of the Isiolo Resort City is in the county, and they must have some control over it. Lapsset Highway is also a sensitive project as it is supposed to pass through Ilait, Chumvi Yarre, Gambella, Tractor and Kisima areas of Isiolo (areas near the border with Meru), which are inhabited by Borana, Meru, Samburu and Turkana communities.

A senior county official said that these new infrastructure projects have heightened interest, even among pastoralists, in the centrality and value of land, as some of this land was not titled but has been sold to individuals. Given that various Lapsset projects are underway, people are reportedly grabbing land in various parts of the county for speculative purposes. Some of the land that has been grabbed is community land used by local communities for grazing. Disputes over the land could lead to conflict between the grabbers, authorities and local communities. In Gambella area for instance, there are many taxable businesses such as sand-harvesting and stone quarries. From the perspective of Meru County, parts of Gambella fall within it and the county government is asserting the right to collect taxes from these businesses. On the other hand, Isiolo County also claims these areas and believes it has the right to tax these businesses.

### 1.4.3 Key Triggers

There is a broad consensus among government officials, civil society actors, elders and community members interviewed during FGDs, that incendiary statements made by both governors of Isiolo and Meru led to the 2015 violence over the disputed borders. Both governors are accused of not exercising restraint, and instead use local and national media to abuse each other and assert that they will settle their people in the disputed areas.

In late 2015, Meru Governor Peter Munya was accused of directing county officials to place a “Welcome to Meru” sign at the disputed Battalion 78 area. Isiolo Governor Godana Doyo reportedly responded by mobilising youth to take down the sign. According to the DO Isiolo Central, Meru County also established a cess barrier in the area, angering supporters of the Isiolo governor, who proceeded to destroy it.

### 1.4.4 Mitigating Measures and Potential Law Courts / Task Force of Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government

Tension over the disputed boundaries has reduced since the Isiolo County government the issue to High Court. Prior to this, the Ministry of Interior formed a task force to inquire into and give recommendations on resolving the dispute. The task force has completed its work but is barred from implementing its recommendations, which are not publicly known, until the petition filed in court by the Isiolo County is ruled upon. Respondents hope that both counties will respect the final court ruling. However, it should be borne in mind that judicial remedies are adversarial one-side wins affairs, and therefore may not be able to bring about the understanding and reconciliation required to solve the problem in a lasting way.

**Office of the County Commissioner-Isiolo and Meru**

In early 2016, the county commissioners of Isiolo and Meru came together to urge politicians not to politicise the question of boundary disputes. They also made it clear that politicians found inciting conflict over the boundaries would be arrested.

### 1.4.5 Future Scenarios

1. The expected court ruling may provide a final resolution to the Isiolo-Meru boundary conflict. However, should there be misgivings by either county about the ruling, political actors from either of the two counties are likely to resume their incendiary statements, fomenting new conflicts.

2. Unchecked grabbing of land for speculative purposes also has the potential to create new conflicts between grabbers, authorities and local communities that have hitherto not occurred in the county.

3. There is fear among locals that future conflicts in the disputed areas could affect livelihoods by disrupting farming and other business activities.

### 1.5 Pastoralism and Natural Resource-Based Conflicts

#### 1.5.1 Nature of Conflicts and Key Actors

The majority of the communities in Isiolo, particularly the Borana, Samburu and Turkana, are pastoralists. Because Isiolo is classified as an arid/semi-arid land (ASAL), conflicts among pastoralists over water and pasture in the rural parts of the county have been common and persist. About 50 per cent of respondents in the household survey identified conflicts over water and pasture as persisting since the introduction of devolution in 2013, and also over the past
12 months. This means that according to public opinion, the prevalence of these conflicts in Isiolo is only second to politically-instigated conflict.

Herders, mainly youth, are typically the perpetrators of violence in conflicts over water and pasture, which have led to deaths, maiming of people and destruction of property and loss of animals. Findings by Saferworld as well as the Isiolo Inter-Ministerial Committee on Conflicts over Management of Conservancies found that in 2012 alone, conflicts between the Borana, Turkana and Somali over water and pasture resulted in at least 10 deaths and the displacement of more than 2,000 people. Respondents to this study suggest that a high rate of ownership of illegal firearms by many pastoralists has worsened the conflicts.

Over the past decade or so, local communities, particularly pastoralists, have been displaced from communal land they have occupied and used for generations. They have been denied access to land, which was historically categorised as trust land, but which has been purchased by individuals for business and speculative purposes. Most of the land in question has been allocated to individuals, particularly conservancy owners. Respondents in this study, as well as previous research, indicate that there has been little transparency in the way that the lands offices of the national and Isiolo county governments have undertaken these allocations. In recent years, conflict between local communities and conservancy owners has led to deadly violence between them and security personnel guarding some of the conservancies.

As land becomes more scarce as a result of what appears to be land grabs, there is increasing competition among different communities for the resource. This competition is manifested along ethnic lines and politicians representing different communities have tended to politicise the issue for their own advantage, encouraging conflict rather than addressing it.

**1.5.2 Key Drivers**

One of the underlying causes of land-related conflict is that land in Isiolo is trust land. It has been previously held communally and no individual titles were given out in the past. The shift to issuance of individual titles has occurred without due consideration to the effects this could have on the livelihoods of local communities. This situation creates a fertile ground for the emergence of conflicts between local communities, individuals and business entities which are acquiring these communal lands.

Agreements such as the Modagashe Declaration that guide resource-sharing among pastoralists are not viewed as legitimate and fair by some local communities. There is the view among certain communities that such agreements are biased towards dominant groups and offer them little benefit. While these kinds of agreements are well-intentioned, the lack of buy-in by some stakeholders limits their efficacy, which in turn creates conditions for instability.

Key informants interviewed for this study indicated that pastoralist communities are compelled to acquire arms to defend themselves from potential attacks because the presence of State security apparatuses tend to be weak. The presence of many illegal arms has created fertile conditions for natural resource-based conflicts to persist.

Another major driver of land-related conflicts in Isiolo is the feeling among residents that title deeds for trust lands are being corruptly issued to individuals and business entities, who buy the land for speculative purposes. Local communities, particularly pastoralists, believe that these lands are rightfully theirs and find it difficult to accept that they are now being denied grazing rights in land they have lived on and used for generations.

Some key respondents suggest that perceptions of bias in the treatment of certain communities by the Isiolo county government also fuels natural resource-based conflicts among pastoralists. Certain communities, particularly minorities, reportedly feel that their views concerning the allocation of rights to grazing land and watering points are not taken seriously by the county government. In turn, they view the decisions of the county on resource-sharing arrangements as biased, and they are, therefore, reluctant to respect them.

Politics is also a driver of natural resource-based conflicts among pastoralists. In 2012, the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Conflicts over Management of Conservancies in Isiolo noted that while most conflicts in the county could appear to be motivated by competition over scarce resources (pasture and water), they are also fuelled by political motives which seek to ‘uproot’ certain ethnic groups from the area.

**1.5.3 Key Triggers**

The unchecked sale of trust land has resulted in the displacement of hundreds of families, causing anger and frustration among affected communities. With few options to build their homesteads, farm or graze their animals, many people “trespass” into these now privately-held lands to fend for themselves and their families, setting the stage for conflict with the new owners.

As far as conflicts among pastoralists are concerned, several key respondents and FGD participants believe that the main trigger is drought. Since pastoralists depend on rain for water and pasture for their herds, drought causes them to wander farther into areas occupied by other communities in search of water and pasture. Without clear sharing agreements, such migrations are seen as trespass and are...
often met with violence. Previous research undertaken in Isiolo by the Feinstein International Centre lends credence to these views.

1.5.4 Mitigating Measures and Potential

**Office of the County Commissioner-Isiolo**

The Office of the County Commissioner works with other security actors, including the National Police Service, to appeal to pastoralist communities to engage in dialogue rather than violence over water and pasture. It convenes peace dialogue meetings to this end, or participates in meetings convened by other actors such as NRT. A number of informants interviewed for this study commended the current county commissioner’s work in this regard. He is viewed as enthusiastic about resolving these kinds of conflict and is widely respected by community elders and other local actors.

Despite land being one of the major grounds for conflict in Isiolo, neither the national nor the county government has done much to prevent and mitigate growing tension and conflict over perceived land grabs. Land conflict is hardly considered or debated by politicians since it is merely asserted that land disputes are settled by proof of ownership i.e. having a title. In this logic, if one does not have a title, then one has no claim. Moreover, civil society informants claim that most of the people accused of corruption in title allocation are government officials, so they are not genuinely concerned about addressing the problem.

**Isiolo Sub-County Peace Committees**

Previously known as District Peace Committees (DPCs), there are now three Sub-County Peace Committees-Isiolo, Garbatulla and Merti. Each committee has 15 members elected for a three-year term. In the past, DPCs were viewed as active and effective in resolving resource-based conflicts. They used a variety of strategies, including, setting up of grazing committees to settle water and pasture disputes, convening inter-community dialogue meetings, as well as training of councils of elders and Nyumba Kumi committees on conflict resolution. They operated effective conflict early warning systems, and also advised communities on voluntary disarmament exercises.

They collaborated closely with the Office of the County Commissioner, the NPS and the NCIC. In the past, the DPCs have worked in partnerships with key non-State actors in peace and security, including ACCORD, Action Aid, Anglican Development Service, Brave, Inter-faith Council of Kenya, National Youth Council, UN Women and World Vision.

Several key informants suggested that since 2014, however, DPCs have been largely inactive as they have not received adequate funding to support their operations. This may partly explain why only 13 per cent of the respondents to the household survey believe that the DPCs are effective at addressing conflict. Some activities are still undertaken but with funding support from civil society actors such as Isiolo Peace Link and Gender Watch.

**Councils of elders**

Local councils of elders remain instrumental in the prevention and mitigation of resource-based conflicts as they command great respect. Some 39 per cent of respondents to the household survey have identified them as effective actors in conflict mitigation. They use alternative dispute resolution approaches to address community grievances over sharing of resources. However, some civil society informants express concern that the councils of elders are gradually losing their authority as young people, who form the majority of perpetrators, are increasingly becoming disconnected from traditional systems.

**Isiolo Peace Link and Gender Watch**

Many key informants spoke positively about the interventions of Isiolo Peace Link and Gender Watch, which collaborate to strengthen the participation of women in managing natural resource-based conflicts. Both organisations are represented in the Isiolo Sub-County Peace Forum. They have been credited with supporting women to successfully lobby for their inclusion in Dedha (Grazing) Committees of the Borana. They have jointly been popularising the UN Resolution on Women and Peace Building, targeting women leaders at local levels. They have simplified the core ideas of the resolution, which advocates and provides a framework for women’s participation in addressing conflict.

In particular, Isiolo Peace Link was a key collaborator in the government’s Amani Voluntary Disarmament Initiative in the county. It worked closely with women and village elders to get them to influence local youths to voluntarily turn in illegal arms. In 2009-11, Isiolo Peace Link was funded by Saferworld to support the national government’s efforts to map out all arms in the hands of Kenya Police Reservists in Isiolo (These arms are sometimes used for illegal purposes, including cattle rustling). They assisted the police to establish a database on these arms that facilitated quarterly inspection on their safekeeping by holders. This initiative was highly regarded by the Office of the County Commissioner-Isiolo. However, it collapsed when the funding support ended and the local police indicate that they do not have the resources to carry out inspections on their own. Isiolo Peace Link has also worked with vulnerable youth through United Nations dividend programmes that support livestock trade so as to give them alternative livelihood opportunities. They have also localised their conflict early warning system to address the diverse areas of the vast county, and their system has been credited with diffusing some conflicts.
The two organisations are represented in the Isiolo Sub-County Peace Forum, and work closely with the Office of the County Commissioner and the County Police Commander. They also have active peace work partnerships with the Office of the County Commissioner, Caritas and World Vision.

**World Vision-Kenya**

World Vision-Kenya has been an active player in DPCs. Its conflict experts participate in DPC meetings, where they provide advice on conflict hotspots and on prevention and mitigation strategies. They are involved in peace dialogue meetings with the elders as well as youth/morans drawn from the Borana, Samburu and Turkana communities. They have established peace committees in four wards in Isiolo, which provide a forum for community dialogue on peaceful sharing of grazing land and watering points. In 2015, they supported 200 Samburu and Turkana youth to participate in the Isiolo peace marathon. World Vision also runs various livelihood programmes, all of which have a peace and conflict resolution component built into them. They collaborate closely with the Office of the County Commissioner, Isiolo Peace Link and Amani Milele-Catholic Diocese.

**Mid-Kenya Programme (Merti, Isiolo)**

Its peace work has included organisation of peace caravans, most recently in 2014 and 2105, which aim to create awareness on the need for peace. Youth, women and elders from the ‘Big Five’ communities as well as senior Isiolo county government officials have participated in these caravans. In 2014, the organisation held a series of peace dialogue meetings with elders from the Boran, Rendile, Samburu and Somali communities, which resulted in the Kom Declaration that banned cattle rustling and spelt out penalties for offenders. In 2015, they organised a peace marathon with the support of Northern Rangelands Trust and Uraia that aimed to bring peace between Borana and Samburu communities, particularly youth in Merti. Winners received livestock prizes.

**Pastoralist Women for Health and Education (PWHE)**

PWHE is a respected organisation that was initially established to assist girls and orphans from pastoralist communities. With time, PWHE realised that conflict was intricately intertwined with the issues it was focusing on, and in 2008, it chose to start a series of peace programmes. Currently, it does not have any active peace programmes as it does not have sufficient funding. In the past, however, PWHE has partnered with organisations such as ASAL Stakeholders’ Forum, DPCs, Merti Integrated Development Programme, NDMA and Pastoralists Network Kenya to undertake peace work and drought relief interventions. Below are profiles of some relevant projects it has carried out.

Peace building and Cohesion Project: This was a four-year CORDAID-funded project that ran from 2011-15. It sought to promote peaceful, free and fair elections in Isiolo County. Key strategies included capacity development for peace workers and convening peace dialogue meetings.

Rooting Democracy in Kenya: Funded by Uraia Trust, this civic education project aimed at explaining the concept of democracy and the need for people in Isiolo to embrace it. The project aimed to influence people to vote on the basis of issues rather than along ethnic lines. Key strategies included enhancing public understanding on the provisions of the Constitution, particularly provisions on elections, leadership and integrity as well as rights.

Beyond Quotas-Women Leadership: This 10-month, USaid-funded project promoted public understanding on women's inclusion in leadership. It also promoted education for girls and women and challenged locally held stereotypes about women's roles in society. Under the project, PWHE trained and supported women in Isiolo, Marsabit and Samburu counties to vie for elective posts.

**1.5.5 Future Scenarios**

1. As the 2017 general election nears, resource-based conflicts will likely be politicised by some politicians. DPCs would be useful in deterring such politicians and providing conflict early warning information, but they are largely dormant because of lack of resources. The absence of active DPCs will make it challenging to detect conflicts early enough and deter violence.

2. In the medium-term, the inability of the national and county governments to build confidence in resource-sharing agreements could lead to a breakdown of these crucial conflict prevention and management mechanisms. The absence of such agreements could lead to increased disputes among communities over natural resources, and even violence.

3. In the long-term, the continued reliance of communities on subsistence-type livelihoods will continue to exert pressure on scarce natural resources.
resources, particularly because populations are growing. These trends, if left unaddressed, will likely generate more tension and violent conflicts in the years ahead.

1.6 Cattle Rustling

1.6.1 Nature of Conflicts and Key Actors

While the Isiolo County Police Commander and the County Commissioner claim that cattle rustling is on the decline, the menace continues to be a major issue of concern. Some 52 per cent of respondents in the household survey identified cattle rustling as a form of conflict that has persisted in the county since the introduction of devolution in 2013, while 44 per cent identified it as having persisted over the past 12 months. Several key informants indicate that raids are partly a manifestation of inter-ethnic conflict and rivalry. Firearms are used in most cattle raids which lead to deaths, maiming of people and loss of animals and other property. Women and children are particularly vulnerable during raids, which sometimes involve sexual violence. Between June and November 2015 alone, more than 50 people were killed, and hundreds of animals stolen in cattle raids in Isiolo. Cattle rustling has historically been viewed as a cultural practice of different communities, particularly the Samburu and Turkana. However, over the two or so decades it has become increasingly commercialised and politicised.

Morans or youth from the Turkana and Samburu communities are identified as the most involved in raids, although youth from other communities including the Borana, Meru and Somali, have also been involved. Some civil society informants claimed that elders have been accused of mobilising the youth, assisting them with planning, and providing weapons and other resources required to carry out attacks. Women are also accused of putting pressure on their husbands and sons to carry out revenge raids to protect the honour of their homes and communities. Fearing to appear weak, some men succumb to this pressure.

1.6.2 Key Drivers

While there have been many well-intentioned official attempts, including disarmament of communities, to address the problem of cattle rustling, there is no still no coherent policy to guide and coordinate the efforts of the relevant actors. In the absence of a clear policy, efforts are episodic and entail mainly security-oriented measures. Powerful individuals thought to be involved in cattle rustling are seldom arrested or prosecuted, and therefore enjoy impunity.

At a cultural level, some communities in Isiolo consider involvement of youth in cattle rustling to be a rite of passage that marks the transition from childhood to adulthood. Insufficient attention has been paid to this belief system, which creates conditions for cattle rustling to continue.

Key informants, including government officials, suggest that cattle rustling is today disconnected from culture. Instead, it is a profit-making venture that has attracted criminal syndicates comprised of powerful business actors and politicians. Owing to the poorly regulated livestock market in Kenya, stolen animals are not easy to track and end up in areas such as Nairobi where there is high demand for meat.

Other key informants also suggest that unemployment and lack of opportunities for the youth in Isiolo has driven some into cattle rustling. Many young people are disillusioned and do not see any other feasible means of earning a living other than turning to crime. The need to provide for basic needs for themselves and their families seems to outweigh the risk of death, injury or arrest.

Local elders also encourage the youth to engage in cattle rustling because they themselves receive the lion’s share of the spoils. Cattle are also a patronage resource for elders. When cattle are stolen, elders not only get to keep some, but also distribute others to community members, increasing their power and influence.

According to the Isiolo County Commissioner, the proliferation of illegal small arms is a key driver of cattle rustling. Readily available firearms in the county have led many youths to get involved in cattle rustling as firearms tend to give raiders confidence and make their criminal activities more successful.

Some FGD participants suggested that certain sections of some communities are envious of the success of other communities which have larger tracts of land, herds of animals and are perceived to get more official development attention. As a result, they plan and carry out raids with the hope of getting even.

Politicians have also been accused of providing resources to

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11 Inter-Ministerial Committee (2012), Report of the Inter- Ministerial Committee on Conflicts over Management of Conservancies in Isiolo County, 18.
local communities to support cattle rustling so as to consolidate the support they enjoy, particularly around election seasons. This view resonates with the findings of recent studies on cattle rustling in Isiolo (and other parts of Kenya) conducted by Feinstein International Centre and UNDP.

1.6.3 Key Triggers
Cattle raids in Isiolo are usually carried out in retaliation to previous attacks. A cycle of attacks and counter-attacks is then set in motion. These cycles seem to continue for extended periods because attackers often go unpunished.

1.6.4 Mitigating Measures and Potential

**Office of the County Commissioner-Isiolo**
The Office of the County Commissioner in Isiolo has been instrumental in leading peace talks between communities affected by cattle rustling. It is respected and when it intervenes, attacks die down for a while. The office also collaborates with effective and respected organisations involved in conflict management, such as Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT), Isiolo Inter-faith and Isiolo Peace Link to promote dialogue between communities affected by cattle rustling. This kind of collaboration gives the civil society actors the much-needed official anchor for their activities.

Nonetheless, some of the approaches it uses are questionable. For instance, in November 2015, it ordered security personnel to shoot-to-kill anyone found with illegal firearms or involved in cattle rustling. While resolute action should be taken to address these issues, shoot-to-kill orders remain illegal under Kenyan law.

**National Police Service**
The police play a key role in addressing cattle rustling in Isiolo. However, most respondents interviewed for this study felt that prevention efforts by the police have been weak and far between. According to some respondents, the police are only active when raids have occurred and they are required to investigate and collect bodies of victims. There is little confidence that they have the capacity to bring attackers to justice, as their promises to do so have remained largely unfulfilled. Indeed, as stated earlier, a minority (32 per cent) of respondents in the household survey believe that the police are effective in addressing conflicts.

According to the Isiolo Police County Commander, there are several factors that hinder police effectiveness in responding to cattle rustling. They complain that the areas they are expected to patrol are expansive and they lack adequate vehicles and fuel to do so effectively. They lack modern crime-fighting technologies and the presence of many illegal arms also greatly complicates their work. However, since they started to partner with NRT, the police have tapped into previously unavailable resources, including expertise to trace attackers and stolen animals, as well as extra vehicles and fuel to enhance their mobility. The police also indicate that the peace programmes undertaken by NRT strongly complement their law enforcement work.

**Councils of Elders**
Local councils of elders remain instrumental in the prevention and mitigation of cattle rustling. They are influential and respected, to the extent that youth even ask for their permission to carry out retaliatory raids. Some 39 per cent of respondents in the household survey have identified them as effective actors in conflict mitigation. They play a key role in pacifying communities by bringing them together to dialogue after raids have occurred, thereby contributing to the prevention of retaliatory attacks.

**Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT)**
Established in 2004, the NRT has been at the forefront of responding to cattle rustling, a fact confirmed by the Isiolo County Commissioner and many civil society informants. The organisation works in partnership with councils of elders, local communities, local conservancies, youth and political leaders, the Isiolo county government, the County Security Committee and the National Police Service, among others. Security agencies and county governments are keen to work with NRT because of its expertise and experience in making the linkages between peace, security and development. To this end, NRT’s programmes focus on livelihoods development, supporting building of infrastructure and assisting counties to develop relevant policies and legislation to address conflict. NRT is respected by local communities and has convened peace meetings and peace-oriented sporting events, among other past initiatives.

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¹³ NRT’s interventions are discussed in the section on “Cattle Rustling”.

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Mid-Kenya Programme (Merti, Isiolo)
Registered as an NGO, Mid-Kenya Programme focuses on natural resource management in the vast Merti region of Isiolo County. It partners closely with different organisations, including NRT, to create awareness on the dangers of using violence to address resource-based conflicts.

1.6.5 Future Scenarios
1. Many key informants indicate that the work of NRT stands to have a great impact in addressing cattle rustling. With reliable streams of funding and continued partnerships with the security agencies, civil society actors and local communities, this impact can be enhanced further and sustained.

2. As the 2017 general election nears, inter-ethnic rivalries are likely to be stoked by political actors. If this leads to open conflict, one of the manifestations of violence that may be seen is cattle rustling. Should this occur, then the usual cycle of attacks and counter-attacks can be expected to return.
2. Garissa County

2.1 County Profile
Garissa borders the Republic of Somalia to the east, Lamu County to the south, Tana River County to the west, Isiolo County to the north-west and Wajir to the north. The county has a population of 623,060 as per the 2009 National Census and it has an area of 45,720 sq. km. It is divided into six constituencies; Fafi, Garissa Township, Balambala, Lagdera, Dadaab and Ijara. In addition, there are thirty county electoral wards. Garissa is a Muslim majority Somali speaking county. Pastoralism is the main mode of livelihood especially for those living outside trading centres. Camels, goats and sheep are dominant in most of the area. Whenever there is shortage of rainfall, herders move to other counties in search of greener pastures, especially Isiolo. But higher rainfall and good grasslands in parts of Garissa support cattle keeping. Pastoralism, especially for camel herders, involves lengthy seasonal migrations across northern Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia, and requires maximum mobility. Cycle climatic change has also exposed the pastoralists to environmental shocks. Aside from pastoralism, commerce also forms part of economic activity in Garissa. Small but fast-growing towns are the centres of local and cross-border commerce. Regional commerce is vibrant and is linked to markets and production in Somalia and Ethiopia. Traders sustain their businesses by engaging in cross-border trade, sometimes without paying customs because of a weak border enforcement regime. The county is also a home to at least 600,000 refugees.

This study finds that ethnic/clan conflicts, political conflicts, violent extremism and natural resource-based/land-related conflicts rank as the most prevalent forms of conflict and insecurity in Garissa. There is a broad concurrence from all respondents in the household survey (see figure 10 above), government and civil society officials informants, FGDs on this point. Conflicts in Garissa are broadly divided into old and new. Old conflicts are those that have been present in the county for quite some time. They can further be divided into conflicts arising from the communities’ pastoral form of livelihood. They are mostly natural resource water and pasture-based conflicts. An increase in human and livestock population continues to place a huge strain on an already fragile arid and semi-arid ecosystem, hence making the communities more vulnerable to conflicts. The second form under the old conflict is the political. This conflict is a function of the Somali community’s form social

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**Public Perceptions on Cause of Conflict - Garissa**

![Figure 11: Public perceptions on causes of conflict in Garissa](image)

This study has established that ethnic hatred, political competition and competition over natural resources rank highest as the most significant causes of conflict and insecurity in Garissa, followed by unemployment and weak government institutions. The data from the household survey (see figure 11 above), interviews with elders/opinion leaders, government and civil society actors, as well as previous research converge on this point.

**Public Perceptions of Effectiveness of Government Institutions - Garissa**

![Figure 12: Public perceptions government agencies’ effectiveness in addressing conflict in Garissa](image)
The trend seen in Isiolo holds for Garissa. Peace and security structures such as chiefs, assistant chiefs and Nyumba Kumi committees are perceived by the public (see figure 12 above), key informants and FGD participants as among the most effective intercessors in mitigating conflict and insecurity. Moreover, despite their perceived excesses, the police are seen by a significant percentage of the public, 53 per cent, as being effective, ranking first (see figure 12 above).

2.2 Ethnic-Political Conflict

2.2.1 Nature of Conflict and Key Actors

Several studies undertaken by various stakeholders in Garissa show that ethnic and political conflicts are rampant in the county. Ethnic and political conflicts are ranked highest at 56 per cent and 44 per cent respectively by respondents as persistent forms of conflict in the county. Key informant interviews and FGDs reveal that in most of the ethnic or clan conflicts, youth and men are the primary participants as the fighters. Women play the catalytic role as well as raising money while elders play the duo role of sanctioning the conflict -- giving their 'blessings', but also mediate when circumstances demand. Despite social-political changes, the elders' role in the community hasn't diminished. Together with the clerics -- the Council of Ulema - they are seen as a neutral and legitimate arbiter in the event of conflict.

Since introduction of multiparty politics, competition for political seats has increased conflicts in Garissa. While ethnic conflict has a long history in the community, it has become deadly and high casualty. Some of the FGD participants attribute the increase in casualties during conflicts to the collapse of Somalia and availability of illegal arms. The violence has also become more organised and involves both "guns for hire" and standing private militias answering to local politicians. The national political parties and coalitions of parties vying for power complicated the 2013 general election. Larger tribes and clans in northern Kenya sometimes find themselves split by rival political elites affiliated with different coalitions.

2.2.2 Key Drivers

Some 38 per cent of respondents to the household survey believe that political competition contributes to conflict in the county. The key driver of ethnic and political conflict is the reduction of politics into a zero sum game, where one clan's or sub-clan's victory is seen as a loss for another. What is practically an individual loss is made a communal one, creating a siege mentality between the clans/sub-clans. Additionally, for some individuals from the clan, victory means being able to access the State largess, particularly under the county government. This means that if an individual from one's clan is the governor or a county executive, once can expect to receive preferential treatment in accessing employment and tender opportunities in the county government.

As a result, boundaries and migration is a sensitive issue since most boundaries are based on ethnic composition. Migration is seen as an attempt by a 'rival' clan to dislodge another clan from power by increasing its votes in the area the clan is migrating to.

2.2.3 Mitigation Potential and Measures

All the peace and security institutions have so far played a minimal role in addressing political conflicts in Garissa County. Unlike in other conflicts, few institutions have the across the board capacity, legitimacy and political will to address this issue. The county government is a party to the conflict and cannot therefore be a neutral arbiter.

National security sector agencies

According to several key informants and focus group discussions, the relations between security agencies; the police, especially the specialised agencies -- ATPU, NIS -- and the community is poor. While these poor relations predate the anti-terrorism security operations, the overzealous policing of the community has exacerbated this. This has become acute since 2011 when Kenya intervened in Somalia, and subsequently launched domestic counter-terrorism operations following an increase in Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya. Garissa has itself suffered multiple attacks including at Garissa University in April 2015 in which 147 people, mostly students, were killed. The security agencies response to Al Shabaab attacks has been characterised by excessive use of force, torture, disappearances and extra-judicial killings.

Initially, trust between the community in Garissa and security agencies was absent following the disproportionate and excessive use of force by the police in response to a series of terrorist attacks in the county. Relations between the community and the security agencies improved tremendously following the appointment of Mohamud Ali

19 www.asdp.ke
20 Garissa County information-infro-track East Africa www.infortrack.co.ke
21 (PDF) GARISSA COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF KENYA www.cog.go.ke/images/stories.
Saleh as the northeastern regional coordinator. This was as a result of his open-door policy with all the stakeholders. The community perception is that his arrival has made the security situation better. His arrival also coincided with the change by security agencies in their community engagement and tactics and in particular their kneejerk use of collective punishment of the community whenever criminal activities occurred.

Haki na Sheria Initiative (HSI)

HSI is a community-based organisation. HSI’s primary focus is to provide a platform for the promotion of the participation of marginalised communities in governance and reduce human rights violations in the county. It carries out interventions focusing on access to justice, governance and accountability, women and youth empowerment and protection and promotion of cultural rights.

2.2.4 Future Scenarios

1. The high stakes political competition between groups such as the Abdwaq and Auwliyahan sub-clans will likely define the contest in the coming general election. For Abdwaq, missing out on the governor’s position is loss of pride as well as substantive control of county’s resources. The third sub-clan, Abdalla, will determine who will get an outright victory between the two sub-clans. This contest may not necessarily end in conflict, but it will create a significant inter-sub-clan tension.

2. Using a mixture of formal and informal, mostly informal traditional mechanisms and infrastructure, the community has sustainably addressed some of the traditional pastoral conflicts. However, these mechanisms and institutions -- council of elders or religious leaders -- have certain limitations. They lack enforceability partly since some of them are not necessarily anchored in law. Additionally, some of the conflicts are beyond their remits, for instance, the land question and boundary conflicts. In the long term, the gap in legal and policy mechanisms on land is the primary challenge. As long as land is ‘owned’ by the counties on behalf of the community, and no individual ownership is in place, communities could be easily displaced in the event of State-led large-scale infrastructure development, and the community will have no legal recourse. But even more important, determination of the boundaries will continue to be contested.

3. Politicised ethnicity in Garissa has the potential of being a driver of conflict. The nature of conflict will be determined by the role played by the swing clan. Part of tempering the polarisation that could eventually lead to conflict, may be the adoption of a route taken by the Garre council of elders in determining who runs for elective position. The ‘negotiated democracy’ approach prioritises inclusivity over a leader’s development record.

2.3 Natural Resource-Based Conflict

2.3.1 Nature of Conflict and Key Actors

Since pastoralism is the main source livelihood, natural resource based conflicts -- fights over water and pasture -- have been the major source of conflict. The findings of the household survey show that the public in Garissa rank the persistence of conflicts over these resources higher than any other form. Human and livestock populations have placed more pressure on the land’s carrying capacity. Additionally, recurrent dry spells and drought in the surrounding counties have resulted in diminished pasture reserves, and increased the subsequent movement of livestock from the adjoining counties of Wajir, Marsabit, Tana River, Isiolo, Samburu, and Garissa. These conflicts over natural resources assume an ethnic dimension. Since land has not be adjudicated and demarcated, it is owned by the community rather than an individual basis. The communities know their boundaries through informal council of elders’ structures.

Despite the Council of Elder’s mechanism, competition and contested claims on specific grazing lands create tension that increases the possibility of a conflict. One member of the Council of Elders interviewed for this study notes that the growing resource scarcity in pastoral zones is attributed to population increase, environmental degradation and restricted access to pasture which then heighten tension. Close examination of case studies of communal clashes in the region reveal a near complete preoccupation on the part of clans and their leaders with gaining access and staking claims to pasture and watering sites while warding off rivals. Grazing and water point committees have been instrumental in mediating in the event of conflicts. FGD participants explain that there are enforceable rules of engagement. For instance, during droughts, the community will pay maintenance fee for wells and agree on what days of the week they can bring their livestock to the wells. Violations of the rules are also followed by sanctions enforced by the water and pasture committees.

2.3.2 Key Drivers

Communal disputes over contested pastoral land have turned violent when clans establish small settlements or boreholes that are then used to mark the territory

as their own. One example is the long-running dispute between Makabul and Aulihan Somali clans over valuable seasonal riverine land on the Wajir-Garissa boundary. Three settlements were established in the disputed area as well as a bolehole, by both clans, resulting in armed clashes and an arms build-up. The land is held in trust by the county as no proper adjudication has been done. The delay in passing the Community Land Act, 2015, has exacerbated the problem.

One of the most common complaints in Kenya and one that was validated by investigations into the 2008 electoral violence is that communal violence is often triggered by decisions made by political elites who seek to advance their interests through clashes. In northern Kenya, this allegation has been repeatedly leveled by local observers against both elected and unelected leaders, some local, others living in Nairobi or even in the Diaspora. These and other observers report that political leaders from northern Kenyan communities are increasingly relying on their own private security forces, mirroring wider use of private political forces in Kenya. To the extent that communal violence is planned and ordered by violence entrepreneurs, it demands close analysis of the machinations of political and private sector elites, and a range of other potential spoilers.

Land disputes between neighbouring ethnic groups are a powerful underlying source of conflict because the demarcation of administrative boundaries also assumes ethnic/clan dimensions. While this has been a constant fixture in Garissa County, devolution has made it acute. Garissa has boundary disputes with Isiolo. The fact that land is held in trust of the community by the county has made the issue to fester.

Since pastoralism is predicated on uninhibited mobility in search for pastures and water, communities transverse the boundaries, making migration a long-term contestation. This pattern has created winners and losers as stronger pastoral groups have pushed their way into rangeland once held by others. For instance, Lagdera, which has more rangeland has been a site of contest between rival clans living in Garissa.

Refugees in Garissa have been living in the Dadaab Refugee Camp for over two decades and have become an easy target for recruitment by armed groups. There are at least 600,000 refugees who have a disproportionate impact in a few border areas, most notably in the Northern half of Garissa County, where the five camps at Dadaab are located. Most of the direct problems of insecurity involving Dadaab have occurred inside the camp or in the perimeter areas and involve chronic and serious violent crime. The camp’s large population comprises of unemployed youth, some of whom have lived there their entire lives, thus easily recruited to join armed groups. Many refugees have claimed that there is no trust between them and the police, claiming that instead of the police offering them security and protection, they rob their shops. For instance, the Kenyan Government has repeatedly called for the closing of the camp and return of the refugees to Somalia because Al Shabaab has been actively recruiting from inside the camp, and some of the attacks that occurred in Garissa were planned there. Al Shabaab is the most active group in the camp in recruiting, raising revenues and periodically engaging in acts of violence.

2.3.3 Mitigation and Potential Measures

Council of elders

Traditional councils of elders negotiate application of customary law – an important mechanism of conflict management and resolution. But elders are also critical actors in mobilising their lineages for conflict. Whether elders promote peace or foment conflict depends on a combination of factors, including the interests of their lineage, their level of integrity or venality and wider political pressures placed on them. The elders also mediate in sustainable management of land and water resources, mitigating conflicts and promoting mutual support and collective action during times of crisis. Despite the social, political, economic and technological changes, the council of elders within the Somali community enjoys unrivalled trust, although that trust is not as significant as it has been in the past. The elders’ principal role is to be the representatives of their community. They are first and foremost negotiators on behalf of their lineages. Skilled elders are effective in finding compromises that allow for negotiated settlements for crimes or armed clashes. Very respected elders are sometimes asked to serve as mediators in conflicts involving other ethnic groups or clans. Their utility gets compromised when they begin playing a role in local politics.

2.3.4 Future Scenarios

1. As a result of climate change, the pastoralists will move more often in search of pasture and water, which puts them in conflict with other pastoralists or agro-pastoralists. For instance, the conflict between the Borana in the neighbouring county of Isiolo which has more water and larger grazing zones, is because of the drought frequency in Garissa. The continued climate change shocks and stresses make pastoralism a perilous form of livelihood. It also makes conflict over resources such as water and pasture an ever-present threat in the short to long term.

2. The place of the councils of elder is steadily being eroded. Although the younger generation is still respectful of the institution of council of elders, that respect is waning with every successive generation. The councils of elders are also increasingly being seen as less neutral, especially when it comes to politics. The decline of this structure will eventually deny the county a critical mitigation avenue and potentially open up room for conflict and instability.
2.4 Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

2.4.1 Nature of the Conflict and Key Actors

Being home to at least 600,000 refugees and its closer proximity to Somalia border has made Garissa susceptible not only Al Shabaab attacks but also recruitment of youth to join the terrorist group. Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) intervention in Somalia in 2011 after a series of cross-border attacks of tourists and humanitarian workers, has also seen an increase in Al Shabaab inside Kenya’s territory. For instance, of the 116 “conflict events” attributed to Al Shabaab in Kenya between 2009 and the end of 2014, 63 per cent (73 attacks) occurred in northern Kenya counties. Prior to 2011, Al Shabaab controlled the border town of Beled Hawa but opted not to engage in cross-border attacks in northern Kenya and they are believed to have had an understanding with KDF in the Mandera border region.

Most Al Shabaab attacks in northern Kenya have been in Garissa County, but Mandera has suffered the most lethal attacks, especially in late 2014. Two major attacks were especially significant. The first occurred on November 22, 2014, when a Nairobi-bound bus was stopped by Al Shabaab fighters, who separated Muslim and non-Muslim passengers and executed all 28 non-Muslim passengers. According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), Garissa has been the site of 34 per cent of Al Shabaab terrorist attacks in Kenya, making it the most targeted area. These attacks have sharply risen since 2011. They include assassinations, ambushes, grenade attacks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In Dadaab, Al Shabaab has targeted suspected informants, defectors and collaborators within the camps and Kenyan security forces, police, government officials and aid workers outside the camps.

Since the Garissa University attack in 2015, the number of Al Shabaab attacks in Garissa has declined. FGDs and key informant interviews suggested that the other reason for the decline is the improved relations between the community and security agencies. For instance, in the past, to the security agencies the difference between the community and Al Shabaab was indistinguishable; in the event of an attack, the security agencies collectively punished the community. This bred longstanding resentment of the security agencies.

According to several key informants, security agencies are increasingly developing a more nuanced understanding of Al Shabaab’s threat and are increasingly employing mixed approaches as opposed to just the use of force. As part of the community outreach and countering Al Shabaab, the Council of Ulema has been active in mosques in Garissa and within the interfaith circles, particularly post-Garissa University attack. This is significant because Al Shabaab has been trying unsuccessfully to divide Muslims and Christians. The attacks on churches were intended to give the clash a religious hue. At some point, according to a pastor, the Christians felt under siege. However, through dialogue between the religious leaders, the two faiths now see each other more positively.

Despite improved relations between the community and security agencies, constant dialogue between Muslims and Christians and reduced attacks, Al Shabaab still maintains active local cells with community knowledge.

2.4.2 Key Drivers

Several factors have pushed the youth in Garissa to join and be recruited into violent groups like Al Shabaab. Close proximity to Somalia, historical State neglect, failure to give them identity cards and excessive policing during counter-terrorism operations continue to alienate the community. The upshot of this is a trust deficit, whereas trust is a critical component in fighting terrorism because of its complex nature. Some mosques and Madrassas have also been blamed for exposing the youth through preaching and teaching Al-Shabaab ideology.

The collapse of the Somalia government, civil war in Ethiopia in early 1990s and the decades-long on and off war in Sudan have seen the increase in illegal arms. Since pastoralists occupy frontiers that are less governed, and because of the threat from their rivals, they usually engage in an ‘arms race’, acquiring guns mostly for self-defense. Some key informants believe that the ethnic/clan conflicts have also seen huge casualties as the availability of deadlier weapons becomes easier. There have been several attempts at disarmament, but most have been relatively unsuccessful because they were more reactive and top-down led by the national government. In areas where disarmament has succeeded, it was more multi-sectoral with “…local elders, women representatives, local administrators, and law enforcers in joint non-coercive efforts to establish peace and manage small arms and light weapons.”

29 Climate Change Vulnerability and Adaptive Capacity in Garissa County, Kenya, Adaptation Learning Programme, (ALP) Care International, Pg. 4
2.4.3 Mitigating Measures and Potential

**SUPKEM-Garissa**

SUPKEM Garissa is part of the national umbrella of the Supreme Council of Muslims of Kenya. SUPKEM Garissa works with various government ministries and departments as well as with other partners -- national and international NGOs, FBOs and CBOs -- on interfaith outreach programmes in the county, particularly after the Garissa University College attack. As part of the work on de-radicalisation, SUPKEM has trained Madrassa teachers, youth and mosque Imams.

Although Garissa is predominantly Muslim, there is a significant Christian population, and SUPKEM enjoys across the board trust. This is partly because interfaith institutions and the Council of Elders together enjoy broad trust from State institutions and security agencies. Moreover, SUPKEM is also the oldest none-State organisation in Garissa. SUPKEM Garissa has the capacity to convene a cross-section of stakeholders especially in interfaith issues, countering extremism and de-radicalisation in the county.

**The Council of Clerics**

The Interfaith group and, especially for the Muslim community, the Council of Ulema are held in high regard in Garissa. One key informant states that they enjoy the twin characteristics of trust and legitimacy across the board, which makes them an extremely useful stakeholder in peace and security. The moral authority they exercise is seen by many as a useful ingredient. A women movement official interviewed for this study asserts that sermons delivered in the mosque or church can have a direct impact on subsequent security conditions.

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Africa Talent and Change Foundation (ATCF)

ATCF was founded in response to increasing acts of terrorism and extremism, with a view of ensuring peaceful co-existence between and among communities. ATCF was also established as a centre for countering violent extremism ideologies by planning and executing CVE workshops and forums for the youth.

2.4.4 Future Scenarios

1. While undoubtedly Al Shabaab’s capacity as a military and political force has been waning in Somalia, the group is still lethal and has carried out low-tech spectacular attacks inside Kenya. This is in addition to continued recruitment of Kenyans, beyond the traditional triangle of Northern Kenya, part of Nairobi -- Eastleigh and Majengo -- and the coastal region.

2. Garissa still remains extremely vulnerable to attacks as well as recruitment of the youth. Therefore, a combination soft and hard approaches of addressing violent extremism will be a useful antidote against recruitment of the youth. The present approach of using only force ends up alienating the same community -- the first responders in the addressing it.

3. While lately Garissa has been spared any large-scale terrorist attack, the county will continue to be vulnerable. Garissa’s vulnerability transcends the externally inspired groups. Domestic and local cells that have been latent can be equally as dangerous. Besides the use of force, crafting customised programmes addressing the drivers of domestic radicalisation in partnership with State and non-State actors will be important.

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3. **Kisumu County**

3.1 **County Profile**

Kisumu County is divided into seven sub-counties; Kisumu West, Kisumu East, Kisumu Central, Muhoroni, Nyakach, Nyando and Seme. It is home to the third largest city in Kenya. The county borders Vihiga and Nandi counties to the north, Kericho County to the east, Homa Bay County to the south and Siaya County to the west. It is home to 952,645 people and the population was projected to grow to 1,145,749 by 2017. The county's population is dominated by a large number of dependants. Three quarters of the population is under 30 years old and 43.5 per cent is under 15 years. The county is predominantly inhabited by Luo, Luhya and Gusii communities but there is also a small Kikuyu, Somali and Indians population. The county’s CIDP identifies the young population and high unemployment as threats to development. Poverty is prevalent in the county and manifests itself in other socio-economic outcomes, such as poor nutrition, health, education, as well as a lack of access to basic services.

Several types of conflict affect Kisumu: Those driven by ethnic violence along territorial boundaries, gangs and political violence. Cattle rustling has been taking place in the county in the past three years. Clan divisions have also caused instability in the running of the county government.

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**Figure 13: Public perceptions on prevalence of different forms of conflict in Kisumu**

This study finds that political conflicts, ethnic conflict, land-related conflicts and cattle rustling are the most prevalent forms of conflict and insecurity in Kisumu. There is a broad concurrence from all respondents to the household survey (see figure 16 above), government and civil society officials informants FGDs on this point.

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The findings of the household survey (see figure 14 above) on the causes of conflict and insecurity in Kisumu also seem to resonate with data gathered from key informant interviews and FGDs. There is a broad concurrence that ethnic hatred/chauvinism, political competition and lack of opportunities/unemployment are the leading causes of conflict and insecurity in Kisumu.

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*Figure 14: Public perceptions on causes of conflict in Kisumu*

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36 Kenya Interagency Rapid Assessment. (2014). Kisumu County Baseline Analysis

The trend seen in Isiolo and Garissa holds for Kisumu. Peace and security structures, such as chiefs and assistant chiefs and Nyumba Kumi committees are perceived by the public (see figure 15 above), key informants and FGD participants as effective interveners in mitigating conflict and insecurity in Kisumu. Moreover, despite their perceived excesses, the police are seen by a significant percentage of the public in Kisumu – 64 per cent- as being effective, again ranking highest (see figure 15 above).

3.2 Inter-Clan Divisions

3.2.1 Nature of Conflict and Key Actors
Several key informants note that clan conflicts in Kisumu are most acute between the dominant Kajulu, Kano and Nyakach clans, with the Kano clan being perceived to wield more power than the others. These conflicts revolve around competition for elective positions, particularly the posts of governor, senator, MP and MCA. Key informants claim that struggles for power between individuals in the Kisumu County government and the county assembly have been attributed to inter-clan rivalry. The wrangles grounded government business in 2015 following the suspension of the county assembly Speaker. In addition, these three clans dominate the county government to the general exclusion of other communities.

3.2.2 Key Drivers
Just as in the case of Isiolo County, the exclusivist politics of the Kano clan and its leaders in the Kisumu County Government are a reflection of Kenya’s historical political culture of patrimonialism. As in other places in Kenya, this culture endures and has cemented a misplaced sense of entitlement among populous and economically powerful communities. Devolution has heightened this mentality in Kisumu more than at any other time before.

Some key informants suggest that competition for control of political positions and allocation of county jobs and resources drive leaders to instrumentalise their clan identity to gain the political initiative. For instance, the current Kisumu governor is affiliated to the dominant Kano clan and there is the perception among many that he does not respect the idea of merit, and instead favours members of his clan in appointments and awarding of tenders. In response, clans and communities which feel excluded are said to have formed broad alliances to increase their bargaining power.

3.2.3 Mitigating Measures and Potential
There are no actors outside of the key political players who have the level of influence required to address the divisions among leaders and officials in Kisumu that have emerged as a result of clan-based politics. As in the case of Isiolo, this may be explained by the fact that these actors lack the access and influence required to encourage and convince politicians to change their attitudes and style of politics.

Local elders from different clans may exert some influence on the county leadership as they play a key role in election campaigns. However, their influence in this regard remains untested.
3.2.4 Future Scenarios
1. In the run-up to the August 2017 elections, it is likely that there will be heightened and even fierce clan-based competition for elective posts and county positions in Kisumu. There is the likelihood that this competition could spiral into violence if it is not closely monitored and addressed.

2. Even if violence does not occur, it is likely that this form of politics will influence many voters to elect their leaders on the basis of clan and/or ethnicity, paying little attention to their development pledges. The risk here is that voters may end up electing leaders who may not have any substantive programmes for the county’s development needs.

3.3 Gangs and Political Violence

3.3.1 Nature of Conflict and Key Actors
In the past two years, some political actors in Kisumu have reportedly formed gangs to intimidate and instil fear in their opponents and disrupt their activities. Notable gangs are China Squad, which is affiliated to the Jubilee Party, the American Marines associated with CORD coalition and the 42 Brothers. Some key informants claimed that local political leaders have also been forced to cooperate with these gangs, who extort money from them by demanding to be paid to mobilise youth to provide “security” at political events or mobilise supporters and distribute campaign materials. Politicians or political parties operating in Kisumu also have to seek the approval of these gangs to hold their activities or risk them being disrupted. About 31 per cent of the respondents noted that gangs are the perpetrators of conflict in the county.

One key informant suggested that gang members are paid about Sh700 each to provide security in events organised by politicians. American Marines and China Squad also generate resources through criminal activities such as looting, theft and even reportedly contract killings. Some key informants also claimed that the gangs own shops at bus stops and markets which they rent out.

The activities of these gangs have interfered with normal running of businesses in Kisumu, leading to further loss of employment and business opportunities. While some gang members have been arrested and prosecuted, the gang culture endures because of police failure to act on political actors who fund and back the gangs.

3.3.2 Key Drivers
The main economic activities in Kisumu are fishing, farming, informal businesses such as boda boda and small-scale trading. However, low levels of development, poor infrastructure and an anaemic economy have greatly reduced the availability of opportunities in these sectors for the growing youth population, creating the conditions for gangs to emerge. While many youth are employed in the informal sector, particularly the boda boda industry, farming and small-scale trading, many more remain unemployed.

Stiff competition between political aspirants during party nominations and electoral competition such as during the 2013 election season has led to some political actors resorting to using gang violence to gain the political initiative. A majority of the respondents (61 per cent) pointed out that political competition is the cause of violent conflict in the county.

Some civil society informants also suggest that these gangs are motivated by the need to become powerful economic actors as evidenced by the efforts to run legitimate businesses, such as shops.

3.3.3 Mitigating Measures and Potential

The Office of the County Commissioner - Kisumu County
The county commissioner and his deputy have been significant in providing leadership in addressing political violence. The national government officials partner with the police in beefing up security during conflict in hotspots such as Kondele and Nyalenda A and Nyalenda B. Some of the key informants, however, argued that the government initiatives are more reactive than preventive. Some of the residents suggest that the county commissioner has not been effective at the grassroots level. In the survey, only three per cent of the respondents believed that the office of the county commissioner had capacity to prevent and address conflict in Kisumu County.

Security Committee of the County Assembly
The security committee of the Kisumu County Assembly is widely involved in formulating policies and security strategies for the county. However, most of the strategies adopted and advanced are not implemented due to lack of the capacity of the committee to influence changes in the security sector because of inadequate resources. Some of the key informants argued that failure to devolve security has made such committees redundant.

The National Cohesion Integration Commission (NCIC)
The NCIC has been instrumental in public campaigns and discussions against political violence. NCIC has also stepped up efforts to summon political actors implicated in hate speech and incitement in the county. However, so far there has been no prosecution of those involved in incitement to violence in the area.

Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHRC)
The KNHRC mitigation efforts have involved monitoring and oversight on issues of human rights violations. The KNHRC is also engaged in conducting investigations and inquiries.
into perceived human rights abuses. Only eight per cent of respondents in the household survey identified the commission as being effective in addressing conflict in the county. Some key informants perceive the commission as effective but slow implementation of recommendations by the commission’s reports on human rights violations have slowed down reforms in the security sector in the county.

National Police Service
In Kisumu, the police service is one of the main actors in prevention and mitigation of conflict. The police have been involved in patrols especially in conflict hotspots such as Nyalenda A, Nyalenda B, Kondele and Muhoroni. However, the poor relationship between the police and public has watered down policing efforts in the county. Some key informants believe that harassment and use of excessive force during peaceful demonstrations and ordinary policing activities such as patrols may have contributed to the poor public-police relations. Some of the interviewed informants from the civil society were of the view that the police officers deployed use excessive violence. Gangs are a target of the police, who feel that they are a source of conflict in the area. Reformed gangs such as members of Baghdad for Peace, an NGO currently undertaking peace initiatives, are also targeted by police, who are still suspicious of them. Despite this, a majority of 64 per cent of respondents indicated that the police are the most effective government agency in preventing and reducing conflict in the county.

Chiefs
Many key informants and FGD participants suggest that chiefs remain influential in prevention and mitigation of gang and political violence. According to the area chief in Kisumu South West, chiefs organise meetings known as ‘barazas’, comprising of community elders, youth and women representatives. Some respondents suggested that chiefs have been effective in bringing disputing parties together and promoting dialogue. Muhoroni DPCs have also partnered with chiefs, local NGOs and county government officials in establishing early warning systems.

Nyumba Kumi committees
The committees have been instrumental in promoting cohesion and peaceful coexistence through knowledge of one’s neighbours. The committees have gained credibility and recognition in parts of Kakolwa, Nyalenda, Kanyawengi and the Northern region of Kisumu. The effectiveness of these committees is based on the level of citizens’ participation in policing. Moreover, the committees have been a source of intelligence on insecurity and conflict. Nyumba Kumi committees have worked collaboratively with the police to provide intelligence on potential conflict or insecurity.

Kisumu Sub-County Peace Forums
Prior to the 2013 general election, Sub-County Peace Forums in Kisumu City, where gangs operate, were perceived to be effective in addressing conflicts, particularly in conflict early warning. At present, they are not as active although some continue to conduct peace dialogues in conflict hotspots such as Kondele, Nyalenda A and B with the aim of strengthening cohesion and understanding among communities.

Baghdad for Peace (BAFOPE)
Formed in 1992, the organisation is made up of reformed gang members who have transformed to become peace ambassadors. It started out as the Kisumu Anti-Violence Lobby Group (KAVILOG). BAFOPE brings together some 15 youth groups with 20 members each, who work to recruit other youths into their peace initiatives. BAFOPE is also mainstreaming gender in its peace-building activities. BAFOPE’s main strength is its ability to gain access to gangs and to engage them in dialogue. They have also run a project to monitor hate speech at political events in Kisumu. Its members have also received training in community policing and some have been supported to receive vocational training.

Civil Society Organisation (CSO)-Network
This organisation is principally involved in governance, youth and peace issues. It has partnered with various local organisations, including Local Capacities for Peace International (LCPI) to implement peace work in Nyalenda and Kondele. The organisation operates a conflict early warning system for Kisumu City, and also trains community leaders on peace building and conflict management.

National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK)
This is the umbrella body of protestant churches in Kenya and has a long history in peace building and conflict prevention. NCCK has developed a comprehensive programme to promote peace and reconciliation at the community level and to link community based-structures with national decision-making processes by lobbying government entities on conflict resolution on political violence in Kisumu County. The organisation has partnered with the Kisumu governor, the county government and civil society organisations in lobbying the national government to be active in conflict resolution activities on gang and political violence. Members drawn from the Nyanza regional office have been representatives on National Steering committee responsible for peace-building.

3.3.4 Future Scenarios
1. Without resolute government action to root out and prosecute members of gangs in Kisumu, there is
the likelihood that unscrupulous political actors will mobilise them to carry out violence during the 2017 election season.

2. In the long term, the county government and relevant national agencies will need to make significant investments in the Kisumu economy to create jobs and income-generating opportunities for youth at risk of conflict with the law. Where this is not acknowledged and done, there is the likelihood that many youth leaving school will have few prospects of succeeding and may turn to gangs and other illegal activities.

3.4 Ethnic Violence in Boundary Areas

3.4.1 Nature of Conflict and Key Actors

Violence between members of the Luo and the Kalenjin communities near the Kisumu County-Nandi County boundary has flared on and off since the early 1990s. In fact, 15 per cent of the surveyed respondents indicated that inter-ethnic conflict is one of the notable conflicts that have occurred in the county since the introduction of devolution. DPC members in Muhoroni interviewed for this study reported that in June 2016, clashes between members of the Luo and Nandi communities in Kopere, Muhoroni, resulted in deaths, partly because of the weak police presence in the area. Cattle were also stolen during the clashes. According to civil society key informants, these clashes have adversely affected farming and businesses in centres such as Kibigori, Kopere and Chemase. Interestingly, it is believed that youth from the two communities colluded to steal the cattle. Earlier, in January 2016, five people were killed and 15 injured in clashes at the Muhoroni (Kisumu) and Tinderet (Nandi) boundary area. During the clashes, eight houses were burnt in Kibigori, rendering some families homeless.

Boundary disputes have also been a cause of conflict between members of the Luo and Luhyas in Maseno, which borders Vihiga County. Perceptions of discrimination against Luhyas in employment at Luo-dominated education institutions in Maseno have also been a source of ethnic tension between the two communities. In all these conflicts, it is young men who have perpetrated the violence. Key informants pointed out that in some communities, such as the Nandi, the elders sanction the youth to carry out attacks and counter-attacks. Of those surveyed, 66 per cent of the respondents in Kisumu indicated that women are the most affected when conflict erupts while 49 per cent indicated that children are the most affected.

Some key informants pointed out that women are sometimes involved in inciting men to participate in clashes, especially on the Kisumu-Nandi boundary. Men who fail to participate in clashes are labelled ‘weaklings’. Women also reportedly cook for warriors and sing songs of praise to them.

3.4.2 Key Drivers

Unresolved boundary disputes and delays in compensating squatters in some areas of the Kisumu-Nandi, Kisumu-Vihiga and Kisumu-Kisii boundaries have created fertile ground for conflict in these areas. Competition between the Kisumu and Vihiga county governments for control of revenue collection in Maseno has also contributed to ethnic tensions. Luhyas living in disputed areas at the boundary are concerned that land they believe belongs in Vihiga now falls in Kisumu County and will be occupied under leasehold as opposed to freehold terms that prevail in Vihiga. This issue has been brought to the attention of both the National Lands Commission and the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), but it remains unresolved.

Some key informants suggest that political competition between leaders of the Luo and Nandi communities has also influenced ethnic conflict at the Kisumu-Nandi boundary. For instance, the 2009 fallout between Raila Odinga and William Ruto further divided the two communities.

Historically, the planners and perpetrators of ethnic violence in Kisumu, as in other parts of Kenya, have enjoyed impunity. From the early 1990s when ethnic violence became a serious concern in Kenya, there have been few arrests or prosecutions. Recommendations for action against planners and perpetrators by several official inquiries, including the 2009 Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence, have largely been ignored by criminal justice actors. This can be explained by the fact that powerful national leaders have themselves been implicated in ethnic violence and have used their influence over these institutions to block prosecutions.

Unchecked divisive national and local-level political rhetoric seems to have deepened perceptions of exclusion and marginalisation and acted to promote ethnic chauvinism and tensions in Kisumu. Of those interviewed in the household survey in Kisumu, 35 per cent noted that ethnic hatred is a key driver of conflict. Failed efforts to reconcile the communities in conflict in the county have also contributed to the cycles of tension and violence between them. Moreover, perceptions by many Luos that they have been excluded and marginalised by other communities in national development seem to have created a siege mentality among many, and as a result, some of them view other communities living in Luoland as “outsiders”. This mentality has created tension between Luos and non-Luo people in Kisumu County.

The collapse of agricultural based industries in Kisumu in the 1980-1980s also resulted in massive unemployment. In the past, companies such as Chemili Sugar and Miwani...
Sugar in Muhoroni, as well as Kisumu Cotton Mills, provided employment to many youths in the county. However, owing to mismanagement, they are operating at low capacity. KICOMI has been wound up.

### 3.4.3 Key Triggers

Some key informants indicated that in the past, politicians have incited local communities to violence during political events such as rallies. In particular, incendiary speeches made during campaigns have triggered ethnic violence in Kisumu.

Ordinary crimes, such as robberies, have also sparked communal violence in places like the Kisumu-Nandi boundary. These incidents trigger a cycle of attacks and counter-attacks.

Several respondents indicated that divisive and hateful rhetoric propounded through social media, SMS and even local FM radio broadcasts have also triggered ethnic violence in the county.

### 3.4.4 Mitigating Measures and Potential

**Kisumu Sub-County Peace Forums**

Prior to the 2013 general election, Sub-County Peace Forums in the Kisumu-Nandi boundary areas were perceived to be effective in addressing conflicts, particularly in conflict early warning. They have diverse membership comprising youth, former civil servants and clergy, which allows them to have greater legitimacy, reach and influence that is required to address conflicts. They have active partnerships with development organisations, such as World Vision and national government agencies, which provide relief support in conflict hotspots. However, peace forums are not in operation in the Kisumu-Vihiga and Kisumu-Kisii boundary areas.

**The Office of the County Commissioner**

The current Kisumu county commissioner has been instrumental in mitigation efforts aimed at addressing ethnic violence in the boundary areas. He works with government officials such as chiefs to gather early warning signs of conflict in Muhoroni. In the recent past, he ordered chiefs to profile perpetrators of ethnic violence in their areas for action from law enforcers. In various instances, he has partnered with the police to quell tensions in the Kisumu-Nandi boundary and Kisumu-Vihiga counties’ conflict. In 2016, the commissioner authorised the setting up of a police post in Songhor, Muhoroni and sought deployment of anti-stock theft police on the Kisumu-Nandi boundary to address the problem of cattle rustling.

**Chiefs**

The national government, through chiefs, mitigates inter-ethnic conflicts by promoting dialogue and conducting barazas to create awareness on the problems facing the county. Chiefs in parts of Muhoroni also create entry points for civil society actors to carry out peace work at the local level. They are considered effective as they are legitimate and have intimate familiarity with local communities and the conflict issues of concern.

**Nyumba Kumi committees**

Nyumba Kumi committees have been instrumental in creating cohesion at the neighbourhood level. There provide a forum for people of different ethnicities to work together to make their communities safer and to establish trust and friendships. However, the effectiveness of the committees is yet determined and some residents doubt their usefulness altogether.

**National Police Service**

There is the perception that the police only intervene in ethnic conflicts when situations get out of control. Once the conflict has subsided, the police are no longer available. Although they tend to be effective in responding to ethnic violence, they are weak at prevention.

**Team Empowerment for Action Initiative (TEAM)**

This grassroots civil society actor is focused on promoting democratic governance, human rights, constitution and constitutionalism. TEAM runs youth and women empowerment and conducts faith based civic education on conflict sensitivity and negative impacts of conflict. It also partners with other civil society actors to sensitise communities on self-reliant livelihood options. The civil society works collaboratively with other non-governmental organisations on democracy, governance and gender programmes.

**Kisumu Youth and Development Working Group (KYDWG)**

This network of nine CSOs has conducted a number of public forums in the county focused on identifying and prioritising community needs and development projects for implementation in wards. The forums have partly focused on options for addressing inter-ethnic conflict. The working group is a good model as it brings together groups such as CSO Network and TEAM, which have a focus on ethnic violence, to share ideas and strategies.

### 3.4.5 Future Scenarios

1. If the boundary disputes are not addressed by the counties concerned with the support of the national government, they are likely to be politicised in the 2017 election season and thereafter, and could result in new outbreaks of violence.

2. If the criminal justice system continues to fail to act against the planners and perpetrators of ethnic conflict at boundary areas in Kisumu, they will likely be emboldened to commit violence in future.
3.5 Cattle Rustling

3.5.1 Nature of Conflict and Key Actors
Cattle rustling is dominant in Chemilil and Muhoroni areas. One raid is typically followed by a retaliatory raid, and subsequent cycles of raids and counter-raids.

Youths from the Luo and the Nandi communities are the main perpetrators. Several key informants claimed that Kalenjin youth usually attack men during raids but spare women and children. Youth reportedly use bows, arrows and machetes during raids and have been known to set ablaze sugar cane fields. Boda bodas are used to ferry youths to attack sites.

One key informant claims that some cattle raids are the result of collaboration between youth from both communities. The youths share intelligence before carrying out raids and share the spoils once raids have been accomplished. Some FGD participants suggested that some local administrators in Nandi County, particularly chiefs and assistant chiefs, are believed to be involved in the planning of raids undertaken by members of their communities. Local administrators have also been blamed for failing to take action on known raiders.

Members of the Muhoroni DPC suggested that politicians incite communal conflict by magnifying past cattle rustling attacks. However, a number of community leaders interviewed for this study suggested that cattle rustling is sometimes a cover or manifestation of conflict over land. Skirmishes caused by cattle rustling have affected farming and business activities in Kibigori, Kopere and Chemase centres.

3.5.2 Key Drivers
The inability of either the national or Kisumu county government to provide alternative livelihood options for people in the region has increased the vulnerability of youth to recruitment into illegal activities like cattle rustling. Moreover, the absence of a comprehensive official policy or programme to eradicate cattle rustling in Kisumu and other parts of the country also contribute to its persistence.

The influence of traditional leaders and governance systems in Muhoroni area is generally weak. Youth continue to defy the elders’ system, reducing the ability of communities to manage and prevent cattle rustling. The national government authorities have exacerbated this problem through policing actions that either neglect or undermine traditional systems in Nandi and Luo communities living in rural areas of Muhoroni and Chemilil.

Cultural beliefs have also been a driver of cattle rustling in Muhoroni. Some of the key informants suggested that the Nandi believe that cattle belong to them. This perception has fuelled cattle rustling against their Luo neighbours in Muhoroni, an area characterised by poverty and acute dependence on natural resources (grazing land and water).

Competition for natural resources has also fuelled cattle rustling in Muhoroni. With limited resources and livestock rearing and farming as the only means of livelihood, dry spells have forced some communities to engage in cattle rustling to sustain themselves.

3.5.3 Mitigating Measures and Potential

Local Capacities for Peace International (LCPI)
LCPI has demonstrated capacity and ability to engage local stakeholders in Muhoroni to quell conflict between the Nandi and Luo. The organisation has worked with members of sub-county peace forums to initiate peace-building initiatives in Kopere area of Muhoroni. The NGO has also worked with the National Police Service to develop better conflict management and mitigation efforts in Muhoroni.

Centre for Community Dialogue and Development
This youth-led organisation based in Muhoroni is involved in creating platforms for dialogue between youths from both communities. The organisation has conducted peace sessions and community awareness aimed at promoting conflict sensitivity among youth in Muhoroni. It has a history of a close working relationship with local administrators in preventing and addressing conflict in Muhoroni and Chemilil.

The Kenya Red Cross
The Kenya Red Cross has made inroads in providing food and emergency aid to the afflicted in the area. The aid organisation, in conjunction with the national government, has initiated projects for construction of housing and temporary shelter structures for affected victims during conflict. The national government also works with the Kenya Red Cross to put up temporary health care centres for the affected in the area.

National Police Service (Anti-Stock Theft Unit)
In Muhoroni, the police have played a significant role in arresting and preventing occurrences of cattle rustling incidents pitting the Luo and the Kalenjin. However, the police personnel deployed to this area are few and sometimes have limited equipment to fully address conflict.

Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs
Chiefs have a lot of influence in Muhoroni and have proven their ability to gather intelligence from the public. They work with informers to gather intelligence on perpetrators and planners. Chiefs also provide vital information to the County Commissioner and the NPS on revenge attack plans and the parties involved.
3.5.4 Future Scenarios

1. Without concerted efforts to develop a comprehensive policy aimed at addressing lasting solutions to curb cattle rustling, the vice will continue unabated with cattle rustlers developing more sophisticated methods of operations.

2. Incitement by political actors continues to divide the Luo and the Nandi along ethnic lines with the NCIC doing little to investigate and recommend prosecution of hate mongers.
4. Kilifi County

4.1 County Profile

Kilifi is one of the six counties that form the coastal region of Kenya. It has seven sub-counties; Kilifi North, Kilifi South, Ganze, Malindi, Magarini, Rabai and Kaloleni. The Kilifi County Integrated Development Plan 2013 estimates that 27 per cent of its 1.2 million people are youth, who also constitute 49 per cent of the labour force. The Mijikenda are the largest community, followed by the Bajuni, Swahili, Arabs, Indians, and Europeans. Christianity and Islam are the dominant religions. Others include traditional religions which have a smaller following.

Kilifi is ranked 39 out of 47 in the County Development Index (CDI), with a CDI index of 0.4951 which was below the national average of 0.520 as at 2013. The rate of poverty (adult equivalent poverty head count) is 70.8 per cent, higher than the national rate of 45.9 per cent. It is estimated that 11.3 per cent of households are squatters. Unemployment rate is about 30 per cent, and just 13 per cent of the population has secondary level education. The major economic activities include tourism, fishing and agriculture, particularly livestock rearing and crop farming.

The study established that the main challenges Kilifi grapples with are related to land, violent extremism and radicalisation and political violence. The household survey indicates that respondents believe land-related conflicts, political and electoral conflicts and violent extremism are the main factors that contribute to insecurity and instability in the region.

An estimated 40 per cent of respondents consider land conflicts to be a challenge while 34 per cent believe major conflicts occur around political periods. Twenty eight per cent view violent extremism and terrorism to be the biggest problem. Land conflicts have been based on ownership, access, user rights and succession challenges. Disputes between ethnic communities also periodically flare up.

Several key informants and FGD participants believe that political violence escalates during electoral periods and particularly in the lead up to national and local elections. Violent extremism presents a problem particularly in the recruitment of youth into extremist ideologies and groups that espouse violence. While drug abuse and trafficking have been a challenge in Kilifi as in much of the coastal region, recent reports note a significant decline in the problem in the county.

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40 First Kilifi County Integrated Development Plan 2013 – 2017, p.9
42 Committee on Revenue Allocation 2013, pp.22-25
43 CEWARN 2014
44 Kenya National Assembly, 2013, pp. 68-69
This study can confidently state that ethnic hatred, competition over natural resources and lack of opportunities/unemployment are the key drivers of conflict and insecurity in Kilifi. Findings of the household survey (see figure 14 above) and the views of several government and civil society officials as well as FGD participants converge on this point.
The trend observed in Isiolo, Garissa and Kisumu holds for Kilifi. Peace and security structures, such as chiefs, assistant chiefs and Nyumba Kumi committees are perceived by the public (see figure 18 above), key informants and FGD participants as effective interveners in mitigating conflict and insecurity in Kilifi. Moreover, despite their perceived excesses, the police are seen by a significant percentage of the public--38 per cent--as being effective, ranking second (see figure 18 above).

4.2 Land and Resource-Based Conflict

4.2.1 Nature of Conflict and Key Actors
Conflict over land in Kilifi manifests in the conflicts between squatters and land owners; between pastoralist and farming communities; differences over disputed boundaries between ethnic communities; and killings related to ploys to grab land mainly from the elderly.

The conflict between squatters and land owners is often seen in squatters tearing down perimeter fences around lands that are contentious, forcible evictions of squatters, riots and running battles with police, destruction of property and violence meted out against the squatters by hired goons. Political actors are thought to fuel the riots and violent behaviour among squatters for their own political gain, and in some instances, to support individual ownership of the contested lands where they stand to benefit financially. In May 2016 for instance, there were violent clashes between squatters and representatives of the owner a 230-acre piece of land in Bofa/Kiwandani area of Sokoni Ward in Kilifi North sub-county.

According to civil society actors and government officials interviewed for this study, conflict related to pasture and farming land has been a longstanding challenge in the Kilifi-Tana River boundary region. The Giriama, mainly found in Kilifi, and the Pokomo who occupy parts of Kilifi and mainly found in Tana River, are predominantly farming and fishing communities. The Wardei and the Orma communities are pastoralists who own cattle and camels and are based predominantly in Tana River. During the dry seasons or the pastoralist migratory periods, the Wardei and Orma have been known to travel through farming community lands and crops have been destroyed as a result. The pastoralist communities assert that some of the farming land has encroached on pastoral zones while the farming communities argue that the pastoralists illegally enter and destroy farm land. A lasting solution to the dispute has not been found and the conflicts continue to flare up from time to time. They are characterised by sudden attacks and killings, revenge attacks, abductions, destruction of livestock and displacement of communities. Men, women, youth and children have all been victims of these attacks. In 2015, the governors of Kilifi and Tana River proposed the zoning of the areas to clearly demarcate the farming and grazing lands. However, the zoning has not been undertaken.

Household survey respondents are of the view that the youth are the main perpetrators of violence (47 per cent of respondents). Community leaders and elders also have a significant hand in triggering violence and conflict, including hiring young people to terrorise or fight other communities. Discussions with key informants also point out that youth are seen as the most at risk for recruitment into violence and also the most likely perpetrators of violence during conflicts.

4.2.2 Key Drivers
A number of key informants as well as FGD participants suggest that the failure to conclusively adjudicate and allocate land to coastal communities after colonialism has turned many people into squatters on ancestral lands. Unlawful evictions and dispossession of poorer communities, due to the failure of land adjudication, as well as disgruntlement over ownership of large tracts of land by non-indigenous people and foreigners, has allowed anger to simmer and eventually erupt in conflicts between squatters and land owners.

Poor implementation of land management systems in the region has meant that many parcels of land have been illegally allocated to individuals and groups and many communities have been rendered squatters on their ancestral homes. The delay and failure to adequately adjudicate land has also meant that families will illegally take over parcels of land as squatters even where the land was legally sold to individuals. These are major causes of disgruntlement and conflict among Kilifi residents and also many communities in the coastal region. MRC has seized on these grievances as a rallying point for launching a political movement and in 2010, a secessionist claim that created significant tension in the coastal region. Competition for scarce resources and access to land is a driver of conflict between communities. Unresolved disputes between the communities make conflicts flare up periodically, particularly during dry seasons when grazing land is scarce. Pastoralists and farming communities are yet to reach long-term solutions and therefore remain locked in cyclical conflicts.

Most key informants suggested that poverty is also a driver of land conflicts. Land ownership is seen as a buffer against poverty. Families without legal title to land particularly where the land is contested are left feeling insecure. The failure to adjudicate land claims and ownership conclusively creates an environment of insecurity and heightens the risk of conflict as people seek to avoid eviction on the one hand and to protect personal property on the other. Poverty and lack of capital also contributes to the incidents of killing elderly people who are accused of witchcraft. Local leaders classify this pattern of behaviour as criminal acts disguised as cultural practices with the aim of taking over land forcefully.
Political competition and high stakes in electoral outcomes also drive conflict between communities, as is the case in many boundary regions. While the boundaries remain disputed, the flare-up of conflict often follows the patterns of electoral periods.

4.2.3 Key Triggers
There is consensus among key informants that one of the triggers of violence between the pastoralists and farming communities has been entry into farming land by pastoralist communities in search of grazing lands for their animals. In addition, during tense periods, where a member of the farming or pastoralist community is killed by either side, it has been known to spark conflict, which leads to more killings, displacement and destruction of property.

Dry seasons and drought have been a trigger of violent conflicts between the Pokomo and Wardei and the Giriama and Oromo as the pastoralist communities travel further in search of pasture and water. Drought has also meant that farmers and pastoralists fight over grazing land.

Developments on disputed lands such as perimeter walls and blocking of access ways among others, have been a trigger for riots and violence between squatters and the groups hired by affected land owners to protect the disputed land.

4.2.4 Mitigating Measures and Potential Government Mitigation Measures
Sub-county and ward administrators as well as chiefs collaborate to convene and attend community gatherings aimed at resolving disputes between communities, and therefore diffusing potentially violent conflicts. The household survey indicates that chiefs and assistant chiefs are the most trusted in preventing and resolving conflicts. Up to 43 per cent of the respondents consider them the most effective in preventing and reducing conflict. The police were also considered important actors in conflict reduction and prevention (34 per cent of respondents). Overall, sixty-one per cent of respondents are satisfied with the government efforts to address land conflicts. One chief explained that he relies significantly on faith and inter-faith groups to address conflicts when tensions arise. Public barazas are a significant forum for conducting such dialogue among the communities.

In relation to the pastoralist and farming communities, the county governments of both Kilifi and Tana River have initiated dialogue and peace building, which is thought to provide a way of enhancing peace. The recommendation to demarcate farming and grazing land is yet to be implemented. The county government has a lot to do in terms of public information and communication and resolving conflicts between disputing communities. The household survey indicated that only six per cent of those polled consider the county government effective in reducing and preventing violence and conflict.

Security agencies, particularly the police, play a prominent role because they interact frequently with communities. In the regions affected by pastoralist and farmer conflicts, security agencies have from time to time enforced curfews to reduce possibilities of conflict and enhance safety. While these measures have temporarily reduced the number of casualties, they need to be backed up with additional measures by the county government, communities and other national government structures to address the root causes of the conflicts. Curfews also have the effect of curtailing the quality of life that residents in the affected areas can enjoy. Unfortunately, curfews are sometimes left running for months and undermine perceptions of security and quality of life in the affected areas.

Nyumba Kumi Committees
The committees and village elders from time to time intervene in local land disputes. Although newly-formed, thirty-eight per cent of survey respondents view Nyumba Kumi committees as trustworthy and effective in resolving disputes. They work with assistant chiefs and chiefs to coordinate community forums. They play a significant role along with the National Government Administration Officers in diffusing tensions in relation to land disputes.

Civil Society Organisations
CSOs such as Sauti ya Wanawake work on squatter concerns and advocate with the National Land Commission for resolution to squatters’ land issues. The CSOs advocacy capacities may be low because a thorough understanding of the land issues and the current land adjudication and conflict resolution structures are among the competencies that CSOs lack.

4.2.5 Future Scenarios
1. Tension between individual land owners and squatters over contested lands is likely to escalate and become more complex as poverty and population pressure render more and more people landless. At the same time, for some individuals, squatting on disputed lands will become more about quick money
rather than a genuine assertion of rights, making the solutions to the genuine problems more difficult. Where legal titles to land remain problematic, rising levels of frustration are likely to yield further violence.

2. In the medium term, extremist movements which capitalise on disenfranchisement, discrimination and marginalisation are likely to use the frustrations over land to draw in more recruits as they not only offer a temporary outlet for the frustration, but also provide monetary benefits.

4.3 Politically-Instigated Ethnic Violence

4.3.1 Nature of Conflict and Key Actors

In Kilifi, politically-instigated ethnic violence flares up during periods of heightened political activity, such as the general election, by-elections or referenda. County and national government officials and community leaders and members interviewed for this study suggested that the threat of ethnic violence exists, but due to its episodic nature and low intensity, it is often not treated as a major challenge in Kilifi particularly in the intervening periods.

Ethnic violence has erupted between different communities in the county, including the Giriama and Wardei, Chonyi and Kauma, Ganze and Chonyi, among others. Male members of these communities are often the dominant actors in the violence. Politicians have also been known to hire gangs to intimidate or attack their rivals. Interviews with county administrators indicate that tensions exist between the Chonyi and the Kauma over the contested Chonyi/Ganze sub-counties’ boundaries even after the formal boundaries established by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). The tensions persist and flare up often during political periods.

4.3.2 Key Drivers

Kenya’s political systems have a long history of patronage and patronism. Development programmes and services were doled out based on the proximity of an elected representative and his or her community to the ruling powerful centre. Areas seen to be in the political opposition, or viewed as unimportant to the overall political numbers outcome, have been starved of critical resources and services over the years. As a result, they have lagged behind other regions in the development indicators. This has affected the quality of life and the CDI confirms that poverty levels are highest where regions were marginalised in development, economic and political engagement.

The history of being underserved and neglected for decades has fed into deeply embedded beliefs of marginalisation that persist even with the advent of the devolved government structure. Although the purpose of devolving governance and providing guaranteed budgetary allocations to counties was to break the system of patrimonialism, the perceptions of residents in Kilifi remain that county employment opportunities, development priorities and service provision still follow ethnic favouritism patterns and serve to exclude many residents. This raises the stakes in political elections and leaves communities desperate to have a representative in government, making conflict an ever-present danger linked to elections.

The unchallenged narrative that is popularly repeated among community members, which distinguishes “watu wa bara” (people from the inland) and “watu wa pwani” (people from the coastal region) is whipped up particularly towards elections to influence voting outcomes. The narrative asserts the greater claim of watu wa pwani to live and engage politically in the coastal region as against the lesser claim of watu wa bara. These sentiments have triggered gruesome killings, terrorising of communities and displacement of those considered to be non-indigenous to the region.

Low income levels, lack of employment and lack of income generating opportunities among the youth make them susceptible to recruitment into gangs used by political actors to dominate a region and intimidate or eliminate their competition. The use of violence is a regular part of the operations of such gangs. Joining the gangs gives the youth access to quick, easy money that they would otherwise be unable to get.

Perceptions among communities of exclusion from political office and from development initiatives have created a siege mentality, where communities place high stakes in ensuring a political representative from their community is elected to office in the belief that access to resources, development initiatives and improved services requires one of their own to be in office. The Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), a movement that has been active in the Coast region in the recent past, is a product of this mentality. MRC enjoys support among many individuals in the region because it is seen as a voice speaking out against injustices suffered by coastal residents. MRC’s political ambitions received support in a number of focus group discussions with men, women and community leaders as well as with some civil society groups. However, few people are supportive of the proposal to secede which was initially espoused by MRC. MRC has been accused of planning and carrying out

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47 In Tana River a curfew was imposed from September 2013 to September 2014.
48 Interview with Sub-county Administrator on 07 July 2016. See also, Kenya Red Cross, 2015; ACLED, 2016.
violent attacks in the region to advance its cause as well as employing intimidation tactics to prevent voters from casting their ballots in 2013. Its presence in Kilifi has been on the wane in recent years as a result of aggressive police efforts. Some informants insist however that it has started to regroup and could be a possible source of conflict in the county ahead of the 2017 general election if it continues with its previous tactics.

The widely-held sense of marginalisation of the coastal region is often exploited by politicians who campaign for elections on platforms that promote an ethnic or religious agenda without accountability for promoting development and better standards of living. This also spikes ethnic tensions among communities which sometimes results in conflict.

4.3.3 Key Triggers

The main trigger of ethnic violence is incitement by politicians either directly or through their proxies and agents which may take place during public rallies or private meetings. Focus group discussions with local residents indicated that some politicians in Kilifi have reportedly incited communities against each other to influence voting outcomes. Subtly spoken messages, or sometimes openly inciting speech that identify members of an ethnic community as ‘the problem’ or as underserving of leadership, are usually used to whip up ethnic sentiments against other groups and trigger violence and conflict. Some politicians go beyond inciting speeches and hire youths to mete out violence.

4.3.4 Mitigating Measures and Potential Government Mitigation Measures

The police address political violence during public barazas and public occasions, usually appealing to residents not to engage in political violence as well as warning of legal consequences for people or groups found participating in it. This often happens towards the elections periods.

Ward Administrators take the opportunity to speak out on the importance of peaceful elections and peaceful conduct before and after the elections. This is often done in the lead up to elections but scarcely in the intervening periods. However, because political stakes are often high in a winner-takes-all scenario, these efforts are not always successful as tensions at local levels will reflect the pitch set by political aspirants. More needs to be done to work with youth and community members to take up the role of promoting peace through innovative ways such as social media, youth groups, sports and community barazas among others.

There is not yet a sustained government effort (at national and county levels) that focuses on curbing politically-motivated violence in the interim period when elections are not imminent. The violence is perceived as periodic and as such, efforts to curb it often emerge during the elections and heightened political periods.

Politicians are often the triggers for the violence, and this makes it difficult for county officials and civil society groups to hold them accountable. Although NICC tries to combat hate speech and other public commentary that can incite violence between communities when it arises, the efforts have not been adequate in changing the attitudes of political actors and communities.

Civil Society Organisation Efforts

The Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) has a strong record of using its broad network of Christian and Muslim clerics to diffuse potential ethnic violence. In the past, it has done so in Ngongoni and Chakama locations near Malindi. CIPK also uses its network of clerics to diffuse violence. In 2008, for instance, the Provincial Administration relied heavily on CIPK to resolve communal tensions arising after a highly contested electoral period.

Civil society organisations such as KMYA, SCOPE and Sauti ya Wanawake conduct outreach programmes, including education forums with the youth, in which they promote peaceful conduct and dialogue to resolve conflict. These measures have not been high as they are inadequate to counter the lure of payment and promise of favours given by politicians to draw youth into doing their bidding, including engaging in violence. Again, the reach of the trainings is limited.

4.3.5 Future Scenarios

1. Political tensions and violence that often arises around elections could create ground for deadly criminal gangs taking root. Groups of youth who participate in intimidation and violence during electoral periods for financial gain are likely to continue to use their presence as groups to intimidate community members and form rent-seeking gangs as has appeared in other parts of the county. The cycle of violence related to elections may cease to be cyclical and become a permanent part of the socio-political terrain in Kilifi if not dealt with.

2. As devolution takes root and people become more aware of the resources available to county governments, more pressure will be placed on county governments to undertake and account for development projects that improve community welfare. This will create less opportunity for political actors to campaign on platforms of narrow ethnic interests and demand more focus on their development agenda.

4.4 Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

4.4.1 Nature of Conflict and Key Actors

Radicalisation and recruitment into violent extremist movements are prominent challenges to peace and security in Kilifi County, particularly in the Malindi area. Findings
from the current study indicate that actual major acts of terrorism by radicalised youth are not common within the county, but recruitment into groups that support violent extremism is considered a problem. Available research suggests that violent extremism has led to riots and insecurity, spates of religious violence between Muslim and Christian youth and also resulted in a significant decline in the tourism economy of the region. Youth are recruited into Al Shabaab through extremist religious sects that support violence. The recruited youth are thought to be used to commit acts of terrorism in other parts of the country or in Somalia. There have been cases of intimidation of individuals or families, and even killings of village elders, Nyumba Kumi representatives (known as Nyumba Kumi Balozis) and youth who have abandoned Al Shabaab and returned home. Although the incidents are not common, they have had the effect of dramatically causing fear and silencing communities. Informants in the study attribute the killings to Al Shabaab loyalists who aim to silence returnees and also scare communities into silence, and to security agencies particularly in the killing of returnees, in some of the covert measures against terrorism and violent extremism.

Some key informants note that young men under 35 years are particularly vulnerable to recruitment into extremist movements, notably Al Shabaab. Others point out that some youth working as boda boda operators have been known to be recruited as assassins in business or land deals, as well as into Al Shabaab where monetary incentives are offered.

More recently, young women have been targeted by recruiters while older women have been hired as recruiters. Informants interviewed for this study concur that this takes place mainly in Mombasa and less so in Kilifi. Informants also suggest that extremist Muslim clerics and madrassa teachers play a key role of radicalising the youth by promoting false interpretations of the role of violence in religion. For instance, focus group discussion participants recalled cases where youth affiliated to the radical Ashabuul Kahf sect were encouraged to violently take over mosques in Malindi and Kilifi Town that are led by so-called ‘moderate’ clerics in 2013-2014.

4.4.2 Key Drivers

One of the underlying explanations for religious radicalisation in Kilifi and other parts of the country is that Kenya lacks an official counter-violent extremism (CVE) policy, which would guide and coordinate the CVE initiatives of security agencies, civil society and other actors. Partly because of this gap, extremists can infiltrate communities and propel their ideas without being effectively countered where the activities take place at very local levels, away from the ordinary reach of law enforcement agents.

Widely held perceptions that the region’s grievances have been left unaddressed by successive governments has led to feelings of exclusion and neglect among most people and provided fertile ground for the emergence and persistence of radicalisation and violent extremism. Radical extremists have used a call to radically correct the historical injustices as one of the grounds for recruiting youth.

Poverty among young people is an underlying cause of radicalisation. Interviews with county officials indicate that high rates of school dropouts and low education levels are major problems the county government is grappling with as they contribute to poverty and crime. Part of the attraction into radical movements is the incentive of payments that are believed to be offered, and attraction to a cause that gives the youth a sense of purpose and a cause. Several research studies also concur that youth unemployment and poverty are significant underlying factors in the recruitment of youth into terrorist activities.

The lack of a sense of purpose among the youth in Kilifi is a driver of recruitment to violent extremism. Extremist groups operating in Kilifi and in the Coast generally offer a sense of belonging and brotherhood to frustrated youth, and also promise attractive financial and spiritual rewards to recruits. Beyond the finances, the factors of belonging and purpose draw youth into the movements. In Kilifi, extremist groups play on the frustrations of the youth regarding the lack of opportunities, low incomes and poverty, difficulties in gaining access to political spaces and general exclusion in many decision-making spaces. The extremist groups and radical religious sects provide a sense of belonging and power for youth who may not have access to such power through conventional means. For instance, there is the perception that the county’s vibrant tourism sector is dominated by people who are not indigenous residents (Watu wa Bara), and local youth are only able to get informal job opportunities in the sector.

Poor access to educational opportunities is another driver of radicalisation and violent extremism in Kilifi. According to Kilifi County Government officials, many youths have only

56 Interview with key informant in Mombasa on 13 July 2016
57 Violent extremism is still largely addressed from a security perspective -- through counterterrorism operations, while the prevention aspect, which is crucial, has received less attention. A major national conference on a draft national CVE policy that addresses prevention was held in 2015, but it has not been adopted nor have the conclusions from the conference been made public.
58 Research publications by Akoth et al (2015); Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2014); Khalil and Zeuthen (2014); and KNCHR (2014)
59 Ibid.,
achieved modest levels of education, while many more have dropped out of school altogether. Negative attitudes among the youth towards to education have also resulted in poor uptake of vocational training opportunities. The county government is trying to address these challenges but progress has been slow.

4.4.3 Key Triggers
Acts of violence, such as the attempts made by youth to take over mosques in 2013-2014, are incited directly by radical clerics and their counterparts in madrassas. Excessive measures deployed by police in the course of their counterterrorism operations have also triggered violent, retaliatory demonstrations by youth involved in extremist causes.

4.4.4 Mitigating Measures and Potential

Office of the County Commissioner-Kilifi
The Office of the County Commissioner coordinates security in the county, and should ideally be the key anchor for the interventions of different agencies and organisations aimed at addressing radicalisation and violent extremism. However, this coordination and cooperation often depends on the vision and drive of the office bearer at a particular period. At the time of this study, informants’ views were that the Kilifi county commissioner has taken a lone ranger approach and seldom partners or shares information with other actors. Civil society actors are not regarded as key players or valuable partners in counterting extremism at the time of the study. The county commissioner has also been unable to cultivate a strong working relationship with the county government, hindering opportunities for sharing of information, resources and technical expertise. This narrow approach is partly attributable to the absence of a national CVE policy, which would encourage government agencies to build partnerships with different actors to address the problem effectively.

National Police Service
Ideally, the police are supposed to be a key partner in efforts to counter extremism. However, the police, particularly the National Police Service and its General Service Unit, have tended to unfairly profile certain communities, particularly Muslims, and therefore do not enjoy the level of public support and cooperation required to be effective actors in countering extremism.

Nyumba Kumi Committees
The Nyumba Kumi committees are volunteer security structures established by the Ministry of Interior in 2015 to enhance community participation in detecting and preventing terrorism, among other security concerns. In Kilifi, information-sharing between Nyumba Kumi committees and the chiefs has worked well. However, committee-police partnerships have been ineffective as the latter tend not to be readily accessible. There is also concern that the police are not able to prevent leaks of security-related information provided to them by committees — a situation which puts committee members at risk.

Many FGD participants perceive the Nyumba Kumi idea as a government-driven surveillance effort, denying the structures the local legitimacy they require to be effective. The household survey indicates that although Nyumba Kumi committees are among the most trusted structures for resolving conflicts, this represents only 36 per cent of respondents. They are perceived as government driven initiatives, hence the expectation that the committees are better able to resolve conflict. However, they are also seen as mirroring the roles of village elders which has allowed them to draw on the legitimacy of these existing structures but without clarifying the difference and complementarity of the Nyumba Kumi initiative.

Informants complained that there has been no orientation or training of Nyumba Kumi committees on their roles and how they ought to interact with communities and government agencies. Committees are generally disgruntled because there was the expectation that being a government-driven initiative, members would receive some remuneration for their time and effort. These gaps have discouraged many people from volunteering to be in the committees.

Faith-Based Groups
Religious and interfaith groups were identified as important players in counter-radicalisation efforts. Informants noted that the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC), the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), the Lutheran Church and the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) have been working in Kilifi to counter extremist religious ideologies and recruitment of youth into extremist movements.

60 Focus group discussion with men in Kilifi on 7 July, 2016
61 A low percentage (13 per cent) of residents with secondary or post-secondary education (KNBS and SID 2013).
These are community leaders that for a long time been a structure within and worked with the office of the Assistant Chief. The Nyumba Kumi committees introduces a new structure. See KNBS, National Census, 2009; Kwale County Integrated Development Plan (CIPD), 2013
These organisations have extensive grassroots networks that have demonstrated success in detecting radicalisation and terror threats and advocating for peaceful coexistence. Much of their work is targeted at the youth. Various respondents, including community leaders, village elders and government officials, lauded the initiatives these groups have undertaken to counter extremist messages by educating the youth on the correct interpretation of the role of violence in religions, such as Islam. CICC, for example, has an in-house officer specifically charged with tracking and countering extremist messaging on social media platforms.

They are also trusted by local communities, as evidenced by the number of returnees who have preferred to approach them for assistance rather than government agencies. An important strength of these faith-based groups is that they are highly regarded by government and have constructive working relationship with NGAO and the police. On its part, the Lutheran Church has been supporting peace clubs in high schools to promote tolerance and dialogue as a means resolving conflict.

Civil Society Organisations
Dialogue with the youth on issues of faith is important. Regular prayer sessions on Friday and Sunday as well as additional topical seminars that allow for debate and discussion are useful in countering the radicalising narratives.

In 2015, the BRAVE initiative held a seminar in Mombasa that brought together scholars from universities at the Coast to debate religion and radicalisation. Informants cited this approach as effective in reaching out to the youth on questions of religion and radicalisation because it drew from scholars in local universities and was based on realities in the region.

4.4.5 Future Scenarios
1. Opportunities for the youth in Kilifi are generally limited and many continue to feel marginalised and frustrated. It can be expected that if this situation persists, extremist groups will likely recruit many more young people to their causes with promises of financial rewards, power and respect.
2. Failure to improve coordination between national and county governments as well as government agencies and non-government actors is likely to mean critical information, ideas, knowledge and expertise will not be shared. In these circumstances, recruitment of youths could persist and create more instability.

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⁶² These are community leaders that for a long time been a structure within and worked with the office of the Assistant Chief. The Nyumba Kumi committees introduces a new structure. See KNBS, National Census, 2009; Kwale County Integrated Development Plan (CIPD), 2013
5. Kwale County

5.1 County Profile

Kwale is estimated to have a population of 713,488. The youth form majority of the population with 47.23 per cent being below 15 years. Kwale is divided into four sub counties namely; Matuga, Msambweni, Lunga Lunga and Kinango. Under each of these are a total of twenty wards. Socio-economically, Kwale land is mainly owned by absentee landlords, with the drier areas being held in trust and under group ranches. Only 22.5 per cent of the land in the county has title deeds (CIDP Kwale, 2013). Literacy levels have reached an average of 57 per cent. However, cultural and traditional practices such as witchcraft and early marriage are also rife. The labour force is mostly employed in the hospitality sector with about 30 per cent of the total labour force aged between 15 to 64 years either unemployed or underemployed (CIDP Kwale, 2013). Very few local entrepreneurs have investments in medium and large businesses due to lack collateral. Despite the trade, industry and tourism sectors in the county generating millions of shillings each year, very little of this money filters back to the communities. Women are under-represented in almost all spheres of life including property, education, political leadership and corporate decision-making organs. This is owing to discriminatory property laws and practices and deep-seated cultural biases. (CIDP Kwale, 2013).

![Public Perceptions on Prevalence of Conflicts - Kwale](image)

**Figure 19: Public perceptions on prevalence of different forms of conflict in Kwale**

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63 See KNBS, National Census, 2009; Kwale County Integrated Development Plan (CIPD), 2013
64 See Kwale CIPD, 2013
65 Ibid.,
66 The local population feels oppressed and marginalised by the national government, including socio-economically, and this grievance finds expression through violence. A point of confluence for both MRC and Al-Shabaab is that they identify the government as the enemy.
67 A radical brand of Islam has taken root in Kwale in the recent past which appears to advocate for absolute religion with little to no tolerance for local traditions or practices or other value systems. At the time of the research, women researchers were required to cover up during the research period and interviews could not proceed whilst the call to prayer was ongoing. (Tiwi area)
This study finds that land-related conflicts, political conflicts and violent extremism rank highest as the most prevalent forms of conflicts and insecurity in Kwale. There is a broad concurrence from all respondents in the household survey (see figure 19 above), government and civil society officials informants FGDs on this point.

20.

![Figure 20: Public perceptions on causes of conflict in Kwale](image)

This study has established that lack of opportunities/unemployment, unresolved historical grievances, political competition, ethnic hatred and competition over natural resources rank highest as the most significant causes of conflict and insecurity in Kwale. The data from the household survey (see figure 20 above), interviews with elders/opinion leaders, government and civil society officials, as well as previous research converge on this point.

![Figure 21: Public perceptions government agencies’ effectiveness in addressing conflict in Kwale](image)
The trend seen in Isiolo, Garissa, Kilifi and Kisumu, holds for Kwale. Peace and security structures, such as chiefs and assistant chiefs, and Nyumba Kumi committees are perceived by the public (see figure 21 above), key informants and FGD participants as among the most effective interveners in mitigating conflict and insecurity in Kwale. Moreover, despite their perceived excesses, the police are seen by a significant proportion of the public, 40 per cent, as being effective, ranking second (see figure 21 above).

5.2 Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

5.2.1 Nature of Conflict and Key Actors
Radicalisation is a prominent security challenge in Kwale County and has led to various acts of violence. Youths thought to be affiliated to Al-Shabaab have been accused of attacking and destroying government installations and assets, places with high civilian populations and some tourist sites. Violent extremists have also been accused of carrying out targeted killings of village elders they believe are police informants, as well as religious leaders and people generally who they feel do not agree with their religious views. This study has established that so far, three Nyumba Kumi representatives and a DPC official had been killed in Ukunda. One Imam has been killed while another is under State protection. The household survey undertaken as part of this study indicated that 25 per cent of respondents believe that community leaders and elders are the main perpetrators of violence, while 32 per cent of believe the youth are the main perpetrators.

Key informants interviewed for this study claim that large numbers of youth have also disappeared for extended periods, presumably for terrorist training in Somalia or nearby forests in Kwale. It is alleged that some returnees from Somalia have been killed, but the perpetrators are not known. However, local people believe security agents are eliminating them to prevent potential terrorist attacks in future. Security agencies on the other hand, point a finger at Al-Shabaab. Fearing a similar fate, some youth in Tiwi, Msambweni and Diani, who reportedly opted out of Al-Shabaab, have fled the area.

Some social movement informants suggested that security agents have reportedly been intimidating and arresting people believed to have any links with individuals thought to be linked to Al-Shabaab. Some informants claimed that civil society actors have also been targeted by security agents, who charge that they are terrorist sympathisers, yet many are working to de-radicalise and reintegrate returnees.

There are also reports that young women, who have previously not been involved with extremist movements, are now being intercepted by security agents as they try to cross into Somalia to join Al-Shabaab there. It is still not clear what roles they are playing in the group.

Some key informants indicated that there are links between Al-Shabaab and MRC in Kwale because both are aggrieved by similar issues such as marginalisation by the national government and use and access to land. Both also draw their recruits from the same areas. They also claim that the well-resourced Al-Shabaab has recruited MRC to carry out some of the terrorist attacks that have taken place in Kwale in recent years. However, this study was unable to establish the veracity of these claims.

Several key informants pointed out that there are clerics preaching a radicalised brand of religion, a trend which has resulted in deep community suspicions, with community members almost monitoring each other’s conduct in relation to religion or level of devoutness. Reports of an Imam having been killed and another having gotten police protection were available. They, however, claim that they cannot withdraw from the group for fear of persecution both by Al-Shabaab members as well as the police. Residents of Kwale, however, do not so publicly speak of violent extremism as a conflict. A baseline survey conducted as part of the study indicated that 26 per cent of the respondents thought violent extremisms and terrorism were visible conflicts since 2013.

5.2.2 Key Drivers
Local grievances over land rights and livelihood opportunities find expression in the broad cloak of violent extremism. Youth who are unable to find jobs or use land to earn a living yet see the striking opulence in the hospitality industry find purpose in a religious ideology that condemns the opulence and gives them identity. These youth are then persuaded, either through this religious doctrine or remuneration, to destroy anything that is contrary to their beliefs. Other grievances that the community has are also finding expression in this radicalised brand of religion just as the youth without employment or engagement are finding purpose in this space.

Radical teachers and clerics seem to operate unchecked in madrassas and other religious forums, encouraging youth to be trained to fight a holy war against an unfair secular world. Some informants claim that some teachers entice the youth with promises of money to join groups like Al-Shabaab. These teachers are themselves reportedly on Al-Shabaab’s payroll. Such teachings resonate well with the youth who feel deprived and undervalued. Some recruits seem to find purpose in forcibly promoting radical beliefs, while others are there for financial gain and not ideological reasons.

Low levels of education among the youth in Kwale have prevented them from gaining employment in the local private sector, in the county government or in national government agencies. Neither are they able to start viable
income-generating activities. Many remain dependent on land as the only means of earning a living. Many young people go through religious education rather than mainstream, secular education. The environment created as a result is one where the youth are susceptible to radicalisation and to engage in violent extremism.

Since land adjudication has not been done in Kwale County, residents do not have title deeds. The local community, therefore, has no proof of ownership either as a community (communal land) or as individuals within the community. Lack of title deeds has also meant that the local community can neither sell the land nor use it as collateral to obtain loans from financial institutions. The local community cannot also develop the land as they have no proof of ownership. This situation has persisted since independence and local communities, who feel economically deprived, harbour resentment against the State and landowners generally. Many young people are particularly angry as they tend not to have resources to acquire land or related resources. This situation is compounded by perceptions among majority communities like the Digo and Duruma, that minorities, particularly Arabs and other people whose roots are outside Kwale, are the dominant landowners in Kwale. These issues contribute to creating an environment for radicalisation and violent extremism to flourish. Findings of the household survey reveal that 23 per cent of those polled believed that unresolved historical injustices contributed to conflict.

5.2.3 Mitigating Potential and Measures

The National Police Service and the Office of County Commissioner-Kwale

The National Police Service and the Office of the County Commissioner-Kwale have led in arrests of those alleged to be involved in terrorist acts. It has been alleged that youth who have returned from Somalia have disappeared and some have been found killed. Some of those interviewed claimed that the police are behind the disappearances although the evidence is limited. Officially, however, the county commissioner’s office indicates that they have changed their approach to “winning hearts and minds”. For instance, they have made phone numbers available enabling civilians to reach them through WhatsApp, text messages and calls alerting them about possible threats and spaces where radicalisation is taking place. There is also an indication that the police are beginning to work with some grassroots organisations and are moving away from mass swoops and arrests. This collaborative action has had what appears to be a positive impact in specific areas such as Mwakamba.

Chiefs and assistant chiefs are seen as effective interveners in situations of conflict and insecurity in Kwale as they have a good understanding of the context. The household survey reveals that 70 per cent of people in Kwale trust the area chiefs and assistant chiefs to keep them safe and resolve conflicts.

Civil Society Organisations and International Partners

Community based organisations have engaged the youth in income-generating activities so as to reduce their vulnerability to recruitment into violent extremist activities. These organisations include, LICODEP, KMYA, UMA initiative, HURIA (Human Rights Agenda) MUHURI (Muslims for Human Rights) and the Association of Muslim Patrons. LICODEP, for instance, has taught the youth to purify and desalinate water for sale, allowing them to earn a living selling water for domestic use. UMA Initiative is convening youth in groups, training them in management skills and facilitating their application for national funds such as UWEZO. HURIA has been involved on social media, putting out messages for the youth not to be engaged in violent extremism and explaining its repercussions in a language the youth easily understand and identify with. On its part, MUHURI is involved in the representation of youth who are unfairly targeted by security agencies. Organisations which appeared to have convening power of the youth at risk of engaging in Violent Extremism included LICODEP and KMYA.

Organisations such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) have initiated rehabilitation programmes for returnees. Although this programme was initially hailed as timely, its inability to absorb all the youth it had registered resulted in the unnecessary exposure of these youth. When they subsequently began getting killed in unclear circumstances, many went into hiding, further complicating the security situation. Furthermore, it is not clear why returnees came back, and what their intentions were upon returning. Such knowledge would be useful for future recruitment prevention programmes. Currently, the national government is said to be in partnership with IOM to establish a new returnees’ rehabilitation programme in Msambweni. Little is publicly known at this point about the nature of the planned programme.

Emphasis on education is a crucial potential point of engagement. At present, only two community-based organisations are on record emphasising the importance of education for the youth (LICODEP, Sauti ya Akina Mama). The county commissioner also highlighted this as a key gap, and also a key opportunity, to engage the community. The Kwale county commissioner pointed out that local communities still privilege religious education over formal education. County administrators interviewed for this study gave the example of parents in Golini sub-county who sought the transfer of a teacher because he argued that students should devote more time to studying.
Programmes initiated by CIPK in partnership with the Ministry of Education have the Imams going to schools to teach sound doctrine and hopefully undo the damage done through erroneous teachings by teachers who have a violent persuasion. Schools run under the Aga Khan Foundation for example have a madrassa curriculum which could be adopted and used to run other madrassas in the region and indeed nationally.

**Nyumba Kumi Committees**

Nyumba Kumi committees in Kwale and village elders collaborate and share security-related information with chiefs. However, some elders have been targeted by extremists, compromising their effectiveness. FGDs with some of the community elders also revealed that some Nyumba Kumi committees have been infiltrated by extremists, including Al-Shabaab and MRC.

### 5.2.4 Future Scenarios

1. Security forces continue to use excessive measures to address radicalisation and violent extremism. Unfortunately, this approach has resulted in the arrest, persecution, torture and even death of people who act as intermediaries between the State and youth at risk of radicalisation, and also youth who are interested in being rehabilitated. Some key informants argue that this approach is counter-productive as some relatives of individuals who have been tortured or killed have chosen to join Al-Shabaab to avenge the suffering of their loved ones. Should this approach continue, opportunities for intelligence gathering or rehabilitation of returnees could be lost.

### 5.3 Gangs and Violence

#### 5.3.1 Nature of Conflict and Key Actors

Gangs affiliated to the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), a secessionist movement, have been accused of attacking the local population as well as government installations in Kwale County. MRC gangs have also been accused of carrying out targeted killings of village elders they believe are State informants. They have also been accused of disrupting the 2013 general election in the county by breaking into polling stations, attacking voters and damaging equipment. Prior to the 2013 elections, MRC cautioned Kwale residents not to participate in the poll, and instead encouraged them to burn their national identification cards. Gang members tend to be young men and women. However, its bedrock of support comprises older people who identify with the movement’s aims.

The women in Kwale largely appear not to actively engage either in the conflict end of the spectrum or the prevention part of it. It is not immediately clear if this is as a result of their version of religious practice or culture but the women, though keenly aware of most of the details of the MRC violence, are largely spectators. A few women, however, appear to play the unique role of custodians of the movement in that where certain mothers stop their sons from joining MRC, these custodians would be sent by the movement to warn and guide these mothers “back to the fold”. Some of these mothers risk being divorced by their husbands for taking a stand against MRC and worse still, would be threatened with forceful oath-taking (kiutsi) should they persist in this way.

It appears that the support by some community members for MRC is in some instances informed by financial compensation. In specific locations, interviewers were informed that where interests of MRC and Al-Shabaab merged, supposed Al-Shabaab recruiters compensated families of the actors to engage in violent acts on behalf of Al-Shabaab but in the name of MRC. There were narratives of financial compensation of up to KSh200,000 given to families of perpetrators of violence.

Interviews with different community members indicate that some members of the County Peace Committees and Nyumba Kumi representatives who are naturally drawn from the community are sympathisers as well as supporters of the MRC movement in specific areas of Kwale. About 25 per cent of respondents in the household survey believe that community leaders and elders are perpetrators of conflict.

There is lack of coordination between the county and national governments on security. For instance, legally, there is no provision for the sub-county administrator to be present in any security meeting. Subsequently, actions and operations undertaken do not involve the county government, which enjoys the support of the local community. The relationship between the county and national government officials is not good as is reflected by the need of the county government to pay police officers for them to provide security during county government functions. As a result, information on potential violence or threats cannot be easily shared.

#### 5.3.2 Key Drivers

Conflicts over the political future of the county have led to violence during elections and still hold the potential for violence in Kwale. Violence has in the past been driven by MRC’s rejection of the electoral process as part of its secessionist agenda. Kwale is also a multi-ethnic county that is also home to large populations that are not indigenous to the coastal region and who have been targeted on occasion for violence following incitement by politicians. About 29 per cent of respondents in the household survey in this region indicated that the cause of conflict in Kwale was political competition, perhaps viewing some of the MRC activities in this context.
Lack of education and exposure has made many youths vulnerable to recruitment into MRC. Most MRC recruits have no more than primary school education and are therefore unable to find employment or start businesses. They are frustrated and are attracted to MRC to fight for what they presume to be their economic right.

Most of the land in Kwale is not adjudicated and therefore has no title. Most land in Kinango, Msambweni and Matuga Sub-counties specifically do not have title deeds. The local/indigenous community feels deprived of a basic factor of production or livelihood and is embittered and aggrieved. This position has obtained since independence and has been narrated to each subsequent generation, resulting in a communal anger and bitterness towards the authorities but also any other persons who seemingly is accessing land and resources. The local community largely comprises of the Digo and the Duruma.

Use of illicit drugs may contribute to conflict and insecurity in Kwale. There have been reports that some of the youth in MRC have been on drugs when they have carried out their acts of violence. About 14 per cent of respondents in the household survey believe that drugs and alcohol abuse by the youth contributed to conflict and insecurity within Kwale.

5.3.3 Mitigating Potential and Measures

Sub-County Peace Forums/DPCs and Chiefs
DPCs have engaged the community in civic education, encouraging the youth to be involved, including in the county government, which locally they refer to as their “own government”. Village-level committees, such as the Mwakambas village committee, are also active in intervening in conflicts and disputes.

National Police Service
Police officers have in the recent past arrested and prosecuted members of MRC. Following the declaration of MRC as an outlawed outfit (until the recent court decision overturning this position), police clamped down on MRC members, thus significantly crippling their operations.

Civil Society Organisations
In the recent past in areas such as Lunga Lunga, youth groups and initiatives have been established in an attempt to redirect youth energies towards entrepreneurship (through Youth Bunge, UMA initiative, Haki Yetu initiative). These groups are organic in that they have emerged from the local community to enable the youth apply for various funds meant for youth empowerment projects. For instance, Youth convened under UMA initiative in 2016 applied for Uwezo Fund although unsuccessfully. The groups provide alternative means of livelihood for youth separate from land.

Other non-governmental organisations are agitating for education of the youth, particularly girls. These include Plan international and LIKODEP -- which have Youth Empowerment Project. Others are KIMYA, Kenya Community Support Centre, Pwani Youth Network and Human Rights Agenda (HURIA).

Other National Government Agencies
The launch of the Social Protection Plan by the national government has provided for the elderly vulnerable in the community. This has contributed in positively addressing the community grievances about marginalisation. Further, the national government, in partnership with the International Organisation for Immigration, has set up a rehabilitation programme for youth identified as ‘returnees’ through purchasing motorcycles for them to engage in transportation business. There are also a few agricultural sector programmes being set up by the national government, specifically the deployment of livestock officers to enhance capacity of local communities in livestock keeping. It is thought that these projects and programmes initiated by national government will serve to counter radicalisation.

The National Lands Commission has made attempts at resolving specific land disputes within Kwale, particularly as regards squatters. It has cancelled land titles irregularly acquired in Msambweni for example and has won the support of the local community. However, the broader land question in Kwale and the coastal region generally is yet to be comprehensively addressed.

Kwale County Government
The county government has been useful in identifying persons most deserving of social security. The county government is also engaging the MRC leadership. Open channels of communication could be used to encourage the group to renounce violence.
5.3.4 Future Scenarios

1. Some key informants suggest that members of the MRC will vie for elective positions in the 2017 general election. Having run for five years now, the county government system has opened up the local community to the fact that they can administer their own region without seceding or resorting to violence. However, in certain areas of Kwale, such as Tiwi, people had been threatened not to obtain voters’ cards so as not to engage in national government processes or give legitimacy to national processes.

2. In the recent past, MRC gangs have been accused of launching attacks on police officers and stealing guns and ammunition. In Bombato and Ukunda wards for instance, two people were recently shot and killed by weapons suspected to have been stolen from the police. This trend might indicate that the MRC is arming itself in readiness to commit violent acts.

6. **Mombasa County**

6.1 **County Profile**

Mombasa County has six constituencies; Jomvu, Changamwe, Kisauni, Nyali, Mvita and Likoni. It is the location of Kenya’s largest sea port, and is also the second largest urban settlement in Kenya with a population of 939,370. The county’s literacy level is fairly high, standing at 86.3 per cent. Net enrolment into primary and secondary schools is however relatively low. Unemployment in the county is high, especially among the youth who comprise 41 per cent of the population. Land in Mombasa is mainly public, private and communally owned, and has been a source of instability. Most people live in informal settlements, such as Bangladesh, Magongo, Likoni, Longo, Kisauni and Bamburi.

This study finds that violent extremism, political conflicts, ethnic conflict and land-related conflicts rank highest as the most prevalent forms of conflict and insecurity in Mombasa. There is a broad concurrence from all respondents in the household survey (see figure 22 above), government and civil society officials informants FGDs on this point. Currently, the emergence of gangs with suspect links to politicians as well as radicalisation and violent extremism appear to be the most serious peace and security concerns in Mombasa. While there is considerable support for MRC’s secessionist agenda in parts of Likoni and Kisauni, MRC-related violence has been uncommon in Mombasa, unlike in Kwale or Kilifi. There have also been religious tensions between Christians and Muslims and also within Muslim groups, but these have been less prominent in the past few years.

Figure 22: Public perceptions on prevalence of different forms of conflict in Mombasa

This study finds that violent extremism, political conflicts, ethnic conflict and land-related conflicts rank highest as the most prevalent forms of conflict and insecurity in Mombasa. There is a broad concurrence from all respondents in the household survey (see figure 22 above), government and civil society officials informants FGDs on this point. Currently, the emergence of gangs with suspect links to politicians as well as radicalisation and violent extremism appear to be the most serious peace and security concerns in Mombasa. While there is considerable support for MRC’s secessionist agenda in parts of Likoni and Kisauni, MRC-related violence has been uncommon in Mombasa, unlike in Kwale or Kilifi. There have also been religious tensions between Christians and Muslims and also within Muslim groups, but these have been less prominent in the past few years.
Respondents in the household survey believe that children (44 per cent) and women (43 per cent) are most affected by conflicts taking place in Mombasa. However, only small minority, below 12 per cent, feel that the men and the elderly are also affected by conflicts.

23.

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<th>Public Perceptions on Causes of Conflict - Mombasa</th>
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<td>Ethnic hatred</td>
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<td>Weak government institutions</td>
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<td>Drug and alcohol abuse</td>
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<td>Lack of opportunities /unemployment</td>
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<td>Extremist ideologies</td>
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<td>Availability of illegal arms</td>
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<td>Boundary disputes</td>
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Figure 23: Public perceptions on causes of conflict in Mombasa

This study has established that lack of opportunities/unemployment, drug and alcohol abuse, political competition, ethnic hatred, extremist ideologies and unresolved historical grievances rank highest as the most significant causes of conflict and insecurity in Mombasa.

24.

The data from the household survey (see figure 23 above), interviews with elders/opinion leaders, government and civil society officials, as well as previous research converge on this point.

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<th>Public Perceptions of Effectiveness of Government Institutions - Mombasa</th>
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Figure 24: Public perceptions government agencies’ effectiveness in addressing conflict in Mombasa
The trend seen in Isiolo, Garissa, Kilifi, Kisumu and Kwale, holds for Mombasa. Peace and security structures, such as chiefs and assistant chiefs, and Nyumba Kumi committees are perceived by the public (see figure 24 above), key informants and FGD participants as among the most effective interveners in mitigating conflict and insecurity in Mombasa. Moreover, despite their perceived excesses, the police are seen by a significant percentage of the public, 62 per cent, as being effective, ranking first (see figure 24 above).

6.2 Gangs and Violence

6.2.1 Nature of the Conflict and Key Actors
Since 2013, criminal gangs involving both adults and juveniles have emerged in Mombasa County. About a third (31 per cent) of respondents in the household survey believe that gangs contribute to the persistence of conflict and insecurity in Mombasa. The ages of juvenile gang members range from nine to 15 years. Allegations have been made that some politicians in have formed these gangs to intimidate and harass their opponents in the run-up to the 2017 general election. While this link has been made, no politician has so far been arrested in connection with these gangs.

Some of the neighbourhoods and areas affected by these gangs include Buxton, Chaani, Dunga-Unuse, Kalahari, Majengo, Matangini, Mbuyuni, Migadini, Mwembeni and Old Town-Mombasa. While most members of these gangs are men and boys, there have been reports that young women and girls have also been recruited. While the number of gangs is not readily available, officials at the Office of the County Commissioner-Mombasa informed this study that many gangs are operating in several parts of Mombasa Town. Some of the known gangs include Wakali Kwanza, Wakali Wao, Spanish Spatter and Gaza, with the first two being particularly notorious. Some of them are believed to use military formations to organise themselves and their activities and have names such as ‘Army’, ‘Navy’ and ‘Air Force’.

The gangs are reportedly involved in harassing residents and tourists, committing armed robberies in buses, homes and events such as weddings and funerals, as well as attacking police officers. In August 2016, suspected gang members attacked police officers in Likoni constituency and allegedly stole two rifles, which are yet to be recovered. Some of the juvenile gangs have also reportedly been indecently assaulting women. Some attacks have reportedly resulted in serious bodily harm and deaths of victims. There are also reports of sexual violence being perpetrated within gangs by older members against their younger counterparts.

Several key informants interviewed for this study indicated that the children in the juvenile gangs have diverse socio-economic backgrounds, with some living at home with their families and attending school, while others are destitute. It is believed that many of these juvenile gang members are also using illicit drugs. In terms of their modes of operation, members of these juvenile gangs tend to carry out crimes in areas far from where they live. They also regularly change the location of their activities to avoid capture. They seem to rely on girls to lure unsuspecting victims into ambushes that are undertaken by boys. Some of the gangs have also acquired and trained dogs, which they use to attack their victims.

Media reports suggest that between December 2015 and August 2016, about 90 suspected gang members, including juveniles, were arrested in different parts of Mombasa and charged in court. However, officials interviewed for this study indicate that gangs remain active.

6.2.2 Key Drivers
Widespread poverty alongside great opulence in Mombasa creates resentment and a sense of exclusion and inequality. These kinds of conditions make young people more vulnerable to recruitment into gangs and crime.

Like in the case of Kisumu County, young people are believed to be joining gangs in part because of unemployment and lack of opportunities. Some key informants suggested that the lack of positive social activities for young people outside school has placed them at risk of recruitment into gangs and criminal activity. They suggest that the Mombasa Sports Ground, which is now run by the county government, is not as readily accessible to youths as it was in the past. Beaches where youths could socialise have been privately acquired, leaving few recreational options available to them.

A high rate of truancy among young people is another factor thought to be responsible for the growth of juvenile gangs. Some key respondents suggest that local communities in Mombasa tend not to attach much value to education and are therefore not particularly concerned about the problem of truancy. In these circumstances, young people may join gangs without the knowledge of their parents or school authorities, and interventions are likely to come too late. Other key informants claimed that many of the adult and juvenile gang members are addicted to drugs, and have turned to organised crime to finance their habits. Drug-
addicted children are easily recruited into these gangs, which offer them opportunities for incomes to maintain their drug habits. This viewpoint is supported by a majority of respondents to the household survey (52 per cent), who also believe that drug and alcohol abuse contribute to the persistence of conflict and insecurity in Mombasa.

Competition between politicians in the run up to the 2017 general election is thought to have a bearing on the rise of gangs in Mombasa in the past year. In the past, politicians have allegedly used gangs to intimidate and harass their opponents. In fact, there was a rise in gang-related activity in the county during the 2013 election season. Previous research and this study have not been able to make a link between these gangs and specific politicians or political events/activities. However, their emergence during election seasons suggests there may be a link between them and politics that requires further investigation.

6.2.3 Mitigating Potential and Measures

Civil society organisations
Several organisations, including LICODEP, Kenya Community Support Centre, Pwani Youth Network, and Youth Senate are actively engaging with the juveniles involved in gangs. Through its Shika Adabu Community Development Forum and Mtongwe Community Initiative, LICODEP has been providing bursaries to boys who had joined gangs because their families were unable to afford their school fees. They have also been engaging them in sports and other positive extracurricular activities to keep them away from crime. The Shika Adabu Community Development Forum has been rehabilitating boys involved in drugs, and partnering with them to obtain information about the dynamics of gangs. It has used this information to develop interventions to rescue those already involved. The Forum also uses corporal punishment to discipline the boys they are assisting. This study notes that there are concerns about the ethics and legality of such an approach.

County Intelligence Security Committee-Mombasa
The Mombasa County Intelligence Security Committee (CISC) meets on a weekly basis to share information among different official security actors on the evolving gang situation. Security actors who attend these meetings include the county commissioner, deputy county commissioners heading the six sub-counties, the County Police Commander and officials of the National Intelligence Service. During these meetings, information about the activities and locations of the gangs is shared and action plans for responses developed. The Office of the County Commissioner has also been using social media platforms, such as WhatsApp, to receive information and tips about gang-related crime from the public. In July 2016, the CISC barred Mombasa residents from holding weddings and funerals in the night as they determined that people attending them were being targeted by gangs. The extent to which the Mombasa CISC is involved in violence prevention work, however, remains unclear.

6.2.4 Future Scenarios
1. As some key informants have noted, despite law enforcement action against them, that gangs remain active in Mombasa. There is the risk, therefore, that they could be mobilised by politicians in the run-up to the 2017 elections to create instability with the aim of corruptly influencing electoral outcomes.
2. In the long-term, juveniles exposed to gang life at a young age will likely progress to committing more serious crimes if interventions to rehabilitate them are not made early enough. In particular, there is the risk that juvenile gang members could be easily lured into extremist movements, which pose an even greater threat to peace and security.

6.3 Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

6.3.1 Nature of the Conflict and Key Actors
Radicalisation poses the same threat in Mombasa as it does in Kilifi and Kwale. Youth in Mombasa have been recruited into Al Shabaab through extremist religious sects that support violence, and are thought to have participated in terrorist activities in Mombasa and other parts of the country or in Somalia over the past six years.

In Mombasa, radicalised youth have been accused of attacking and destroying government installations and assets, places with high civilian populations and some tourist sites. Imams such as the late Aboud Rogo of Masjid Musa in Mombasa, called on such youth to kill those who did not share their religious views. Violent extremists have also been accused of carrying out targeted killings of village elders they believe are police informants, as well as religious leaders and people generally who they feel do not agree with their religious views. Sheikh Idriss, a moderate voice, was killed in Mombasa in 2012 for these reasons.

Currently, young women have been targeted by recruiters while older women have been hired as recruiters. They are being intercepted by security agents as they try to cross into Somalia to join Al-Shabaab there. It is still not clear however what roles they are playing in the group.

6.3.2 Key Drivers
As in the cases of Kilifi and Kwale, poor access to educational opportunities is another driver of radicalisation and violent extremism in Mombasa. According to some key informants, many youth in Mombasa have only achieved modest levels of education, while many more have dropped out of school altogether. Negative attitudes among the youth towards education have also resulted in poor uptake of vocational training opportunities. The Mombasa county government is trying to address these challenges.
Poverty afflicting many young people is many parts of Mombasa is an underlying cause of radicalisation. Part of the attraction into radical movements is the incentive of payments that are believed to be offered, and attraction to a cause that gives the youth a sense of purpose. Past research findings concur, arguing that that youth unemployment and poverty are significant underlying factors in the recruitment of youth into terrorist activities.

The lack of a sense of purpose among the youth in Mombasa is a driver of recruitment to violent extremism. Extremist groups operating in Mombasa, and in the Coast generally, offer a sense of belonging and brotherhood to frustrated youth, and also promise attractive financial and spiritual rewards to recruits. Beyond the finances, the factors of belonging and purpose draw youth into the movements. In Mombasa, extremist groups play on the frustrations of youth regarding the lack of opportunities, low incomes and poverty, difficulty in gaining access to political spaces and general exclusion in many decision-making spaces.

Widely held perceptions that the region’s grievances have been left unaddressed by successive governments has led to feelings of exclusion and neglect among most people and provided fertile ground for the emergence and persistence of radicalisation and violent extremism. Radical extremists have used a call to correct the historical injustices as one of the grounds for recruiting youth.

6.3.3 Mitigation Measures and Potential Mombasa County Government
The Mombasa County Government has initiated a number of positive CVE initiatives. Key among them is a programme that provides interest-free loans to youth-at-risk of recruitment. So far, 100,000 loans have been given out. The county government has also been actively encouraging youths to form SACCOS to enable themselves to become more self-reliant, and enhance the sustainability of the business ventures they have started with county loans. The county government has also initiated a programme to restore and build new sports facilities in the city that will enable youth to get engaged in positive activities.

There has also been increased cooperation between the county government and the National Police Service in the past two years. In 2014, the county government, in partnership with private sector actors, bought and handed over 60 police vehicles to enhance police presence and mobility. This partnership has also extended to vetting local Imams and mosques to ensure that they are not propounding extremist views. Joint visits over the past year to several mosques have resulted in some being closed, and others that had been banned without sufficient evidence of their involvement in extremist activities being reopened. This vetting of local Imams and mosques has also involved civil society organisations, including HURIA, MUHURI, Ujamaa Centre, CICC and CIPK.

National Government Administration Office
The Office of the County Commissioner-Mombasa has deliberately chosen to win the confidence of the public by partnering with them to gather information on potential attacks and ideas on how they may respond to radicalisation. The National Police Service, in contrast, is still using a security-focused approach that emphasises the use of force rather than prevention.

Through the Office of the County Commissioner-Mombasa, NGAO is implementing a returnees’ programme in Mombasa and other parts of the Coast. However, the results of this programme are not clear. Moreover, some returnees reportedly fear joining the programme as they may be targeted by Al-Shabaab for abandoning its cause. Without good guarantees for personal safety and security, the returnees’ programme’s success is likely to be limited.

Nyumba Kumi Committees
Nyumba Kumi committees and village elders in informal settlements in Mombasa collaborate, and share security-related information with security agencies. However, some committee members and elders have been targeted by extremists, compromising their effectiveness.

Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK) and Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC)
Imams working under these umbrella groups have been involved in CVE work using their mosques and madrassas as platforms. For example, in Majengo, Imams are using LCD projectors and other multi-media approaches to provide learning on CVE and create opportunities for discussion and debate on the role of violence in religion.

Haki Africa
Haki Africa has developed a model CVE strategy for Mombasa County. Inputs were made into the strategy by the members of the Mombasa County Assembly as well as members of the civil society. The challenge is to ensure that there will be a buy-in from the county government to adopt and implement the strategy and there will be linkages to the National CVE Policy.
Other organisations that have convening power of the youth at risk of engaging in violent extremism included CICC, CIPK, KMYA and LCIDEP. For instance, programmes initiated by CIPK in partnership with Ministry of Education have been taking Imams to schools to teach sound religious doctrine. Schools run under the Aga Khan Foundation, for example, now have a madrassa curriculum which could be adopted and used to run other madrassas in the region and indeed nationally. KMYA on its parts has been using its Monthly Learning Circles to engage Muslim youth on debates on religion, violence and extremism.

**International Organisations: UNDP and International Organisation for Migration (IOM)**

The two organisations are currently implementing a programme to rehabilitate and reintegrate returnees into society in Mombasa as well as Kwale. Youth-at-risk are benefiting from motorcycles handed out to them to enable them engage in the boda boda business. Some youth who have benefited from this initiative have reportedly shunned calls to join extremist groups as they now have new opportunities to engage in business.

### 6.3.4 Future Scenarios

1. Security personnel continue to use excessive measures to address radicalisation and violent extremism. Unfortunately, this approach has resulted in the arrest, persecution, torture and even death of people who act as intermediaries between the State and youth at risk of radicalisation, and also youth interested in being rehabilitated. Some key informants argue that this approach is counter-productive as some relatives of individuals who have been tortured or killed have chosen to join Al-Shabaab to avenge the suffering of their loved ones. Should this approach continue, opportunities for intelligence gathering or rehabilitation of returnees could be lost.

Several youths claimed to be returnees from Somalia have been reportedly killed, while others who had surrendered to the government have fled the county, fearing for their lives. There is fear that the youths who have gone underground could be mobilised to carry out attacks.
7. West Pokot County

7.1 County Profile

West Pokot County is located along Kenya’s western border with Uganda and is part of the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs). West Pokot has an estimated population of 512,690 (2009 census) of which 31 per cent are youth aged 15-34 years. Most of the residents are from Pokot community but the Turkana and the Samburu also live there. The ratio of men to women is almost equal. Sixty per cent of the population practices pastoralism, while the other 40 per cent are agro-pastoralists. West Pokot has four constituencies, 13 wards, 61 locations and 220 sub-locations. It has high poverty levels largely attributed to drought, low literacy levels, cattle rustling, poor infrastructure and the proliferation of illegal arms. The population is predominantly rural, depending on pastoralism as the main source of livelihood. The land tenure system is communal.

Youth unemployment has been cited as one of the factors making them vulnerable to engaging in cattle rustling and other forms of violence. The county’s literacy level is estimated to be 40 per cent, and harmful cultural practices have been cited in the West Pokot County Development Plan (2013-17) as the reason for low enrolment in primary and secondary schools.

7.2 Resource-based Conflict

7.2.1 Nature of Conflict and Key Actors

Previous research and key informants interviewed for this study indicated that inter-community conflicts were the most common types of conflict in the county, mainly between the Pokot and the Turkana; Pokot and Karamoja/Sabiny (of Uganda) and Pokot and Marakwet. These conflicts occur at the county boundaries, where the Pokot border Turkana, Marakwet and the Karamajong. These conflicts are mainly related to competition over pasture and water for livestock especially during the dry season. The household survey also confirms these findings, with 36 per cent of respondents in the household survey citing inter-ethnic conflict as one of the major conflicts in West Pokot. Another 34 per cent of the respondents believe the county has been experiencing cattle rustling-related conflict and land conflicts.

The fight for access and control of natural resources has led to increased boundary disputes between communities. These disputes are linked to access to land and hence pasture and water for livestock. Most land in the North Rift and West Pokot in particular, is communally-owned and hence not clearly demarcated, which has increased the inter-community conflicts with accusations and counter-accusations of encroachment by each community.

According to West Pokot residents, in the last one year, cattle rustling and banditry have reduced. This is attributed to the cooperation between the national and county governments in convening peace meetings. Direct intervention by the police following the May 4, 2015 Nadome conflict is also reported to have contributed to peace in the county. Those interviewed reported that following that raid, the President summoned all the North Rift leaders and asked them to ensure there is lasting peace in the region. The governor has rallied county leaders in holding peace meetings to ensure lasting peace. The Presidency, through the county commissioner, also promised that it would look into the correct boundary demarcation between the Pokot and Turkana, a development that is reported to have eased the tensions.

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78 ibid
80 County Government of West Pokot, op cit.
81 This was a statement repeated by multiple respondents during the interviews. Anderson,
Though 74 per cent of respondents in the household survey believe that women are the most affected by violence, they also said women facilitate it by urging warriors to go for raids. This especially affects young men who want to marry and need livestock with which to pay bride price. Those reluctant are ridiculed and called cowards. It is an honour for young men to go for raids and be injured rather than stay at home. At other times, the warriors are pushed by young women, whom they want to marry, to go for raids to generate wealth as they start their families. Women are also said to give warriors food as they go for raids since sometimes they have to go far and they need to carry food to last them several days. When the warriors come back, women welcome them with songs and dance.

Pokot elders bless the warriors before going for raids and also advice on the best time to attack since they also gather intelligence on when other communities are vulnerable. This includes when there is drought or there are intra-community conflicts for example within the Turkana. This is the time to raid successfully with few casualties. Pokot elders have, however, also been involved in peace work, discouraging warriors from going to raid. They have also mediated when livestock is stolen and led peace committees in the villages. Women and elders pass information to the police to deter raids or ensure stolen livestock is recovered and returned to the owners. The key role of elders in conflict was highlighted in the household survey, with 42 per cent of the respondents stating that elders are perpetrators of the conflict.
Some 38 per cent of respondents suggest that the youth are key perpetrators of the conflict. Young warriors, normally aged between 15 to 35 years, are the ones mobilised by the community to carry out raids for cultural purposes. For them to carry out the raids, they have to receive blessings from elders. However, over the years, cattle raids have become commercialised after being sponsored by business people and politicians. The warriors who steal livestock for commercial purposes are militias who cut across age sets. They have no other motivation except commercial interests and do so without the blessings of elders.

The AP, National Police Service and Kenya Police Reservists (KPR) protect the Pokot community from raids and ensure stolen livestock is recovered. KPR in particular are usually the first responders when raids take place and often go on search and rescue missions after cattle raids. The security agencies work closely with chiefs and elders who are mostly involved in gathering intelligence and leading peace work.

Although there is no much hard data, some Pokot politicians are said to be fuelling the conflicts by sponsoring raids in exchange for political support. This is especially when the raids are done for cultural purposes.

7.2.2 Key Drivers

According to key informants, conflicts in West Pokot are largely driven by competition over control of and access to natural resources, particularly water and pasture. Deep-seated cultural practices, land disputes, political competition, lack of jobs and income among the youth also contribute to conflict. Thirty-eight (per cent of respondents in the household survey also attribute the conflict to natural resources with ethnic hatred closely following.

Conflict in West Pokot needs to be seen against the longer history of State-society relations in northern Kenya since colonial times. The alienation of north-eastern Kenya started during the early years of colonial rule when the regime extended its control over the area then known as the Northern Frontier District (NFD). The colonialists enforced a form of military administration, implementing policies that effectively isolated the area from the rest of Kenya. It made no efforts toward the socioeconomic and political integration of its population. It also restricted the political rights of association of the inhabitants of the region. Due to the semi-arid nature of the region, most of the development projects and funds were allocated to other parts of the country, which were viewed as being productive. This meant that the region was left lagging behind in growth and infrastructure development. These policies continued in the post-independence era, leading to the continued under-development and marginalisation of the region.

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The government has not deployed enough officers in the region to curb insecurity and cattle raids. This is partly due to the continued neglect of the region by the government and also its vastness and remoteness, which make it hard to deploy adequate officers. This has forced many pastoralists to acquire illegal firearms for self-protection. In addition, the government of President Daniel arap Moi during the 1990s in order to address conflict in West Pokot and neighbouring counties, was said to have armed some of the communities to protect themselves. This further compounded the problem of insecurity with the arms being used to drive conflict, with its effects lasting to date.

Key informants noted that armed raids of neighbouring communities to steal animals such as cows, goats, camels and donkeys has continued due to the cultural value that the Pokot attach to livestock. In order to be seen and valued as heroes, young men have to successfully take part in raiding neighbouring communities. The livestock stolen is used to increase the herd in the homestead or to pay for bride price when the young men want to marry. Other times, the rustling is undertaken for prestige and as a sign of superiority over the community that has been attacked and livestock stolen. This deep attachment to cattle rustling as a cultural value has attracted support from politicians, who are said to fund raids in exchange for political support.

However, over the years, cattle rustling has also become an avenue for income generation. Some of the informants noted that due to high poverty levels and lack of jobs, cattle rustling and stock theft have been commercialised, with stolen livestock being sold primarily to butcheries in Kapenguria, Kitale and Lodwar while some are also transported to Nairobi and other major urban towns. Informants also noted that the opening of a donkey slaughter house in Baringo County has opened a legitimate market for donkey meat and has most likely increased potential for more.

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85 Wairore, John Ndung’u Influence of Enclosure Management Systems on Rangeland Rehabilitation in West Pokot.
to be stolen. This may ultimately increase conflict and raids between West Pokot and neighbouring communities of Marakwet, Karamoja and Sabiny.

Some key informants and FGD participants also suggest that conflicts over control of and access to natural resources are also driven by lack of clear demarcation of county boundaries. As such, communities constantly accuse each other of encroachment, especially when pastoralists are looking for grazing land. Most land in the North Rift, including West Pokot, is communally-owned and hence not clearly demarcated. This has been cited as a cause of conflicts with reported cases of encroachment by the Turkana on West Pokot land in the northern side of Kases and Ombolyon. The Turkwel Gorge is also a hotspot, being claimed by both the Pokot and the Turkana due to the resources there. Conflicts were also said to be prevalent at Sarmach, Lorogon, Aplo, Apuke and Karon along the Pokot-Turkana boundary. In reality, boundary disputes are driven by the need to access and control resources.

A shift to sedentary lifestyle is also driving people to fence their land and this hinders livestock movement, leading to conflicts. For example, there is a road cutting across Mtembur (in Konyanga Sub-Location, Kapenguria Constituency), passing across community land and residents have been complaining about it. This is an issue which if not properly dealt with will lead into conflict. In addition, illegal logging at Karere, Kamelei and Kanyalti areas, as well as sand and soil harvesting is leading to tension.

Related to this is conflict over access to grazing fields during drought. Since there is no adequate water and pasture, communities fight for the little that is available. Droughts in West Pokot occur almost every year; for instance in 1999-2001, 2002, 2003, 2004-2006, 2007 and 2008-2011. In June, 2016, more than 600,000 people in West Pokot were facing acute hunger following a severe drought. The worst-hit areas were Kodich, Kacheliba, Suam, Ombolion, Lonyangilem, Kasses, Kapchok, Alale, Kiwawa and Konyao where residents had fled in search of water and pasture. After the occurrence of a drought, it takes long for the livestock to be restocked, leading to increased poverty levels and raids for the purposes of getting more herds. Unfortunately, after a raid, retaliatory attacks have also followed almost immediately, leading to more conflict. For example, in October, 2015, three Pokot villagers were killed in a retaliatory attack following a raid at Kotaruk Village in Turkana where a herder was killed and about 600 animals stolen.

Lack of jobs and employment opportunities for the youth has also emerged as key driver of conflict in West Pokot. Some of the young men go to raid in order to get livestock for their own well-being, self-enrichment and even a better future when they sell them in the local market, hotels and

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89 Turkana, West Pokot counties strike deal to end cattle raids,” http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Turkana-West-Pokot-peace/1107872-2931590-546x1vz/index.html, October 27 2015
youth as a means of getting wealth. In addition, commercialised livestock raiding in which wealthy businessmen, politicians, traders and local people pursue economic objectives, has interfered with pastoral livelihoods and contributed to conflicts among pastoralist communities.

Tied to this is the availability of small arms which has upped the magnitude of the conflict. The whole of the North Rift region, including West Pokot County, over the years has seen an influx of illegal small and light weapons from neighbouring countries namely Uganda, South Sudan and Somalia. The number of illegal arms circulating in West Pokot is hard to tell. Successive government initiatives for voluntary disarmament have not been successful as the number of weapons surrendered is almost negligible.

7.2.3 Key Triggers
Drought, which leads to lack of water and pasture, is a key trigger of conflict in West Pokot. Since the Pokot mostly live on arid or semi-arid lands and rely on livestock as a source of livelihood, during droughts they undertake seasonal migrations in search for pasture and water to sustain their herds. Unfortunately, the water points that are functional during dry season are in boundaries areas; including Lorengippi hills, Lokori and Kainuk on the boundaries of Turkana and West Pokot counties; Kerio Valley along the boundary of Pokot and Marakwet counties and in lower part of Sigor and Turkwell bordering Turkana and along the Kenya-Uganda border respectively. Since there are no clearly settled procedures and mechanisms for sharing these resources, disputes during the dry season often break out into violence between the different communities.

Therefore, it can be deduced that with adequate and reliable rainfall or skills on management of drought, conflicts in West Pokot County can reduced. If there is availability of water and pasture including during the drought periods, there will be reduced competition over resources and an overall reduction in conflict.

7.2.4 Mitigating Measures and Potential
Various actors have tried to intervene and quell conflict in West Pokot and their activities are varied.

The trend seen in Isiolo, Garissa, Kilifi, Kismu, Kwale and Mombasa, holds for West Pokot. Peace and security structures, such as chiefs and assistant chiefs, and Nyumba Kumi committees are perceived by the public (see figure 28 above), key informants and FGD participants as among the most effective interveners in mitigating conflict and insecurity in West Pokot. Moreover, despite their perceived excesses, the police are seen by a significant proportion of the respondents, 36 per cent, as being effective ranking third (see figure 28 above).

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**Chiefs**

Chiefs of the NGAO are the point of call for most residents of West Pokot in terms of issues of conflict and security. They are very much on the ground attending to the daily security needs of the people. They call and hold barazas and peace meetings regularly and ensure those responsible for stealing livestock are apprehended and animals returned to their owners. In doing their work, some of the chiefs have been creating and adapting local solutions that work. For example, in Keringet along the boundary of Pokot and Trans-Nzoia, the chief registers all the livestock traders during the market day, taking note of their names, homes and ID numbers. In case it is a child selling livestock, they are supposed to indicate the owner of the animals and their home. This makes it easy to know who is selling what and in case of allegations of stolen livestock having been sold in the market, it is easy to follow up.

Some 74 per cent of respondents in the household survey believe chiefs are the most effective in solving conflicts. Some 65 per cent said chiefs were the most trusted in keeping West Pokot safe. Whenever cattle raids take place, victims first report to the chief and KPR to ensure that the raiders are pursued and animals returned. The chief also calls elders for meetings to know what happened and to see how to initiate peace talks with the other community which has carried out the raid. A report for action is given to the county commissioner and the county government.

**Maendeleo ya Wanawake (MYW)**

According to the local coordinator of MYW, the organisation is working with women, persuading them from encouraging raids and blessing warriors. This, she noted, has helped in converting many of the women to be peace agents. MYW has also been assisting women to farm and seek alternative income generating activities to feed their families, including adopting sedentary livelihoods. It does its work in collaboration with the county government and other NGOs based in West Pokot.

Nevertheless, MYW does not have an office, equipment or staff. The local representative operates alone and it was not mentioned by respondents as one of the organisations involved in peace work. Hence their legitimacy and capacity to implement projects is in doubt.

**Pokot-Karamojong-Turkana and Sabiny Peace and Development Programme (POKATUSA)**

POKATUSA holds monthly peace meetings along the borders of Pokot, Turkana and Uganda involving the Pokot, Karamojong, Turkana and Sabiny communities. It is also involved in returning stolen livestock to their owners and has been encouraging school admissions to be ethnically mixed. According to its coordinator, POKATUSA has six field staff involved in doing peace work, which includes holding meetings and peace caravans. They also work with reformed warriors to assist them get alternative sources of livelihoods and be peace ambassadors.

The POKATUSA coordinator pointed out the organisation has an office with equipment but lacks information back up and its funding is not regular. During interviews with residents, especially in Kacheliba, they mentioned POKATUSA as one of the organisations that has been doing peace work in the area together with SIKOM in partnership with chiefs. Nevertheless, one of the civil society actors mentioned that POKATUSA in 2015 had problems with accounting for donor funds and its staff had been accused of misappropriation. This is something that might need to be established before the organisation is funded.

**SIKOM - The Peace Network for Development**

SIKOM is a regional network of community-based organisations in the Greater Pokot region. It is well known, with many of the residents, police, deputy county commissioner and county government mentioning it as one of the key NGOs that initiates and facilitates cross-border community dialogue and reconciliation, arms control and community policing. SIKOM has a well-established and known office in Kapenguria town, but also works with field-based monitors and peace ambassadors based in various parts of the county. It is the most legitimate and visible organisation doing peace work in West Pokot.

**Tegla Loroupe Peace Foundation**

 Started in 2003 by Tegla Loroupe, a former marathoner, world champion and record holder, the foundation uses sports to engage the youth and bring Pokot, Turkana and Karamoja people together. It has organised annual peace races, like the Moroto Peace Race held annually in Eastern Uganda, the Kapenguria Peace Race in Northern Kenya, the South Sudan Peace Race and the Tana River Race. Many respondents including county government officials mentioned the Tegla Loroupe Peace Foundation and cited the value of using sport for peace.
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED)

ACTED provides seeds to both the Pokot and Karamojong. It also works with reformed warriors, encouraging them to seek alternative ways of livelihood and surrender their guns. ACTED was mentioned by few of the respondents as one of the organisations doing work in West Pokot but we did not interview its officials.

Office of the County Commissioner-West Pokot

As representatives of the national government, the office has a leading role in ensuring peace is maintained. The West Pokot county commissioner convenes and takes part in peace meetings. His office was especially said to have been involved in solving boundary disputes in the county, working together with the Presidency on the conflict around Turkwel Gorge, coordinating efforts and working together with the Survey of Kenya to establish the correct boundary.

National Police Service (KPR and Anti-Stock Theft Unit)

Apart from maintaining law and order and ensuring there is security, these officers’ main work is to ensure stolen livestock is recovered. They are also involved in apprehending the raiders. According to police in West Pokot, they have enough cars to do their work well. However, they noted the fuel allocated is not enough. They are limited to 15 litres per day per car but since the county is vast, the fuel sometimes gets exhausted due to travelling long distances. They recommended fuel to be capped at 30 litres per day.

West Pokot County Government

For the last one year, there has been peace in West Pokot, which is said by most of the key informants including the deputy county commissioner, to partly be due to a peace caravan that has been initiated by governors from the North Rift counties of Samburu, Laikipia, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot and Turkana. The caravan has been traversing the entire North Rift preaching the need for maintaining peace and voluntarily surrendering of arms. MPs, MCAs and religious leaders were also part of the caravan. Forty-seven per cent of respondents in the household survey are slightly satisfied with the partnership between the county and national governments in addressing and preventing conflict in West Pokot County.

The West Pokot County Government also has initiated water projects to enhance the peace, provides artificial insemination services and together with national government, has pledged to buy livestock during drought periods. In addition, the county government has established a peace directorate, domiciled in the Ministry of inter-government coordination, peace building and disaster management, due to the direct connection between drought and conflict in the county. The directorate coordinates peace activities in the county and convenes meetings jointly with CSOs and organises the peace caravans among other activities. County peace actors have formed a WhatsApp group for sharing information on peace and conflict. It is managed by the county government directorate on peace and they plan coming up with a county peace hub as an early warning and response mechanism.

Councils of elders

They work alongside chiefs in mediating violence and conflict. The elders are trusted and chosen by the communities where they live. Elders dialogue with young men not to undertake raids and also share information about the suspected plans for raids with chiefs and KPR. They also curse those who go to raid against their word with some respondents noting how some young men got sick and others died in 2014 when they went to raid in Turkana against their leaders’ advice. The chiefs and elders also help in recruitment of KPR by vetting them and ensuring they are accepted by society and have no criminal records.

Conflicts that transcend counties, inter-community boundaries and even international borders (like in Uganda–Kenya border) have been resolved using elders and chiefs, using an established common framework. For example, the chief of Kopulio Sub-Location in Kacheliba constituency highlighted that when one is caught with stolen livestock, one is fined by the elders who adjudicate over the matter. The elders are from Pokot and Karamoja and are accompanied by chiefs and district commissioners. The agreement is that one is fined double what they have stolen. For example, if one has stolen one cow, he is fined two; if he stolen two, he will pay back four as the fine and so on. If a person’s livestock illegally graze in farms they are charged KSh20,000 or KSh30,000. This makes people careful about where they graze. The fines were agreed with the community and are binding to all.

Women

Pokot women are now being used to deter warriors from going for raids. Instead, they are encouraging them to seek alternative sources of livelihood so that they can buy livestock to pay bride price. If the young men insist on going for raids, their mothers are said to threaten that they will curse them to be killed by the other community. The women also are being used by the police, chiefs and local administration to gather and pass information on when the raids are being planned. They know when this is happening since it is normally discussed within the homesteads.

Sub-County Peace Forums and community-led peace committees

In all areas, there peace committees formed by residents as avenues for dialogue. They serve as early warning mechanisms where issues that can lead to conflict are mediated before they blow up to violence. Some of the peace committees are initiated by the communities
themselves on a voluntary basis and members are not paid a salary or allowance. These committees seem to be more sustainable since they are rooted in the community.

The government has, however, supported Sub-County Peace Forums/DPCs through the Ministry of the Interior. These committees have become dependent on external funding and facilitation such that they cannot operate on their own. They are not currently being funded and are inactive. Nevertheless, DPCs have in the past organised joint dialogues between the Pokot and Turkana, involving a cross-section of actors including warriors, NGOs and county government representatives.

A noticeable challenge confronting peace committees in West Pokot is infiltration by politicians. The deputy commissioner indicates that some of the committees have been compromised by politicians who see them as avenues for solidifying their support. This can compromise peace efforts e.g. in 2014, dialogue between Pokot and Turkana did not work due to political interference.

**Other Emerging Issues**

Though it has not picked, the issue of Masol Community Conservancy has potential of being a trigger and driver of conflict in West Pokot. Some of those interviewed reported that there have been no community consultations on the conservancy, not many people are aware about it and since it will involve fencing land, this may trigger conflict in the largely pastoralist area.

Further, some respondents expressed concern that the conservancy is established in Akulo, the only area with a natural spring, and hence it might trigger conflict due to inaccessibility of the spring during drought.

**7.2.5 Future Scenarios**

1. In the short and medium term, the influence of traditional values and institutions is under a lot of pressure. Youth who carry out raids are rebelling against elders, thus potentially weakening the traditional governance mechanisms for managing conflict. This raises questions as to the future influence of elders in relation to new players like business people in mitigating conflict in future. Sustainable peace and rooting of mediation structures will not take place in the long-term if politicians continue politicising the peace committees. This will hinder efforts in mitigating conflict especially during elections.
Recommendations for PSS Programme Interventions

On the basis of the findings and analysis in this report, it is recommended that the PSS Programme should consider supporting civil society actors to design, implement and scale up the following interventions to address the different peace and security concerns affecting the seven target counties. The recommendations listed here focus on the following forms of conflict and instability:

- Radicalisation and violent extremism:
- Gangs and violence;
- Natural resource-based conflicts;
- Cattle rustling;
- Politically-instigated ethnic/communal violence;
- Inter-clan divisions;
- Boundary and large infrastructure-related conflict;
- Cross-cutting recommendations

A. Radicalisation and violent extremism (Garissa, Isiolo, Kilifi, Kwale and Mombasa):

Policy interventions and advocacy
- Lobby and partner with county governments to contextualise the National CVE Policy to meet the unique situations faced in each county;
- Create linkages with county governments and development organisations to design programmes that provide alternative livelihood options to youth at risk of being radicalised;
- Facilitate Muslim-driven madrassa and mosque reforms, which should entail review and approval of the curriculum taught. Mosque vetting committees need to be strengthened in areas where they exist and put in place where they are absent;

Capacity strengthening/technical assistance
- Strengthen capacities of civil society actors to identify and carry out outreach and other enabling activities with groups at risk of recruitment. This may include school dropouts and returnees;
- Strengthen and scale up women’s community level initiatives on countering radicalization at the family level, including holding women’s education groups, neighbourhood meetings etc. to provide family support and create the first level of defence against radicalization of youth;

Civic education and outreach
- Create awareness among relevant stakeholders on the provisions of the National CVE Policy, and their roles in its implementation.
- Support to interfaith efforts through enabling use diverse approaches to the community outreach and counter-radicalisation work, including use of technology, inclusion of younger people in their leadership structures;
- Develop and scale up interventions on creating awareness about the signs of radicalisation and violent extremism among parents and school authorities;
- Create awareness on the safe use of social media platforms,
- Convene regular community engagements with the National Police Service that can contribute to changing their practices in terms of profiling Muslims;

Research and monitoring
- Monitor and design responses to extremist messaging online;
- Research and document good CVE practices, with a view to having them scaled up. Research on the extent of extremist messaging online, and the existing approaches and capacities to carry out counter-messaging is also recommended;
- Build the capacity of local civil society actors to conduct their own primary research on the push and pull factors in violent extremism;
- Undertake studies to develop briefs on the operation, effectiveness and potential of Nyumba Kumi Committees and the village elders in contributing effectively to countering radicalization at the preventive stage;

B. Gangs and violence (Kisumu, Kwale and Mombasa):

Policy interventions and advocacy
- Undertake advocacy to ensure more children/young people at risk receive bursaries for education from county and national governments;
- In partnership with official agencies, design and implement youth empowerment and life-skills training programmes to assist youth at risk of joining gangs;
**Capacity strengthening/technical assistance**

- Strengthen capacity of Nyumba Kumi committees and local elders to monitor school attendance to ensure children are not idle and at risk of recruitment into gangs;

**Civic education and outreach**

- Scale up their interventions on creating awareness about youth recruitment into gangs among parents and school authorities;

**Research and monitoring**

- Research to build dossiers that may be used to prosecute political or other influential actors involved in supporting and mobilising gangs;
- Partner with the national and county government structures to develop a programme/policies aimed at collecting data and generating analysis on how gangs develop, their dynamics and options for intervention;

**C. Natural resource-based conflicts (Isiolo, Kilifi, Kwale and West Pokot):**

**Peace dialogue**

- Partner with county commissioners, county governments the NCIC, political leaders and elders to jointly review and reform existing resource-sharing agreements in order to build in mechanisms that will foster greater community trust and acceptance;
- Acquire resources that can be used to reactivate the dormant DPCs. This could include providing resources for meetings, mobility, communication, operation of early warning systems and awareness creation;
- Scale up successful interventions such as the work of the Tecla Lorupe Foundation that have inter-communal peace building sports activities;

**Policy interventions and advocacy**

- Lobby and partner with county governments, county commissioners, the National Police Service, the KNCHR, and elders, to carry out a long-term, humane voluntary disarmament. This must be accompanied by an increase in the presence of security personnel across the county so as to prevent people from taking the law into their own hands.

**Capacity strengthening/technical assistance**

- Partner with county and national government agencies to strengthen existing customary institutions and conflict resolution mechanisms including councils of elders and women;
- Strengthen capacities of civil society actors working on conflict and on land rights to understand the current land management and governance regime, including the various actors and processes involved in addressing current and historical land challenges;
- Strengthen capacities of local communities to better engage in land management;
- Adopt use of effective technologies, such as SMS-based conflict warning systems, in their conflict early warning work;

**Civic education and outreach**

- Partner with county governments, conservancy and NGOs to carry out civic education on conservancies and how these affect pastoral lifestyle;

**Research and monitoring**

- Carry out research and mount advocacy actions for the return of all communal/trust land that has been grabbed for speculative purposes or otherwise irregularly acquired;
- Partner with research institutions to research and generate data and analysis that can inform national and county government policy formulation aimed at modernizing local economics to enable more people to move away from subsistence-type of livelihood;
- Research impact of technologies, such as SMS-based conflict warning systems, research with a view to improving their effectiveness, uptake and scaling up their use, is also recommended;

**D. Cattle rustling (Isiolo and Kisumu):**

**Policy interventions and advocacy**

- Partner with County Commissioners, county governments, elders and other stakeholders, to initiate processes to develop county-focused policies/programmes aimed at comprehensively addressing cattle rustling;
- Create linkages with local authorities and development organizations to design programmes that provide alternative livelihood options to youth found to have been involved in, or are at risk of being involved in cattle rustling;
- Partner with county governments and national agencies to initiate consultative processes that lead to the formulation of policy options for providing alternative livelihood strategies to achieve food security and limit dependence on livestock;
- Lobby county governments to strengthen regulations for tracking them movement of animals out of the county in order to counter syndicates involved in animal theft;
- Undertake advocacy aimed at ensuring that the planners and funders of cattle raids, including politicians, are arrested and prosecuted;
E. Politically-instigated ethnic/communal violence (all seven target counties):

**Peace dialogue**
- Develop bottom-up reconciliation processes to bring local communities together to foster cohesion through settlement of historical grievances;
- Establish partnerships with NCIC and county governments to develop and undertake peace aimed at gauging community needs and views on solutions for addressing existing boundary conflicts;
- Engage informal and formal networks of local people ethnic leaders, internally displaced persons, and neutral spaces such as schools and colleges to promote ownership of local peace processes;

**Capacity strengthening/technical assistance**
- Scale up existing peace and conflict prevention programmes that are already working well;
- Support strengthening of Sub-County Peace Forums to use effective technologies in their conflict early warning work;
- Strengthen the capacity of the media to set the agenda at local level and improve coverage of public policy issues at county level;

**Civic education and outreach**
- Undertake civic education on violence in the run up to the 2017 general elections. Focus areas should include peace, security, devolution and electoral governance and justice, and county governments, ward representatives, county commissioners, local elders and opinion leaders should be included;

**Research and monitoring**
- Partner with and support county and national government agencies to conduct comprehensive conflict monitoring either through research studies or collaborating with credible researchers and institutions with knowledge and capacity to understand an in-depth analysis of inter-ethnic conflict, causes and drivers of the conflict with the intend to managing the boundary conflict;

F. Inter-clan divisions (Garissa, Isiolo and Kisumu):

**Peace dialogue**
- Partner with and support community leaders to develop their own initiatives to broader discussions on inter-clan divisions within the counties and means for their peaceful resolution;

**Policy interventions and advocacy**
- Lobby county government to strengthen staff recruitment procedures to ensure fairness and equality to address nepotism and corruption in the employment process

**Capacity strengthening/technical assistance**
- Strengthen capacities to reach out to political and religious leaders in order to develop peace messages grounded in local customs and integrate them into community debates;
- Strengthen capacity of civil society actors to hold politicians accountable for policy pledges;
- Strengthen the capacity of the media to set the agenda at local level, and improve coverage of public policy issues at county level;

**Civic education and outreach**
- Facilitate public discussion of conflict issues and dynamics in conflict-affected areas to generate ideas for how to address the situation and to mobilize creative and constructive responses;

G. Boundary and large infrastructure-related conflict (Isiolo):

**Peace dialogue**
- Establish a standing mechanism that brings together all stakeholders, including the two county governments, county commissioners, religious leaders, local elders, and other actors, to deliberate peacefully on the issue of the disputed boundaries;

**Policy interventions and advocacy**
- Lobby for better land administration, particularly the passage and implementation of the pending Community Land Bill;

**Civic education and outreach**
- Create awareness and carry out long-term monitoring of the implementation of the anticipated court ruling and boundary task force’s recommendations on the Isiolo-Meru county borders;

H. Cross-cutting recommendations:

- It is clear from this study that conflict in the seven target counties is highly gendered. Women and men participate in unique ways, are affected differently and have unique capacities for engaging in mitigation. Therefore, RFAs for grant funding from the PSS Programme should require grantees to demonstrate this understanding in their specific contexts and design projects that are sensitive to this gendered nature of conflict.
- In order to receive PSS Programme funding, prospective grantees should demonstrate that their peace and security interventions will to the
greatest extent possible engage chiefs, assistant chiefs, Nyumba Kumi committees, DPCs and local community security structures. It is clear from this study that these structures are widely trusted and seen as legitimate in all the seven target counties. They operate at the grassroots level and have intimate knowledge of local peace and security challenges, and the capacity to formulate context-specific solutions to these challenges.

- Although the National Police Service is not generally trusted by Kenyans because of its record of excesses and corruption, this study finds that the public and expert informants expect the police to play a role in addressing conflicts and insecurity. Notwithstanding this record, the police have a distinct legal mandate and certain professional capacities e.g. the expertise in investigations, use of arms and so on, which make them a critical and indispensable actor on issues of peace and security. To that extent, prospective grantees for PSS Programme funding should demonstrate that they are able and willing to engage the police in their interventions.

The PSS Programme’s research component should establish a conflict and security observatory that tracks and generates periodic reports (monthly, quarterly and annually-shared online) on the peace and security context in the seven target counties. This observatory would address the gaps in availability of data on peace and security trends in the target counties which this study found; provide a reference check for the PSS Programme to allow it to adapt to changing trends; and provide grantees with better insights and a more global outlook on peace and security issues that goes beyond the issues they face in their specific counties. An MS Access or MS Excel database could be established for this purpose, and data could be sourced from PSS Programme grantees, media and other sources working on peace and security in the seven target counties. To succeed, this effort will require the support and cooperation of PSS Programme grantees, meaning that it may have to be built in from the start into their project proposals.
Annex 1: References/List of Documents Reviewed


Haki Centre (2013) ‘Beacons of Conflict: Land irregularities within the settlement schemes of Kwale County’ United States Agency for International Development


Kenya Red Cross 2015, Elnino Rainfall Monitoring Report 1 on October 6, 2015


Conflict Assessment Report

This study argues Al-Shabaab remains one of the greatest threats to national stability and security. Worrying violent inaccuracy in Kenya suggests that the more important impact of the group has been to simply unmask the country’s deep, structural divisions.

Missing the Point: Violence Reduction and Policy Misadventures in Nairobi’s Poor Neighbourhoods
November 2015

This study discusses the methodology for CHRIPS’ three-year research project on community-led security initiatives in low income urban neighbourhoods in Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.

This study examines police accountability structures and needs at the local community level, where the scrutiny of oversight institutions, civil society organizations and the media is often low. It argues that the lack of confidence in the police as the key hindrances to local policing accountability.

This study is a critical examination of the effectiveness of the accountability of the intelligence services in Kenya. In tandem with the central tenet of the constitution that all national security organs remain subordinate to civilian authority, the study argues that democratic accountability would ensure proper impetus for reforming the National Intelligence Services.

This study examines the civilian oversight structures over the Kenya Defence forces, in the context of military engagement in countering terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya. The study argues that the threat of terrorism requires a multi-pronged approach in developing an effective national security strategy.

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